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I. ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACT
A. Jurisdiction
1. Affecting commerce
In enacting the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), Congress
intended to exercise the full extent of its commerce power in regard to
both representation proceedings,I and unfair labor practice cases. 2 The
Act, therefore, specifies that the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) has jurisdiction so long as a business is in a class of activity
1. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1976).
2. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963); NLRB v. Children's
Baptist Home, 576 F.2d 256, 258 n.1 (9th Cir. 1978).
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that as a whole "affects commerce."' 3 The "affects commerce" test, un-
like the "in commerce test,"4 does not require a specific showing of a
connection between the particular employer and interstate commerce.
For example, an intrastate employer who sells merchandise to an em-
ployer engaged in interstate commerce is subject to the Board's juris-
diction, even though the merchandise never leaves the state.6
Jurisdiction will, however, attach when a showing is made that the em-
ployer's business generates an amount of interstate commerce that rises
above the "de minimus" level.
7
In NLRB v. First Termite Control Co. ,8 the Board petitioned for
enforcement of its order requiring a California termite and pest control
company (the employer) to cease and desist from committing certain
unfair labor practices.' The employer contended that the enforcement
order should be denied because the evidence used to establish the juris-
dictional requirement of interstate commerce was improperly admitted
in a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). 10
In order to establish the requisite amount of interstate commerce,
the NLRB introduced evidence that the employer bought approxi-
mately $20,000.00 worth of lumber from a California lumber com-
pany." The NLRB further introduced a freight bill, prepared by
Southern Pacific Railroad, which showed that a substantial amount of
the lumber purchased by the lumber company came from outside Cali-
fornia.12 However, the custodian of records for Southern Pacific was
not called as a witness. The only witness called to support the admis-
sion of the freight bill was the lumber company's bookkeeper, who tes-
tified that she had received the freight bill and had paid it. 3 The
freight bill was introduced as a writing in order to prove the truth of the
statement that the lumber came from another state to California. The
court ruled, however, that the challenged freight bill was inadmissible
3. Section 152(7) of the Act provides: "The term 'affecting commerce' means in com-
merce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or
tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of
commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1976).
4. See NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 225-26 (1963).
5. See Usery v. Lacy, 628 F.2d 1226, 1228 (9th Cir. 1980).
6. NLRB v. Cross, 346 F.2d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 1965).
7. NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 607 (1939).
8. 646 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1981) (amended opinion).
9. Id at 425.
10. Id
11. Id at 425-26.
12. Id at 426.
13. Id
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hearsay evidence.' 4 Furthermore, the court found that the lumber
company's bookkeeper was not the custodian of the record or otherwise
qualified as a witness with regard to the freight bill, as required by Rule
803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 5 The court, therefore, held
that the jurisdictional requirement of interstate commerce had not been
established. Consequently, it denied enforcement of the NLRB's order
and remanded for an evidentiary hearing.'
6
In NLRB v. Peninsula Association for Retarded Children &
Adults, 7 the NLRB sought enforcement of its order directing a non-
profit organization (the employer) to bargain with a union. The em-
ployer solicited donations of merchandise which it sold to Thrift Vil-
lage, Inc., who in turn sold the merchandise to the public at its two
California stores.' 8
To demonstrate jurisdiction, the Board relied on the fact that
checks for the merchandise sold to Thrift Village by the employer were
mailed from Renton, Washington; that Thrift Village had stores in
Washington, Oregon, and California; and that there was some evidence
that the Renton office was Thrift Village's main office. 19 The record
did not indicate where Thrift Village was incorporated, whether it
shipped merchandise interstate, whether the local operations were con-
trolled by the Renton office or, conversely, whether they were wholly
independent.
The Peninsula Association court ruled that even if the facts sup-
ported the exercise of jurisdiction over Thrift Village, the employer's
link to interstate commerce was too attenuated to support jurisdic-
tion.20 The Board merely demonstrated that the employer sold mer-
chandise for local sale to a customer who may or may not have been
involved in interstate commerce.' The court distinguished NLRB v.
14. Id at 429-30; see FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976) provides: "[S]o far
as practible [proceedings before the NLRB shall] be conducted in accordance with the rules
of evidence applicable in the district courts of the United States .... " See 29 C.F.R.
101.10, 102.39 (1980).
15. 646 F.2d at 429-30. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) states that records kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity are not excluded as evidence by the hearsay rule if it
was the regular practice of that business activity to make the record, as established by the
testimony of the custodian or other qualified person.
16. 646 F.2d at 430.
17. 627 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1980).
18. Id at 203.
19. Id




Dabol 2 and NLRB v. Smith,23 which subjected multistate operations
exercising some control over their various outlets to NLRB jurisdiction.
This distinction was made on the ground that there was insufficient
evidence to show that Thrift Village exercised control over any of its
outlets.24
In NLRB v. Maxwell ,25 " the Ninth Circuit determined that an em-
ployer who purchased $6,000.00 worth of goods originating in other
states was subject to NLRB jurisdiction.26 The particular goods were
identified and shown to have been handled only by the importer before
being delivered to the employer.' A $1,920.00 order was procured by
a local dealer from an out-of-state supplier and was delivered to the
employer without the importer's having altered or modified the goods
in any way.28 Insurance policies from out-of-state companies were
taken out on the business by the employer through local agents.2 9
The Maxwell court declined to follow a 1949 Tenth Circuit case
wherein it was held that purchases in interstate commerce worth
$6,000.00 did not give a district court jurisdiction under the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA).3 ° Instead, the court relied on a
number of more recent cases in which purchases in interstate commerce
worth less than $6,000.00 were not considered de minimus and, there-
fore, supported jurisdiction.31
2. Employee and employer definitions
Section 2(3) of the Act32 provides that the term "employee" ".in-
clude[s] any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a
particular employer,. . . but shall not include [inter alia]. . . any indi-
22. 216 F.2d 143 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 917 (1954).
23. 209 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1954).
24. 627 F.2d at 204 n.1.
25. 637 F.2d 698 (9th Cir. 1981).
26. Id at 703-04.
27. Id at 704.
28. Id
29. Id
30. Groneman v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 354, 177 F.2d 995, 997
(10th Cir. 1949).
31. 637 F.2d at 703 (citing NLRB v. Inglewood Park Cemetery Ass'n, 355 F.2d 448, 450
(9th Cir.) ($3,000.00 sufficient for jurisdiction), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 951 (1966)). Von Sol-
brig Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 465 F.2d 173, 174 (7th Cir. 1972) ($1,925.00 sufficient); NLRB v.
Aurora City Lines, 299 F.2d 229, 231 (7th Cir. 1962) ($2,000.00 sufficient)). Contra Hiatt v.
Schlecht, 400 F.2d 875, 877 (9th Cir. 1968) (no district court jurisdiction under LMRA when
record only showed that contractor used plumbing fixtures, manufactured out-of-state,
worth $5,600.00 to $8,000.00).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
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vidual employed as a supervisor." Section 2(11) of the Act3" defines a
"supervisor" as
any individual having authority, in the interest of the em-
ployer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, dis-
charge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or
responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or
effectively to recommend such action, if. . . such authority is
not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use
of independent judgment.
As indicated, "supervisors" are generally excluded from the cover-
age of the NLRA.34 The functions listed in section 2(11) are to be read
in the disjunctive. The existence of any one of the powers, regardless of
the frequency with which it is exercised, is sufficient to confer supervi-
sory status upon an employee.35 The "independent judgment" require-
ment is to be read in the conjunctive.3 6 Thus, the exercise or existence
of any one of the enumerated powers combined with "independent
judgment" is sufficient to make an individual a supervisor.37
"Managerial" employees are neither statutoriof defined nor ex-
pressly excluded from the Act.38 Nevertheless, such employees have
been: (1)judicialy defined as those who "'formulate and effectuate
management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions
of their employer,' -3 and (2)judicialy excluded from the Act.40 The
goal in excluding managerial employees is to ensure that employees
who exercise discretionary authority on behalf of the employer will not
33. 29 U.S.C. § 151(11) (1976).
34. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1976) for the limited protection provided supervisors.
35. NLRB v. St. Francis Hosp., 601 F.2d 404, 420 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Pilot Freight
Carriers, Inc., 558 F.2d 205, 207 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978).
36. Laborers & Hod Carriers Local 341 v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 834, 837 (9th Cir. 1977).
37. NLRB v. Harmon Indus., 565 F.2d 1047, 1049 (8th Cir. 1977) (infrequent exercise of
supervisory authority does not, alone, diminish supervisory status of a supervisor); NLRB v.
Gray Lines Tours, Inc., 461 F.2d 763, 764 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (actual existence of
supervisory authority rather than its exercise is determinative). A reviewing court should
show deference to the Board's determination as to supervisory status because the distinctions
to be drawn between gradations of authority are "'so infinite and subtle that of necessity a
large measure of discretion is involved.'" NLRB v. Adrian Eng'g Beneficial Ass'n v. In-
terlake Co., 370 U.S. 173, 179 n.6 (1962).
38. Congress regarded these individuals as so clearly outside the Act that no specific
exclusionary provision was thought necessary. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672,
682 (1980).
39. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. at 682 (quoting NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416
U.S. 267, 288 (1974)).
40. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. at 681-82; NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S.
at 289.
[Vol. 16
1983] LABOR LAW SURVEY 293
divide their loyalty between employer and union.4 '
In Walla Walla Union-Bulletin v. NLRB,42 the Ninth Circuit held
that substantial evidence supported the Board's conclusion that the
photo, sports, and wire editors of a newspaper were not supervisory
personnel and were, therefore, properly included in a bargaining unit.43
Additionally, the court held that the editorial page editor of the news-
paper was a managerial employee and, therefore, was excluded from
the Act's coverage."
The photo editor of the Walla Walla Union-Bulletin did not at-
tend monthly managerial meetings. He was involved with the hiring of
a summer intern, but only to the extent of making a recommendation
to the managing editor, and he did not supervise or discipline other
employees. The sports editor handled no employee grievances and re-
ceived overtime pay only when authorized by the managing news edi-
tor. Finally, the wire editor selected news items and passed them on to
the news editor for daily discussion and was aided only by a rotating
staff assistant in editing and laying out articles and photographs. The
court concluded that the evidence did not support the finding that these
three editors were granted supervisory authority.45
Although the Board determined that the editorial page editor exer-
cised no supervisory authority,4 the court found that this editor should
have been excluded from the bargaining unit. He attended meetings
with other members of an editorial board that approved, by majority
vote, editorial topics. His vote carried the same weight as other mem-
41. 444 U.S. at 688-89. In NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974), the
Supreme Court concluded that all managerial employees, and not just those in positions
susceptible to conflicts of interest in labor relations, were excluded from the protections of
the Act. Id at 289. In NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980), the Supreme
Court held that university faculty members were managerial employees and, thus, were ex-
cluded from the protections of the Act. Id at 679. In Yeshiva, the Board argued that the
faculty members were not aligned with management because they were expected to exercise
"independent professional judgment" while participating in academic governance. Id at
684. The Board contended that because of this independence, there was no danger of di-
vided loyalty and no need for the managerial exclusion. Id The Court found, however,
that the faculty's professional interests could not be separated from those of the institution:
"Faculty members enhance their own standing and fulfill their professional mission by en-
suring that the university's objectives are met." Id at 688. Additionally, the Court empha-
sized that the independence enjoyed by the faculty would actually increase the chance of
divided loyalty between the faculty and its employer. Id at 689-90.
42. 631 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1980).
43. Id at 614-15. The NLRB is empowered to determine the composition of an appro-
priate bargaining unit. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976).
44. 631 F.2d at 613.
45. Id at 614.
46. Id at 612.
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bers of the editorial board, all of whom were management representa-
tives. The court found that his responsibilities placed him in a position
of potential conflict of interest between the employer and the union
and, therefore, he should have been properly classified as
management.47
In NLRB v. Circa Resorts, Inc. ,48 the Ninth Circuit found that a
stagehand at the Circus-Circus Hotel and Casino in Reno, Nevada, was
an employee, and not a supervisor, and could be included in a bargain-
ing unit of stagehands. 49  The court ruled that "[a]n employee who
gives minor orders or directives is not necessarily a supervisor for pur-
poses of the Act."5 °
In Hudgens v. NLRB, lI the Supreme Court held that the owner of
a shopping center was a statutory "employer" with respect to picketers
employed by a company that operated a shoe store in the shopping
center.5 2 In addition, the Court noted that such a statutory "employer"
may violate section 8(a)(1) of the Act" with respect to employees other
than its own.5 4
Similarly, in Seattle-First National Bank v. NLRB, 55 the Ninth
47. Id at 613; see Illinois State Journal-Register, Inc. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 37 (7th Cir.
1969). The Journal-Register court held that district circulation managers, who oversaw the
distribution of newspapers, but who were limited to making recommendations to their em-
ployer with respect to policies and future plans, were not managerial employees. Id at 42.
The court emphasized that the district managers neither formulated nor effectuated the em-
ployer's policies nor were they so closely aligned with management as to place them in a
position of potential conflict of interest between their employer and their fellow workers. Id
48. 646 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1981).
49. Id at 406.
50. Id; see Kaiser Eng'rs v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 1379, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1976); NLRB v.
Swift, 240 F.2d 65, 66 (9th Cir. 1957) (plant clerks who had no power to "hire, discharge,
assign or rate employees" were not supervisors within the meaning of the Taft-Hartley Act);
accord NLRB v. Doctor's Hosp., Inc., 489 F.2d 772, 776 (9th Cir. 1973) (nurses who give
direct orders to auxiliary personnel and occasionally use independent judgment not neces-
sarily part of management or "supervisors" under Act).
51. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
52. Id at 510 n.3.
53. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to "restrain, or coerce employees" in the exercise of their § 7 rights. Section 7, 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1976), provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected
by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
54. 424 U.S. at 510 n.3 (citing Austin Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1257, 1258-59 (1952)).
55. 651 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1980).
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Circuit found that a bank, the owner of a fifty story building, was an
employer under the Act. The bank brought a trespass charge against
union members who had picketed a restaurant in the building. The
union, in turn, filed an unfair labor practice charge against the bank for
threatening to have the picketers arrested.56 The Seattle-First court
found that because section 2(3) of the Act57 does not limit the definition
of employee to the employees of a particular employer, the bank was
an employer under section 8(a)(1) with respect to the picketers, and
thus was subject to an unfair labor practice charge brought on behalf of
the picketers. 8
3. Discretionary jurisdiction
Although the Board has broad statutory jurisdiction over labor
disputes "affecting commerce,"59 under 29 U.S.C. section 164(c) the
Board may decline to exercise jurisdiction.60  Pursuant to this discre-
tionary power, the Board has issued jurisdictional standards6 in an
"effort to reduce the number of complaints reaching it, and in order to
make clear the objectivity of its decision to exercise its. . . jurisdiction
in a particular case."62 The Board has applied these standards in de-
ciding to treat closely related business concerns as a single employer.63
Moreover, the Board has considerable discretion in deciding whether to
accept an arbitrator's award and to decline to exercise jurisdiction over
an unfair labor practice charge involving a contractual dispute.64 The
Board has also set minimum standards, based on the yearly gross in-
come of an enterprise, for educational institutions65 and day-care
centers.66
56. Id at 1273 n.2.
57. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
58. 651 F.2d at 1273 n.2.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
60. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by published rules adopted
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, decline to assert jurisdiction over
any labor dispute involving any class or category of employers, where, in the opin-
ion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently
substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction.
61. Jurisdictional standards are contained in 15 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 5-7 (1950) and 16
N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 15-39 (1951). The original standards were modified in 23 N.L.R.B.
Ann. Rep. 8-9 (1958), and, as such, remain substantially in effect today.
62. NLRB v. Pease Oil Co., 279 F.2d 135, 137 (2d Cir. 1960).
63. 21 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 14-15 (1956).
64. Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535, 537 (9th Cir. 1977).
65. The limit for educational institutions is $1,000,000.00. 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1980).
66. The limit for day-care centers is $250,000.00. See Salt & Pepper Nursery School
No. 2, 222 N.L.R.B. 1295, 1296 (1976).
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a. single employer status
Single employer status is characterized as an absence of an "arms
length relationship among unintegrated companies."67 The criteria for
determining whether two or more distinct business entities may be
treated as a "single employer" for purposes of the Act are: (1) interre-
lation of operations; (2) common management; (3) centralized control
of labor relations; and (4) common ownership or financial control.68 No
single factor is controlling, nor need all criteria be present. 9
In NLRB v. Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. ,70
the Ninth Circuit held that an association of general contractors was
required to disclose to a union a roster of the association's member-
ship.7 The union was concerned primarily with employers changing
their names in an attempt to avoid a collective bargaining agreement.72
The union introduced evidence of common ownership of some union
and open shop employers. 73 Although the court noted that common
ownership alone would not bind the open shop employers to the agree-
ment and was only one factor to be considered,74 it found that under a
discovery standard, a showing of common ownership was sufficient to
permit further investigation. Consequently, it ordered the association
to disclose the membership roster.75
In NLRB v. Cofer,76 the Ninth Circuit deviated from its past reli-
ance on the four criteria in determining whether to treat closely related
concerns as a single employer. Mr. and Mrs. Cofer and Travelodge
International, Inc. (Travelodge) executed a joint venture agreement for
the joint operation of the Marysville Travelodge in California.7 7 The
Cofers and Travelodge each owned a fifty percent interest in the
motel.78 The Board had previously imposed $50,000.00 annual gross
67. Local 627, Int'l tJnion of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 518 F.2d 1040, 1045-46 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), affd sub nom. South Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local 627, Int'l Union of Operating
Eng'rs, 425 U.S. 800 (1976).
68. 21 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 14-15 (1956); see NLRB v. Don Burgess Constr. Corp., 596
F.2d 378, 384 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Transcontinental Theaters, Inc., 568 F.2d 125, 129
(9th Cir. 1978); Sakrete of N. Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 902, 905 n.4 (9th Cir. 1964), cerl.
denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965).
69. NLRB v. Welcome-Am. Fertilizer Co., 443 F.2d 19, 21 (9th Cir. 1971).
70. 633 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1980).
71. Id at 773.
72. Id at 769.
73. Id at 770-7 1.
74. Id at 771.
75. Id at 771, 773.
76. 637 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1981).




income as the minimum jurisdictional standard for the hotel industry.7 9
This amount could not be met by the motel operation itself or by com-
bining the income from the motel operation with the income from
other Cofer ventures."0 However, the minimum standard would be met
if Travelodge and the Cofers were counted as a single employer.81
The court upheld the Board's jurisdictional determination that the
Cofers and Travelodge were a single employer even though that deter-
mination was not expressly based on any of the four "single employer"
factors.8 2 The court -noted that it was unclear whether the Board ever
intended these factors to constitute the rule for partnership cases.83
Moreover, the Board's heavy reliance upon the joint venture agree-
ment, and especially upon a contractual requirement that Travelodge
be consulted prior to any union dealings by the motel, provided a suffi-
cient justification for the finding of single employer status.84
Although the four factors were not explicitly considered, the Cofer
decision demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit is inclined to find single
employer status if there is a showing of centralized control of labor
relations. Of the four factors, centralized control of labor relations may
be the most reliable in demonstrating operational integration of two or
more business concerns. Thus, any contract provision which gives one
employer control over another's labor relations may lead to a determi-
nation that the two employers are to be treated as one for purposes of
the Act.
b. deferral to arbitration
Arbitration does not affect the Board's jurisdiction to adjudicate
unfair labor practices.85 However, the Board has considerable discre-
tion whether to accept an arbitrator's award and decline to exercise
authority over an alleged unfair labor practice. 6
In Spielberg Manufacturing Co. ,7 the Board first articulated a
deferral standard with respect to an arbitrator's award. Under
Spielberg, the Board will defer to arbitration if: (1) the proceedings
79. Florida Hotel of Tampa, 124 N.L.R.B. 261 (1959).
80. 637 F.2d at 1312.
81. Id
82. Id at 1312-13.
83. Id at 1312.
84. Id at 1312-13.
85. Hawaiian Hauling Serv. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 674, 675-76 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 965 (1977).
86. Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535, 537 (9th Cir. 1977).
87. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
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appear to be fair and regular; (2) all parties have consented to be bound
by the arbitrator's decision; and (3) the award is not repugnant to the
purposes and policies of the Act.88 In Stephenson v. NLRB,89 the Ninth
Circuit approved two additional requirements: (1) the arbitral tribunal
must have clearly decided the unfair labor practice issue; and (2) the
arbitral tribunal must have decided only those issues within its compe-
tence.9° It is clear that the Stephenson court intended these require-
ments to supplement those set forth in Spielberg.91
Clearly decided, in the context of Stephenson, means that the arbi-
trator's decision must specifically address the statutory issue.92 The
"competence" requirement arises from the proposition that deference is
88. Id at 1082. These criteria for deferral were clarified in International Harvester Co.,
138 N.L.R.B. 923, 927, enforced sub. nonz Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert
denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964), and were endorsed by the Supreme Court in Carey v. Westing-
house Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1964).
89. 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977).
90. Id at 538. The Stephenson court followed Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 342 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), in adopting these additional criteria. The Banyard criteria, limiting Board defer-
ral to arbitration, were a reaction to the Board's ruling in Electronics Reprod. Serv. Corp.,
213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974). In Electronics Reproduction, the Board recognized that parties
were purposely withholding evidence of unfair labor practices in proceedings before the
arbitrator to assure a second hearing before the Board. Id .at 761. To foreclose this practice,
the Board declared that it would defer to an arbitral award even where there was no indica-
tion that the statutory unfair labor practice issue had been presented to or decided by the
arbitrator. Id at 762. In Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.RB. 147 (1980), the Board
expressly overruled Electronics Reproduction. The Board stated:
Our experience with Electronics Reproduction has led to the conclusion that it pro-
motes the statutory purpose of encouraging collective-bargaining relationships, but
derogates the equally important purpose of protecting employees in the exercise of
their rights under Section 7 of the Act.
The Board can no longer adhere to a doctrine which forces employees in arbitra-
tion proceeding [sic] to seek simultaneous vindication on private contractual rights
and public statutory rights, or risk waiving the latter.
In specific terms, we will no longer honor the results of an arbitration proceeding
under Spielberg unless the unfair labor practice issue before the Board was both
presented to and considered by the arbitrator.
Id at 146-47.
The Board has, in effect, reverted to the Spielberg doctrine, which has been interpreted
to include the limitation that the Board will not defer to arbitration unless the statutory
unfair labor practice issue is both presented to and considered by the arbitrator. See Yourga
Trucking Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 928, 929 (1972); Airco Indus. Cases, 195 N.L.R.B. 676, 677
(1972). As a result, parties may again withhold their statutory claims from the arbitrator to
gain a second review by the Board.
91. 550 F.2d at 538 ("We approve the addition of the two requirements, and the result-
ing five pronged test suggested in Banyard.").
92. Id at 538 n.4. It is not necessary for the arbitrator to expressly review the statutory
issue in a written memorandum if there is substantial proof that the unfair labor practice
issue and evidence were expressly presented to the arbitrator and the arbitrator's resolution
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appropriate only when there is a congruence between statutory and
contractual issues.93 In other words, when an unfair labor practice rests
on factual issues of contract interpretation, an arbitrator may be in a
superior position to resolve the merits of the unfair labor practice.94
Likewise, when resolution of the unfair labor practice charge involves
mainly factual rather than statutory issues, the arbitrator is in as good a
position as the Board to make a correct decision.95
The Ninth Circuit addressed Board deferral to arbitration in
NLRB v. Max Factor & Co.96 and inAdArt, Inc. v. NLRB. 97 In Max
Factor, a discharged employee ified unfair labor practice charges under
section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.98 Thereafter, the union grieved the
discharge under a collective bargaining agreement and proceeded to
arbitration.99 After a hearing on the merits of the unfair labor practice
charges, the ALJ found that the employer had violated the Act and
ordered reinstatement."°° Although the ALJ's decision was before the
Board, the arbitrator, nonetheless, issued a decision sustaining the dis-
charge. 01 The arbitrator's opinion did not discuss the employee's stat-
utory rights, but noted only that unfair labor practice charges were filed
with the Board.10 2 No statutory provisions, court cases or Board deci-
sions were cited.
The Board denied the employer's request to defer to the arbitra-
tor's decision and adopted the ALJ's decision.0 3 The Board stated
three reasons for refusing to defer: (1) deferral to the arbitral award
would engender a result repugnant to the purposes and policies of the
Act (the Board supplied no analysis to support this contention);1°4
(2) the arbitrator did not pass on the unfair labor practice aspect of the
case and, therefore, deferral to the arbitration award would not effectu-
ate protection of section 7 rights; and (3) deferral would be unwar-
ranted regardless of the merits under Spielberg because the arbitration
of that issue is consistent with the Act. Id; see also Bloom v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 1015, 1021
(D.C. Cir. 1979).
93. 550 F.2d at 538 n.4.
94. Id; see Bloom v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 1015, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
95. 550 F.2d at 538 n.4; see Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 842 (1971).
96. 640 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981).
97. 645 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1981).
98. 640 F.2d at 199.
99. Id. at 199-200.
100. Id at 200.
101. Id
102. Id
103. Id at 202.
104. Id at 202-03.
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hearing took place after the hearing before the ALJ and the arbitrator's
decision was issued after that of the ALJ.
0 5
The Max Factor court termed Spielberg the "fountainhead of the
deferral policy" 0 6 and held that the Board's first reason for refusing
deferral, that deferral would be repugnant to the Act, was in itself suffi-
cient to preclude deferral. 0 7 The court declined to follow the Third
Circuit's decision in NLRB v. Pincus Brothers Inc. 108 wherein it was
held that the Board abused its discretion in refusing to defer to an arbi-
tral award. An employee's conduct resulting in discharge was "argua-
bly unprotected" under the Act and, therefore, deferral could not be
based on the "clearly repugnant" criterion of Spielberg.0 9 Instead, the
Max Factor court concluded that: (1) a court should not interpret the
Spielberg criterion differently than the Board itself has, nor differently
than the Board has given litigants reason to expect it would be inter-
preted; (2) the "arguably unprotected" standard is inherently imprecise
and burdensome because before the Board could exercise its statutory
jurisdiction, it would have to rule out every arguable rationale for find-
ing the employee's conduct unprotected; and (3) enforcing the Act's
protections may be so important as to outweigh'the interest in encour-
aging arbitration, even where such conduct is arguably unprotected." 0
In reaching its decision to uphold the Board's refusal to defer, the
court found it unnecessary to rely on the Board's second reason for
refusing deferral, i.e., that the arbitrator did not pass on the unfair la-
105. Id at 202.
106. Id at 201.
107. Id at 202-04. The court observed:
Although the Board's decision contains no supporting analysis of the repugnance
criterion, it affirms the ALU's findings and conclusions and adopts his recom-
mended order. On the basis of those findings and conclusions, the Board could
reasonably conclude that Factor's activities constituted a sufficiently flagrant inter-
ference with protected activities that the duty to prevent unfair labor practices out-
weighed the policy of encouraging arbitration by deferring.
Id at 202-03 (footnote omitted).
See Douglas Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1979), where the Ninth
Circuit set aside the Board's refusal to defer to an arbitral award. Id at 355. In that case,
the arbitral award was based on two grounds, one permissible and one impermissible under
the Act. Id at 353-54. The court held that the Board should not have disregarded the
arbitrator's clarification which established that he had intended the two grounds to be in-
dependent, not cummulative. Id at 354. And, the court noted, that even if there had been
no proper clarification, "the Board should have deferred because a plausible interpretation
of the ambiguous original award was consistent with the Act, and thus the award was not
'clearly repugnant' to the Act." Id at 355.
108. 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980).
109. Id at 375.
110. 640 F.2d at 204 n.7.
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bor practice aspects of the case."' Instead, the court strictly adhered to
the Spielberg criteria and, in dicta, questioned the necessity of the two
additional requirements for deferral adopted by the Stephenson major-
ity." '2 The Max Factor court characterized Stephenson as "holding
that deferral was improper even though the Spielberg criteria were met,
because the arbitrator had not specifically considered and decided the
unfair labor practice issue." " 3 The court reasoned that if the arbitral
award is not clearly repugnant to the Act, then deferral should not be
precluded because of uncertainty about whether the arbitrator intended
to decide the statutory unfair labor practice issues.'1
The Max Factor court also noted that the policy announced in
Spielberg does not depend upon whether the arbitrator's hearing and
award preceded the ALJ's hearing and decision." 5 The court reasoned
that "[i]f the sequence of proceedings were determinative, 'those who
would prefer a Board decision would need only to stall the arbitration
process.' "116
In Ad Art, Inc. v. NLRB," 7 the Ninth Circuit again upheld the
Board's refusal to defer to an arbitration award." 8 In Ad Art, the
union grieved an employee discharge under a collective bargaining
agreement and demanded arbitration.' ' 9 The arbitrator found the dis-
charge "just and lawful" under the collective bargaining agreement.
20
The Board adopted the ALJ's recommendation that it refuse to defer to
the arbitral decision. 2' The AL's review of the arbitration transcript
and decision disclosed that the issue of whether the employee's activi-
111. Id at 203 n.6.
112. Id The court noted:
'An analysis of the court and NLRB decisions dealing with Spielberg during the
past year makes it difficult to see how the two additional prerequisites requested by
the Stephenson majority would add anything of substance to the existing three pre-
requisites, especially the requirements that the proceedings be fair and regular and
that the resulting arbitration award not be repugnant to the policies and purposes
of the NLRA.'
Id (quoting J. Kurtz, Arbitration and Federal Rights under Collective Agreements in 1976,
Arbitration-1977, Proceedings of the 30th Annual Meeting National Academy of Arbitra-
tors 305 (1977)).
113. 640 F.2d at 203 n.6.
114. Id
115. Id at 202 n.5.
116. Id (quoting Lodge 1327, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Fraser &
Johnston Co., 454 F.2d 88, 91 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 920 (1972)).
117. 645 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1981).
118. Id at 679.
119. Id at 672.
120. Id
121. Id at 674.
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ties were protected under section 7 of the Act 122 was neither before the
tribunal nor decided by it. 23 The Board also adopted the ALJ's con-
clusion that the employer violated section 8(a)(1) by discharging the
employee for exercising his section 7 rights, 24 and implicitly found the
arbitral award repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act. The
award, therefore, did not meet the third Spielberg criterion. 125 The
court held that the Board had correctly applied the Spielberg criteria.1
26
The Spielberg criteria were further defined in Suburban Motor
Freight 127 to mean that the statutory unfair labor practice issue must be
both presented to and considered by the arbitrator in order for there to
be a deferral.'28 The AdArt court found substantial evidence that the
arbitrator was not clearly presented with and did not clearly decide the
statutory unfair labor practice issue.' 29 The court discussed Stephen-
son's "clearly decided" requirement that the arbitrator's decision spe-
cifically deal with the statutory issue.' 30 The AdArt court also noted
that this requirement can be viewed as either an independent require-
ment as Stephenson intended, or as an extension of the Spielberg crite-
ria, especially those concerning fair and regular proceedings and results
repugnant to the Act.' The court found no fault with the Board's
application of this requirement from the latter perspective. 132 Further-
more, the court held that even if the arbitral issue were mainly fac-
tual, 133 the Board might refuse to defer to the arbitral award if the
arbitrator failed to consider statutory issues and the decision differed
from one appropriate under the Act.'
34
Although both the Max Factor and Ad Art courts found the
Board's refusal to defer to an arbitral award proper, the analysis in
each case differed. The Max Factor court found that the Board's in-
dependent determination that an arbitral award was repugnant to the
Act was sufficient to preclude deferral. 35 If, however, the arbitral
122. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
123. 645 F.2d at 674.
124. Id
125. Id at 676.
126. Id at 677.
127. 247 N.L.R.B. 2 (1980); see supra note 90.
128. Id at 146-47.
129. 645 F.2d at 677.
130. Id at 677.
131. Id at 677 n.7.
132. Id
133. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
134. 645 F.2d at 677 (citing Max Factor, 640 F.2d at 204).
135. 640 F.2d at 203-04.
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award was not repugnant to the Act, failure by the arbitrator to decide
the statutory unfair labor practice issue would not preclude deferral.'3 6
Conversely, the AdArt court upheld the Board's decision not to defer
because the arbitrator was not clearly presented with and did not
clearly decide the statutory unfair labor practice issue. 137 In effect, the
AdArt court adopted Stephenson's "clearly decided" requirement; the
Max Factor court did not.
c. day care centers
The Board has established a jurisdictional standard of $250,000.00
gross annual income for disputes involving both profit and non-profit
day-care centers. 138 Similarly, the Board has established a jurisdic-
tional standard of $1,000,000.00 gross annual revenues for disputes in-
volving profit and non-profit educational institutions.'39
In Young World, Inc. ," although the Board held that the educa-
tional institution standard was not applicable to an employer's day-
care center operations, it did not establish a jurisdictional standard for
day-care centers as a class. 4 ' The Board did, however, subject the
employer to NLRB jurisdiction because it met the "affecting com-
merce" test of section 10(a) of the Act. 142 The following year, in Salt &
Pepper Nursery School No. 2 the Board established the $250,000.00
standard for day-care centers.'"
In Young World, the Board distinguished the employer's day-care
center operations from those of an educational institution. The Board
emphasized that the centers in question concentrated not on a formal-
ized educational program, but on custodial care which incorporated
learning experiences for young children.' 4- The centers cared for chil-
dren aged two and one-half years through eight years and were open
from 6:30 a.m. to 6 p.m. to accommodate working parents. The centers
cared for children of school age both before and after school. More-
over, in contrast to public school systems, the centers did not require
136. Id at 204; see supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
137. 645 F.2d at 677.
138. Salt & Pepper Nursery School No. 2, 222 N.L.R.B. 1295, 1296 (1976).
139. The Windsor School, Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. 991 (1972).
140. 216 N.L.R.B. 520 (1975).
141. Id at 521.
142. Id; see 29 U.S.C. 160(a) (1976).
143. 222 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1976).
144. Id at 1296.
145. 216 N.L.R.B. at 521.
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that their teachers be formally educated. 46
In past decisions, the Board had exempted employers from NLRB
jurisdiction because of their relationship to public entities. 147 For ex-
ample, in Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board,14 the Board refused to
assert jurisdiction over a non-profit corporation operating a day-care
center even though the corporation's income exceeded $1000,000.00. 149
The Board opined that because the employer's operations acted as a
"head start" program for preschool-age minority children, the em-
ployer was an adjunct to the public school system of Pittsburgh.1 50
Thus, the employer shared the school system's exemption from NLRB
jurisdiction. 5' Similarly, in Rural Fire Protection Co. ,52 the Board
found that a privately owned fire prevention corporation shared a city's
exemption from the Board's jurisdiction because the employer's serv-
ices were intimately related to the exempted operations of the city.1
53
In more recent decisions, however, the Board has ruled that it shall
no longer decline jurisdiction solely because of the relationship be-
tween the purposes of the exempt entity and the nature of the services
provided to it by an employer.154 Instead, the new test, set forth in
National Transportation Service, Inc. '5" and .T Watson Home for
Crippled Children, 56 is simply "whether the employer has sufficient
control over the employment conditions of its employees to enable it to
bargain with a labor oganization as their representative."'
157
In Golden Day Schools, Inc. v. NLRB, 5 1 the Ninth Circuit deter-
146. Id
147. Eg., Laurel Haven School for Exceptional Children, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 1197, 1198-
99 (1977) (Board refused to assert jurisdictions over a learning center for learning-disabled
children which supplemented and was adjunct to the public school systems of Illinois, Mis-
souri, and Louisiana); Perkins School for the Blind, 225 N.L.R.B. 1293, 1294 (1976) (Board
refused to assert jurisdiction over subject to direct control by state department of education);
Mitchell School, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1017, 1018) (1976) (Board refused to assert jurisdiction
over school for handicapped children which was part of a municipal corporation specifically
exempt from the Act); Center for Urban Educ., 189 N.L.R.B. 858, 859 (1971) (Board advised
that it would refuse to assert jurisdiction over an employer engaged in research and develop-
ment in aid of public school institutions).




152. 216 N.L.R.B. 584 (1975).
153. Id at 586.
154. Eg., National Transp. Serv., Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 565, 566 (1979).
155. Id
156. 242 N.L.R.B. 1368, 1370 (1979).
157. 240 N.L.R.B. at 565.
158. 644 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1981).
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mined that the Board did not abuse its discretion in asserting jurisdic-
tion over a proprietary child care facility (the employer). 59 The
employer argued that it operated as an "adjunct" to the California
school system, performing services "intimately connected" with the
purposes of the school system.' 60 The court relied on Watson Home
and held that because the employer, and not the state of California,
controlled hiring, firing, employee evaluation, pay raises, grievance
procedures, and sick and vacation allowances, the employer "ha[d] suf-
ficient control over the terms and conditions of employment of its em-
ployees to bargain effectively with a union representing their
interests."'' 61 The employer also argued that because its gross income
was below the $1,000,000.00 standard for educational institutions, it
should not be subject to the Board's jurisdiction. 62 The court agreed
with the AL's findings that: (1) the employer's annual income was
more than $250,000.00, and (2) the employer was a day-care center
whose operations were indistinguishable from those in Young World,
Inc. 163
d concurrent jurisdiction
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,'" the Supreme
Court held that "[w]hen an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of
the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclu-
sive competence of the National Labor Relations Board."' 65 The Gar-
mon preemption doctrine, however, has been subject to exceptions.'
66
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) 1 67 al-




163. Id at 836-37 (citing Young World, Inc., 216 N.L.R.B. 520 (1975)).
164. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
165. Id at 245.
166. Eg., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180, 190-98 (1978) (state court has jurisdiction over trespass claim even though union's
activity is arguably protected under the Act); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195,
197 (1962) (§ 301 action in district court not preempted under Garmon rule); Bartenders &
Culinary Workers Union, Local 340 v. Howard Johnson Co., 535 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir.
1976) (district court jurisdiction under § 301 to enforce a collective bargaining agreement
not preempted by grant of Board jurisdiction over unfair labor practices).
167. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). Section 301(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization rep-
resenting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
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lows suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization, or between labor organizations, to be brought in the fed-
eral district courts.
161
Suits regarding collective bargaining agreements brought in a fed-
eral district court under section 301 may involve conduct which is ar-
guably protected or prohibited by section 7 or section 8 of the NLRA.
In Smith v. Evening News Association,169 the Supreme Court held that
even though an employer's conduct is concededly an unfair labor prac-
tice within the jurisdiction of the Board, the Board does not have exclu-
sive jurisdiction over suits involving collective bargaining contracts
which are brought or are held to arise under section 301.170 In such a
situation, the Board and the district courts have concurrent jurisdic-
tion.1 ' Thus, where Congress has affirmatively granted jurisdiction to
the district courts, the district court and the NLRB share that
jurisdiction.172
Federal court jurisdiction over a section 301 action involving a
contract breach which is also an unfair labor practice is limited to the
contract portion of the dispute. 173 Federal courts may not act as the
initial arbiters of unfair labor charges in section 301 actions, even when
the unfair labor practice is offered as a defense to enforcement of a
collective bargaining agreement.1 7 4 The Board, on the other hand, has
primary jurisdiction to decide the merits of an unfair labor practice
168. Id
169. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
170. Id at 197.
171. Id
172. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403
U.S. 274, 297 (1971). Exceptions to the Garmon preemption doctrine are not limited to
federal district court jurisdiction. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist.
Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978), the Supreme Court recognized that a state ac-
tion for trespass against union members may be "conduct that touches 'interests so deeply
rooted in local feeling that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could
not infer that Congress had deprived the states of the power to act."' Id at 195 (quoting
Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244). However, the Supreme Court also stated: "The primary-jurisdic-
tion rationale unquestionably requires that when the same controversy may be presented to
the state court or the NLRB, it must be presented to the Board." 436 U.S. at 202.
173. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403
U.S. at 300-01.
174. Waggoner v. R. McGray, Inc., 607 F.2d 1229, 1235 (9th Cir. 1979); accord Huge v.
Long's Hauling Co., 590 F.2d 457, 461 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 918 (1979);
Mullins v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 466 F. Supp. 911, 916 (D.D.C. 1979), aft'd, 642 F.2d 1302,
1313-14 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Contra Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Marine & Shipbldg. Workers,
Local 39, 344 F.2d 107, 108 (2d Cir. 1965) (primary jurisdiction doctrine does not bar a
district court from entertaining employer's suit under § 301 seeking a declaratory judgment




defense to enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement in a sec-
tion 301 action.'75 A conflict arising between any NLRB decision and
either a court decision on the contract or an arbitral award may be
resolved at a later date.
176
In Orange Belt District Council of Painters No. 48 v. Maloney Spe-
cialties, Inc. , a contractor executed a collective bargaining agreement
with a labor organization. 78 The agreement contained an arbitration
clause which provided that an arbitrator or a "Joint Judicial Commit-
tee," comprised of employee and employer representatives, would arbi-
trate any disputes or grievances.1 79 The labor organization filed a
grievance, and the Joint Judicial Committee assessed damages against
the contractor for monies due to the labor organization's trust funds
and for liquidated damages under the collective bargaining agree-
ment. "'8 The contractor then filed charges with the Board against the
labor organization for unfair labor practices in violation of section 8(e)
of the Act. 8' While the contractor's charges were pending before the
Board, the labor organization initiated an action in state court under
section 301(a) to enforce the arbitration award. 82 The enforcement
suit was removed to a federal district court, which enforced the arbitral
award and noted that the charges pending before the NLRB did not
preclude relief because the Board and the federal courts had concurrent
jurisdiction.' 83 The district court also stated that a subsequent finding
by the Board that the labor organization had violated section 8(e)
would not change the result in the court proceeding.' 84 The arbitrator's
award was not based on the subsection of the contract which the con-
175. Waggoner v. R. McGray, Inc., 607 F.2d 1229, 1236 (9th Cir. 1979).
176. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 197-98 (1962); Cannery Warehousemeni
v. Haig Berberian, Inc., 623 F.2d 77, 82 (9th Cir. 1980) (Choy, J., concurring); Waggoner v.
R. McGray, Inc., 607 F.2d at 1236.
177. 639 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1980).
178. Id at 488.
179. Id.
180. Id at 489.
181. Id at 491; 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976). Section 8(e) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer
to enter into any contract or agreement. . . to cease doing business with any other
person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter contain-
ing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforcible and void: Provided,
That nothing in this subsection shall apply to an agreement between a labor organ-
ization and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or
subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, paint-
ing, or repair of a building, structure, or other work. . ..
29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976) (emphasis in original).
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tractor contended to be in violation of section 8(e). Instead, the arbitra-
tor based its award on a subsection of the contract which did not
require the contractor "to cease or refrain from . . doing business
with any other person," as proscribed by section 8(e).
185
The Maloney court held that a district court may exercise jurisdic-
tion "over an action to confirm an arbitrator's award based upon a col-
lective bargaining agreement, even when such award presents a
potential conflict with an NLRB decision." 186 The court reiterated the
rule that federal courts may not act as initial arbiters of unfair labor
practice charges in section 301 actions even when the unfair labor prac-
tice is offered as a defense to enforcement of a collective bargaining
agreement.'8 7 The court affirmed the district court's confirmation of
the arbitral award because: (1) the contractor had failed to demon-
strate that the arbitrator's award was contrary to the agreement, and
(2) the district court would have reached the same result even if it had
found that the labor union had violated section 8(e).'88
B. NLRB Procedures
1. Election objections
Under section 9(c)(1) of the Act,8 9 when a petition has been
properly filed alleging that a substantial number of employees wish to
be represented by a union for collective bargaining, the Board shall
investigate and may order an election and certify its result.
After the filing date of such a petition, the employer and labor
organization may enter into a consent election agreement.190 The
Board's Rules and Regulations provide for two types of consent elec-
tion agreements.' 91 First, under section 102.62(a), the Regional Direc-
tor192 determines the facts ascertained and the result after the consent
185. Id at 491-92, 492 n.6.
186. Id at 490 (citing Waggoner v. R. McGray, Inc., 607 F.2d 1229, 1236 (9th Cir. 1979)).
187. 639 F.2d at 491.
188. Id at 491-92.
189. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976).
190. 29 C.F.R. § 102.62 (1981).
191. Sections 102.62(a) and (b) each provide that a consent election agreement shall "in-
clude a description of the appropriate unit, the time and place of holding the election, and
the payroll period to be used in determining what employees within the appropriate unit
shall be eligible to vote." 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.62(a), (b) (1981).
192. According to the Code of Federal Regulations, a "regional director" is:
the agent designated by the Board as the regional director for a particular region,
and shall also include any agent designated by the Board as officer-in-charge of a
subregional office, but the officer-in-charge shall have only such powers, duties,
and functions appertaining to regional directors as shall have been duly delegated
to such officer-in-charge.
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election has taken place. The director's rulings and determination of
the result of the election are final,193 subject to review by the Board. 194
Second, under section 102.62(b), the Regional Director conducts the
election but the Board determines the facts ascertained and the result of
the consent election. In this case, if objections to the election are filed
with the Regional Director, that director shall prepare a report with
recommendations concerning the objections and send it to the Board in
Washington, D.C. At this time, a party may file exceptions to the re-
port.195 If it appears to the Board that these exceptions raise substantial
and material issues with respect to the conduct or result of the election,
then the Board may order a hearing on the exceptions before a hearing
officer. 196 This officer shall then prepare a report with recommenda-
tions and send it to the Board for resolution of any outstanding
issues.
197
The Board enjoys broad discretion in ruling upon election objec-
tions.' 98 Generally, the Board will only set aside an election if it deter-
mines that the objectionable conduct significantly impairs the fairness
of the election process. 199 Conversations in the polling area, for exam-
ple, may have this effect. Sustained conversation, regardless of the con-
tent, between representatives of any party and voters waiting to cast
ballots triggers the strict rule that a second election be held.2"° How-
ever, chance, isolated, innocuous comment or inquiry by a representa-
29 C.F.R. § 102.5 (1981).
193. 29 C.F.R. § 102.62(a) (1981).
194. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.67 (1981) for a description of Board review procedures.
195. 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(c) (1981).
196. 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(f) (1981); see Valley Rock Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 590 F.2d 300,
302 (9th Cir. 1979); Heavenly Valley Ski Area v. NLRB, 552 F.2d 269, 271 (9th Cir. 1977);
Alson Mfg. Aerospace Div. of Alson Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 523 F.2d 470,472 (9th Cir. 1975);
see also Vari-Tronics Co. v. NLRB, 589 F.2d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1979) (party seeking to void
consent election may not demand evidentiary hearing before hearing officer to inquire fur-
ther into possible election improprieties).
A "hearing officer" is defined as an "agent of the Board conducting the hearing in a
proceeding under section 9 or in a dispute proceeding under section 10(k) of the act." 29
C.F.R. § 102.6 (1981).
197. 29 C.F.R. § 102.670) (1981).
198. NLRB v. Metro-Trick Body, Inc., 613 F.2d 746, 748 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 905 (1980); NLRB v. Miramar of Cal., Inc., 601 F.2d 422, 425 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB v.
Sauk Valley Mfg. Co., 486 F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1973).
199. NLRB v. Heath Tee Div./San Francisco, 566 F.2d 1367, 1372 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 832 (1978).
200. Michem, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 362, 362-63 (1968). This rule insures that the voters will
not be subject to distraction, last minute electioneering, or pressure and that no party shall
gain unfair advantage. Id
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tive will not necessarily void an election. 0 1
Additionally, when an employer and a union enter into an agree-
ment authorizing a consent election,202 any breach of the agreement
will not necessarily require that the election be set aside. The breach
must be material or prejudicial.2 0 3 A party to such an agreement is
entitled to expect that other parties and agents of the Board will uphold
provisions of the agreement that were calculated to promote fairness in
the election.2°4
In South Pacftc Furniture, Inc. v. NLRB,2 °5 an appropriate unit of
employees voted in a section 102.62(b) consent election. A union ob-
server stated to employees waiting in a room adjacent to the balloting
area, "Come on and vote, exercise your power." 2°6 The employees
voted, the union won the election, and the employer objected, claiming
that the observer's statement was impermissible electioneering. 0 7 The
Regional Director recommended that the Board overrule the objection
and certify the union.20 8 The Board refused to order an evidentiary
hearing before an officer on the employer's exceptions and instead,
adopted the Regional Director's recommendation.20 9
The employer petitioned for review and the Board cross-petitioned
for enforcement of its bargaining order.210 The Ninth Circuit held that
the union observer's statement was essentially neutral and not a sus-
tained conversation requiring a second election.21' Furthermore, be-
cause the Regional Director and the Board assumed that the statement
to the voters had been made, the employer was not entitled to an evi-
dentiary hearing.
212
In NLRB v. Vista Hill Foundation ,213 an agreed-to unit of employ-
ees voted in a section 102.62(b) consent election. 214 The union won the
election and the employer objected, alleging that a union observer en-
201. Id at 363.
202. 29 C.F.R. § 102.62 (1981).
203. Grant's Home Furnishings, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 1305, 1306 (1977).
204. Delta Drilling Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 109, 114 (5th Cir. 1969).
205. 627 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980).





211. Id at 175.
212. Id
213. 639 F.2d 479 (9th Cir. 1980).
214. Id at 480.
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gaged in improper electioneering." 5 The Regional Director determined
that the union observer had three conversations with employees during
balloting, but that these conversations were brief and did not involve
sustained discussion.21 6 Two of the conversations concerned the bad
weather and how glad the observer was to see that the employees had
come to vote. In the third conversation, not initiated by the observer,
an employee asked the observer if he would be the union representa-
tive. The observer responded that he would accept the position if the
employees chose him 7.21 The Regional Director recommended that the
Board overrule the employer's objections in their entirety.1
The employer subsequently filed exceptions to the Regional Direc-
tor's report. Included in these exceptions was an affidavit by the em-
ployer's election observer stating that the union observer participated
in six conversations rather than three.2 19 However, the Board rejected
the employer's exceptions and certified the union.220 Later, the em-
ployer refused to bargain with the union and the Board granted sum-
mary judgment against the employer for such refusal. 2 ' The Board
also concluded that because it had already considered the employer's
objections to the election in the certification proceeding, a hearing on
the objections was not warranted.22
The Board requested enforcement of its bargaining order.223 The
Ninth Circuit upheld the Board's finding that all six conversations were
innocuous and, therefore, insufficient to overturn the election.22 4 The
court noted that it was particularly appropriate to defer to the Board's
decision because the Board was in a better position to interpret what
"innocuous comment" meant.225 Furthermore, in evaluating the evi-
dence, the court found that because each conversation alone was insuf-
ficient to invalidate the election, the six conversations, taken as a
whole, did not achieve this result.
2 26
215. Id at 480-81.
216. Id at 481.
217. Id
218. Id
219. Id The three additional conversations were similar in content to the initial three.
Id
220. Id
221. Id at 481-82; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (a)(1) (1976).
222. 639 F.2d at 482.
223. Id
224. Id at 484-85.
225. Id at 484. The "sustained conversation/innocuous comment" standard was devel-
oped in Michem, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 362, 362-63 (1968).
226. 639 F.2d at 484-85.
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A different result was reached in Summa Corp. v. NLRB.2 2 7 In
that case, the employer and the union entered into a section 102.62(b)
consent election agreement.228 The union won the election and the em-
ployer filed objections. The employer specifically alleged that the
Board agent who conducted the election improperly allowed the union
to employ a greater number of election observers than the employer.
This arguably constituted a breach of the parties' election stipulation
agreement that an equal number of observers would be allowed for
each party.229 The Board overruled the objection and certified the
union.
230
The Summa court found that a material breach had occurred and
invalidated the election.231 The court determined that the agreement
indicated the parties' intent to prevent either of them from enjoying a
relative advantage at the polls, and that an imbalance in the number of
observers, with the Board agent's acquiescence, could create an impres-
sion of union predominance and Board partiality.232 Additionally, the
court stated that the employer need not prove actual prejudice.233 The
court reasoned that a party to a consent election, anticipating the diffi-
culty of proving the impact of a breach upon the voters, has the right to
guard against material misconduct through a pre-election contract.234
The Summa court noted that its decision regarding a section
102.62(b) consent election was not necessarily applicable to review of a
"pure consent" election conducted pursuant to section 102.62(a).235
The court gave no reason for distinguishing between the two types of
consent elections. Arguably, the same standards ought to apply to both
section 102.62(a) and 102.62(b) consent elections. The only difference
is that, in a section 102.62(a) election, the Regional Director makes the
final judgment as to certification and, in a section 102.62(b) election,
the Board makes this judgment.236 Moreover, section 102.62(a) elec-
tion rulings, determinations, and certifications by the Regional Direc-
tor have the same force and effect as those issued by the Board.
237
227. 625 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1980).
228. Id at 294.
229. Id
230. Id
231. Id at 295-96.
232. Id at 295.
233. Id at 296.
234. Id at 295-96.
235. Id at 294 n.1.
236. See supra notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
237. 29 C.F.R. § 102.62(a) (1981).
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In St. Elizabeth Community Hospital v. NLRB, 38 the Ninth Circuit
determined that a hospital operated by a religious order raised its first
amendment challenge to NLRB jurisdiction in a timely manner.
2 39
Such a challenge questions whether the establishment clause and the
free exercise clause of the United States Constitution protect a religious
organization from the inhibiting effect and impact of the restrictions of
the NLRB.24 In NLJB v. Catholic Bishop,24 the Supreme Court held
that the Board's assertion of jurisdiction over church-operated schools
was improper,242 but avoided the first amendment questions presented
by narrowly construing the NLRA.243 In 1978, the Ninth Circuit held
that a first amendment challenge to Board jurisdiction could not be
considered because it was raised for the first time in an enforcement
proceeding rather than in prior proceedings. 2 "
The St. Elizabeth court determined that the first amendment chal-
lenge to Board jurisdiction was properly raised as an affirmative de-
fense in the representation proceeding, rather than in the enforcement
proceedings, even though the issue was not raised until after the elec-
tion.245 The court remanded the case to the Board for further proceed-
ings on the question of the Board's jurisdiction in light of Catholic
Bishop 246
2. Motion to reopen record
Section 102.48(d)(1) 247 of the Board's Rules and Regulations pro-
vides that" [a] party to a proceeding before the Board may, because of
extraordinary circumstances, move for. . . reopening of the record af-
ter the Board decision or order."248 In NLRB v. A & H. Masonry Sup-
238. 626 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
239. Id at 124.
240. See Catholic Bishop v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1130-31 (7th Cir. 1977).
241. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
242. Id at 507.
243. Id
244. Polynesian Cultural Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 467, 472-73 (9th Cir. 1978).
245. 626 F.2d at 125.
246. Id
247. 29 C.F.R. § 102.48(d)(1) (1981).
248. Id Section 102.48(d)(1) further provides:
A motion for reconsideration shall state with particularity the material error
claimed and with respect to any finding or material fact shall specify the page of
the record relied on. A motion for rehearing shall specify the error alleged to
require a hearing de novo and the prejudice to the movant alleged to result from
such error. A motion to reopen the record shall state briefly the additional evi-
dence sought to be adduced, why it was not presented previously, and that, if ad-
duced and credited, it would require a different result. Only newly discovered
evidence, evidence which has become available only since the close of the hearing,
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ply, Inc. ,249 the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Board did not abuse
its discretion in denying an employer's motion to reopen a hearing so
that the testimony of the company's president could be taken.250 The
employer's affidavit did not set forth any new evidence, nor did it ade-
quately explain why the company's president could not have been pres-
ent at the original hearing.25' In addition, the employer did not move
for a continuance until eleven days prior to the commencement of the
original hearing.252
In Ideal Electric and Manufacturing Co. ,253 the Board concluded
that in its review of challenged election conduct, none of the conduct
that occurred prior to the filing date of the election petition should be
considered.2 14 In NLRB v. A Dakin & Co. ,251 the Ninth Circuit re-
fused to mechanically apply the Ideal Electric rule and considered a
challenge to conduct that had occurred prior to the filing of the election
petition.256 The Dakin court characterized the Ideal Electric rule as
simply an evidentiary device aimed at conduct too remote to have in-
terfered with employees' free choice in elections.257 However, if pre-
petition evidence can be shown to be material, then the Ideal Electric
rule will not exclude it.
25 8
In NLRB v. Anchorage Times Publishing Co. ,259 the Ninth Circuit
again refused to apply the Ideal Electric rule. The Board had deter-
mined that the challenged conduct was relevant to the fairness of the
election.260 The court found interrogations occurring a month and a
half before the filing of an election petition to be an unfair labor prac-
tice.2 6 1 They were, therefore, correctly considered by the Board in de-
or evidence which the Board believes should have been taken at the hearing will be
taken at any further hearing.
29 C.F.R. § 102.48(d)(1) (1981).
249. 627 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1980).
250. Id at 1014.
251. Id
252. Id
253. 134 N.L.R.B. 1275 (1961).
254. Id at 1278.
255. 477 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1973).
256. Id at 494; accord NLRB v. Lawrence Typographical Union No. 570, 376 F.2d 643,
652 (10th Cir. 1967). The Board has not invariably followed the Ideal Electric rule. See,
e.g., Baker Mach. & Gear, Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 194, 207 (1975); Servomotor of Columbus,
Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 504, 505 (1975); Willis Shaw Frozen Express, 209 N.L.R.B. 267, 268
(1974); Weather Seal, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 1226, 1228-29 (1966).
257. 477 F.2d at 494.
258. Id
259. 637 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1981).
260. Id at 1363.
261. Id
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termining if the results of the election should be set aside and the
employer ordered to bargain.262
C. NLPB Orders and Remedies
1. Bargaining orders
In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. ,263 the Supreme Court cited the
section 9(c)264 Board election and certification procedures as those nor-
mally used by a union to obtain recognition as the exclusive bargaining
representative of an unorganized group of employees.265 The Court
noted that union representatives may also get recognition and impose
upon an employer a duty to bargain by presenting convincing evidence
of majority support (in the form of authorization cards) even when the
union is not certified as the winner of a Board election. 266 The Gissel
Court approved authorization card majorities when it is shown that the
cards are reliable indicators that employees wish to be represented by a
union.267 The narrow issue addressed by the Court was whether card
majorities are so reliable as to support a bargaining order when, due to
election interference, a fair election cannot be held or an election that
was held was in fact set aside.268 The Court concluded that authoriza-
tion cards may be the only way of assuring employee choice if an em-
ployer disrupts the election process.
269
The Gissel Court approved the rule established in Cumberland
Shoe Corp. 270 regarding the validity of authorization cards in demon-
strating majority status. The rule provides:
[I]f the card itself is unambiguous (i.e., states on its face that
the signer authorizes the Union to represent the employee for
262. Id at 1365. See infra Part I. C., Board Orders and Remedies for a discussion of the
bargaining order.
263. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
264. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1976).
265. 395 U.S. at 596.
266. Id at 596-97. Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976), provides: "It
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer.. . to refuse to bargain collectively with
representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title."
Section 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976), provides in part: "Representatives designated or
selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees. . . shall
be the exclusive representatives. . . in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
or other conditions of employment."
Section 9(a) does not specify how such a representative is to be chosen.
267. 395 U.S. at 606.
268. Id at 601 n.18.
269. id at 602.
270. Id at 606 (citing Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963)).
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collective bargaining purposes and not to seek election), it will
be counted unless it is proved that the employee was told that
the card was to be used solely for the purpose of obtaining an
election.271
The Gissel Court was concerned with the appropriateness of a bar-
gaining order where the employer committed unfair labor practices
which caused an election to be set aside and precluded a fair election
by undermining a union's majority.272 The Court identified three cate-
gories of unfair labor practices as guidelines in determining whether a
bargaining order should issue: (1) outrageous and pervasive practices
that destroy any possibility of a fair and reliable election where a bar-
gaining order is almost always warranted; (2) less pervasive violations
which nonetheless undermine the possibility of a fair election and
which make a bargaining order appropriate if the union achieved a
majority status at one time; and (3) less extensive unfair labor practices,
where a bargaining order is not justified because of the minimal impact
on the election process.273 The Ninth Circuit recently applied these
categories in determining the propriety of Board bargaining orders.274
In NLRB v. Anchorage Times Publishing Co. ,275 the Ninth Circuit,
utilizing Gissel's second category, upheld the Board's decision to issue a
bargaining order in a situation where the union enjoyed majority status
at some time prior to an election and the employer's unfair labor prac-
tices were sufficiently significant to undermine the opportunity for a
271. 395 U.S. at 606 (emphasis in original). The Gissel Court noted:
[W]e think it sufficient to point out that employees should be bound by the clear
language of what they sign unless that language is deliberately and clearly canceled
[sic] by a union adherent with words calculated to direct the signer to disregard and
forget the language above his signature.
Id at 606.
Furthermore, the Court rejected any rule that requires a probe of the employee's sub-
jective motivation. The Court reasoned that in a card challenge, employees are likely to give
testimony damaging to the union where company officials have previously threatened repri-
sals for union activity. Id at 608; accord L'Eggs Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 1337, 1350
(9th Cir. 1980).
272. 395 U.S. at 610.
273. Id at 613-15.
274. See, e.g., NLRB v. Chatfield-Anderson Co., 606 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1979) (ap-
plied Gisse's third category in refusing to enforce bargaining order because threats by com-
pany officials, concerning plant closure and lay-offs due to unionization, were mild and had
little coercive effect); NLRB v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 550 F.2d 1148, 1150-51 (9th Cir.
1977) (applied Gissel's second category in upholding bargaining order because interrogation
of employees about union activities, rescission of wage adjustments, and threats of lay-offs
were "less pervasive practices" yet tended to undermine majority strength and impede elec-
tion process).
275. 637 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835 (1981).
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fair "re-run" election.276 The union used two different authorization
card forms: the first stated the single purpose of authorizing the union
to represent the employee in collective bargaining,2 77 and the second
stated a dual purpose, authorizing representation in collective bargain-
ing and requesting an election.278 Because both cards unambiguously
indicated the signer's intent to be represented for collective bargaining
and because the employer did not demonstrate that the clear language
of the cards had been cancelled by the act of a union official, the court
upheld the Board's determination of union majority status.2 7 9
Of the acts challenged as unfair labor practices,28 ° the court cited
the employer's wage increases, granted immediately prior to the elec-
tion, as the most significant interference with the fair election pro-
cess.28 ' The court noted that these wage increases had the effect of
demonstrating to the employees that the employer had the final word
on the amount paid to an employee.28 2 Thus, the cleverly timed wage
increases, along with other employer activities, were classified as falling
into Gissel's second category and were sufficiently pervasive to under-
276. Id at 1368-69.
277. The card read:
AUTHORIZATION FOR REPRESENTATION
I authorize the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers to represent me in
collective bargaining with my employer.
Id at 1362 n.2.
278. The second card read:
I REQUEST A GOVERNMENT ELECTION
I, the undersigned of my own free will, hereby authorize and designate the Na-
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers of the AFL-CIO and CLC to represent
me in collective bargaining with my employer in all matters pertaining to rates of
pay, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment. This card is also
for the purpose of requesting the N.L.R.B. for an election.
Id
279. Id at 1368-69. The court noted that "employees should be bound by the clear lan-
guage of what they sign unless that language is deliberately and clearly cancelled by a union
adherent." Id at 1368. The court found no such cancellation. Id at 1369. Moreover, with-
out direct testimony that employees were solicited by representations that their cards would
be used only to obtain an election, the court could not overturn the Board's finding that the
cards validly demonstrated majority status. Id
280. Before and after the filing of the election petition, the employer had interrogated
employees about their union sympathies; conducted surveillance of union-related employee
activities; threatened employees with the loss of their jobs in the event of a vote in favor of
the union; terminated an employee for discriminatory reasons; and granted wage increases
immediately prior to the election in order to influence employees' votes. Id at 1363-68.
281. Id at 1370. Section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976), prohibits "conduct imme-
diately favorable to employees which is undertaken with the express purpose of impinging
upon their freedom of choice for or against unionization and is reasonably calculated to give
that effect."
282. 637 F.2d at 1370.
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mine the possibility of a fair election.28 3
InPay'n Save Corp. v. NLRB,284 the Ninth Circuit also enforced a
bargaining order. In Payn Save, the union commenced an organiza-
tional campaign and obtained an authorization card majority.285 The
union also distributed pro-union lapel buttons to employees, and the
employer subsequently discharged two leading union adherents for
wearing the buttons to work.2 86 No election had taken place. The
Board found that the discharge of union adherents for engaging in pro-
tected union activities287 undermined the union's majority status and
made it practically impossible to hold a fair election.288 Accordingly,
the Board issued a bargaining order.289
The Ninth Circuit characterized the employer's unfair labor prac-
tices as falling within Gissel's second category.290 The court first found
that the union had obtained a valid card majority because the authori-
zation cards were unambiguous and the employer failed to show that
the signatures on the cards were obtained by misrepresentation.29' In
response to the contention that the Board failed to consider the em-
ployer's good faith, the court stated that an employer's lack of anti-
union animus is irrelevant because bargaining orders are predicated
solely upon the serious effects unfair labor practices have on the elec-
292tion process.
283. Id
284. 641 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1981).
285. Id at 699.
286. Id at 699-700.
287. The Ninth Circuit has held that, absent "special circumstances," an employee has a
right, protected by § 7 of the Act, to wear union buttons. NLRB v. Essex Wire Corp., 245
F.2d 589, 593 (9th Cir. 1957). However, "evidence of a purpose protected by the act" is also
required. NLRB v. Harrah's Club, 337 F.2d 177, 179 (9th Cir. 1964). In Pay'n Save, the
court found that the button-wearing was linked to the protected purpose of union organiza-
tion of employees and that no special circumstances existed. 641 F.2d at 701-02. Thus, the
employer's ban on button-wearing was held to violate § 8(a)(1). Id
288. 641 F.2d at 702.
289. Id
290. Id at 702. The court quoted from NLRB v. Peninsula Ass'n for Retarded Children
and Adults, 627 F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1980), for the three requirements necessary for a
bargaining order in a second category case:
'First, that the union once had a card majority; second, that the employer commit-
ted serious unfair labor practices which, though less "outrageous" and "pervasive"
than those which by themselves justify a bargaining order, undermine the union's
majority and continue to impede the holding of a fair election; and third, that the
likelihood of erasing the effects of the unfair practices and obtaining a fair election
by the use of traditional remedies is slight and that on balance the employees will
best be protected by entry of a bargaining order.'
641 F.2d at 702.
291. Id at 703.
292. Id (citing Gissel, 395 U.S. at 594).
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The employer further argued that an election, rather than a bar-
gaining order, was the proper remedy because a majority of employees
signed a petition seeking an election rather than a bargaining order.293
Recognizing the tendency of employees to make statements damaging
to unions in order to maintain good relations with management, 94 the
court disregarded the employer's argument, and instead, agreed with
the Board that the petition was strong evidence that the discharges had
a chilling effect upon the employees' freedom of choice.2 95 The court
also noted that when a bargaining unit as small as that in Pay'n Save
296
is subjected to unfair labor practices, the impact of the unfair labor
practices is increased, and therefore, the need for a bargaining order is
increased.297
Similarly, in NLRB v. Davis,298 the Ninth Circuit enforced a bar-
gaining order arising from unfair labor practices falling within Gissel's
second category.299 In Davis, the union collected authorization cards
from thirteen of seventeen employees.3" Soon thereafter, the employer
discharged six employees who had signed authorization cards and
"told employees that he would do anything to keep the union out."
30 '
The union subsequently filed a charge of unfair labor practices
with the Board.30 2 The ALJ concluded that a fair election was infeasi-
ble because the employer's misconduct was so pervasive.303 The Board
agreed and issued a bargaining order.3" The ALJ rejected the em-
ployer's argument that any effect of the prior unfair labor practices had
been dissipated because of the hiring of new employees and employee
293. 641 F.2d at 703. The petition was signed about one month after the union adherents
had been discharged. It stated that the employees signed the union cards as a step towards
an election rather than as evidence of a decision in favor of the union. Id
294. Id (citing Gissel, 395 U.S. at 608; L'Eggs Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 1337, 1350
(9th Cir. 1980)).
295. 641 F.2d at 703.
296. The bargaining unit consisted of only 13 employees. Id
297. Id (citing NLRB v. Bighorn Beverage, 614 F.2d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 1980)); accord
NLRB v. Eagle Material Handling, Inc., 558 F.2d 160, 168 (3d Cir. 1977); Ann Lee Sports-
wear, Inc. v. NLRB, 543 F.2d 739, 744 (10th Cir. 1976).
298. 642 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1981).
299. Id at 352 n.4.
300. Id at 351.
301. Id at 351-52. The employer threatened to fire pro-union employees, offered wage
increases to pro-management employees, threatened not to hire union supporters,
threatened reduction in hours for pro-union employees, and stated that he could obtain the
discharge of pro-union employees who left his employment to work elsewhere. Id
302. Id at 352.
303. Id at 354.
304. Id at 352.
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turnover.3" 5 The ALJ reasoned that the nature of the employer's con-
duct was such that it would have a long lasting effect on the employees'
freedom to choose a bargaining representative.3 6
The Ninth Circuit relied on the AL's findings and enforced
the bargaining order.3"7 The court distinguished NLRB v. Western
Drug,30 8 on the ground that in that case an ALJ had made no finding
as to whether a fair election could be held.30 9 In the instant case, such
findings were made and adopted by the Board, which then issued the
bargaining order in conformity with the findings.310 In Western Drug,
however, the Board found that because of employee turnover, the em-
ployer's prior coercive practices did not taint a future election.31  The
Davis court neglected to address the Western Drug court's reasoning
that a bargaining order would deny the new employees the right to
choose their bargaining representative.31 2
In NLRB v. Peninsula Association for Retarded Children and
Adults,31 3 the Ninth Circuit concluded that under the Gissel standards
enforcement of a bargaining order was not justified.31 4 The Board
found that the employer committed four unfair labor practices during
the employees' attempt to organize.315 Three unfair labor practices in-
volved proscribed interrogation of employees, one of which was cou-
pled with a threat, and the fourth involved the employer's refusal to
bargain after the union received authorization cards from a majority of
employees.31 6
305. Id at 354. By the time of the hearing 27 new employees had been hired and only
nine of the original employees remained in the work force. Id at 352. In addition, the six
discharged employees had been offered reinstatement and backpay. Id at 353.
306. Id at 354. The AUA stated:
[This] is the type of conduct which employees are apt to relate to other employees
and which is rather difficult, probably impossible to forget or discount. Nor are
employees likely to miss the point that backpay and offers of reinstatement made
some 9 to 11 months after the discharge does [sic] not necessarily compensate for
the financial hardship and emotional and mental anguish apt to be experienced
during an interim period of unemployment.
Id
307. Id at 356.
308. 600 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1979).
309. 642 F.2d at 355 (citing 600 F.2d at 1326 n.4).
310. 642 F.2d at 355.
311. 600 F.2d at 1326-27.
312. Id at 1327.
313. 627 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1980).
314. Id at 204.




The court characterized the employer's violations as mild.3 17 In
addition, the lapse of four months between the violations and the elec-
tion militated against a conclusion that a fair election was impeded by
the violations.318 Finally, both the manager responsible for the viola-
tions and the workers employed at the time the violations occurred
were no longer in the work force when the election was held.319 The
court concluded that these factors did not support a finding that a fair
election could not be held.320
In Sakrete of Northern California, Inc. v. NLRB, 321 an employer
refused to bargain with a card majority bargaining unit because a su-
pervisor was included in the unit.322 The court held that the employer's
objection to the inclusion of the supervisor in the bargaining unit was
valid but that he should not have refused to bargain altogether.323 The
court stated, however, that had the exclusion of the supervisor resulted
in a non-union majority in the remaining unit, the employer would
have been entitled to refuse to bargain.324
In Walla Walla Union-Bulletin, Inc. v. NLRB,325 the Ninth Circuit
applied the Sakrete rationale to an employer's refusal to bargain with a
317. Id. at 204. The court noted that of the three interrogations two were concededly
noncoercive and one had been initiated by an employee. Id The Ninth Circuit cited cases
in which courts declined to enforce bargaining orders where violations as serious or more
serious than those which occurred in the instant case took place. Id (citing NLRB v. Pil-
grim Foods, Inc., 591 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1978)) (employer solicited and promised to satisfy
employee grievances, threatened reprisal, cancelled employee's promised wage increase, and
wrongfully discharged employee); First Lakewood Ass'n v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 416 (7th Cir.
1978) (employer conducted coercive interrogations, threatened reprisals for union organiz-
ing, created, impression of surveillance of union activities, and promised and granted bene-
fits to discwurage union support); NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc., 472 F.2d 170 (2d Cir.
1972) (employer threatened plant closure, lay offs, discharges, and loss of privileges if union
won election).
318. 627 F.2d at 204-05. The court distinguished NLRB v. Pacific Southwest Airlines,
550 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1977), and NLRB v. Tri-State Stores, Inc., 477 F.2d 204 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1972), which held that lapse of time due to adedication will not
preclude enforcement of a bargaining order, particularly where such delay is caused by the
employer. Id at 205 n.2. The court noted, "the period of time between violation of the Act
and holding of the election remains highly relevant in assessing the need for a bargaining
order." Id
319. 627 F.2d at 205.
320. Id The court additionally noted that "enforcement of the bargaining order would
impose upon current employees the bargaining representative chosen by their predecessors."
Id
321. 332 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965).
322. Id at 908.
323. Id
324. Id; see Home Stores, Inc., 87 N.L.R.B. 335 (1949).
325. 631 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1980).
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certified unit.32 6  In Walla Walla, the Regional Director had deter-
mined that four editors be included in a bargaining unit consisting of a
newspaper's employees.327 The union won the certification election. 28
The employer newspaper refused to bargain on the grounds that the
four editors were either supervisors or managers and that the Board
had wrongfully included these editors in the bargaining unit.329
The court stated that unless the employer demonstrates that im-
properly included employees affect the unit's majority status, the em-
ployer must bargain with a certified unit.330 The employer, however,
may refuse to bargain over the rights of the contested employees in
order to obtain judicial review of the bargaining unit determination.33 1
The court found that the removal of the four editors from the bargain-
ing unit would not have affected the election outcome, and therefore,
the employer's refusal to bargain was an unfair labor practice.332 Addi-
tionally, the court concluded that although three of the four editors
were properly included in the bargaining unit, the fourth editor was
not.
333
When a collective bargaining agreement exists and a change in
business ownership occurs, the new owner must recognize and bargain
with the employees' union if the new owner is found to be a "successor
employer.' '334 The new owner is a successor employer if he conducts
essentially the same business as did the former owner and a majority of
the new owner's work force are former employees or would have been
former employees absent a refusal to hire because of anti-union ani-
mus. 335 If a successor employer unlawfully refuses to retain certain
employees who otherwise would have comprised a majority of a bar-
gaining unit, the successor employer is obliged to bargain with the
union representing that bargaining unit.336 Majority status may be pre-
sumed if a successor employer has discharged former employees to
326. Id at 615.
327. Id at 611.
328. Id
329. Id
330. Id at 615.
331. Id
332. Id
333. Id at 614; see supra notes 298-303 and accompanying text.
334. Kalman v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 1981); see also NLRB v. Edjo, Inc.,
631 F.2d 604,606-07 (9th Cir. 1980); Bellingham Frozen Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 626 F.2d 674,
678-79 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1125 (1980).
335. 640 F.2d at 1100; see also NLRB v. Bums Int'l Sec. Serv., 406 U.S. 272, 281 (1972);
Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc. v. NLRB, 553 F.2d 609, 611 (9th Cir. 1977).




In NLRB v. Nevis Industries, Inc. ,338 an employer, the new owner
of a hotel, did not retain the hotel's engineers and refused to bargain
with their union representative.339 The Ninth Circuit found that the
Board's presumption that the union would have represented a majority
of the engineers but for the employer's unlawful refusal to retain
them340 was not rebutted by the employer's claims that the engineers
would not have accepted jobs for the lower wages offered.341 The court
concluded that the Board's order requiring the hotel owner to bargain
with the engineers' union was justified.342
2. Reinstatement with backpay
Section 10(c) of the Act343 provides in relevant part that if the
Board finds that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice, the
Board shall issue
an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such
unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action in-
cluding reinstatement of employees with or without backpay,
as will effectuate the policies of this [Act] . . . . No order of
the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as
an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the
payment to him of any backpay, if such individual was sus-
pended or discharged for cause. 3 "
Reinstatement with backpay is the normal remedy for an unlawful
337. See K.B. & J. Young's Super Mkts., Inc. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 463, 465 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967); see also NLRB v. Houston Dist. Servs., 573 F.2d 260, 267 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978).
338. 647 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1981).
339. Id. at 907.
340. The Board found that the General Counsel demonstrated that anti-union animus
was a motivating factor in the employer's decision not to retain the engineers. Id at 909.
341. Id. at 911. The court noted that the employer was not bound by the union collective
bargaining agreement and could have negotiated for lower wages. Id (citing NLRB v.
Bums Int'l Sec. Serv., 406 U.S. 272, 287-88 (1972) (successor employer bound to bargain
with incumbent union but not bound by provisions of collective bargaining agreement)).
The employer, however, could not have unilaterally set lower wages. Id (citing NLRB v.
Enjo, Inc., 631 F.2d 604, 606-08 (9th Cir. 1980) (successor employer who retains all employ-
ees from predecessor's bargaining unit must consult with collective bargaining agent before
altering terms and conditions of employment)).
342. Id
343. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
344. Id
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firing.345 Under section 10(c), the Board must determine in each case
whether reinstatement "will effectuate the policies" of the Act,346 in-
cluding avoidance of labor strife, protection of rights guaranteed em-
ployees by section 7 of the Act, and other protections for the victimized
employee.347 Reinstatement may be an inappropriate remedy if em-
ployee misconduct indicates that the employee has been and remains
unfit for the job.343 As noted, a portion of section 10(c) bars reinstate-
ment of any individual discharged for cause.349 The legislative history
of this provision indicates that it was designed to preclude reinstate-
ment of an individual discharged for misconduct.350  The legislative
history, however, does not indicate that this provision was intended to
curtail the Board's power to order reinstatement when the loss of em-
ployment stems from an unfair labor practice.35 1 Therefore, in deter-
mining whether reinstatement is a proper remedy, the Board must
balance the employer's misconduct against that of the employee.352
In Golden Day Schools, Inc. v. NLRB,353 the Ninth Circuit applied
this balancing test to uphold the Board's order of reinstatement with
backpay.35 4 The court upheld the Board's finding that: (1) thirteen dis-
charged employees were fired, not because of alleged misconduct, but
because of union activity;355 and (2) the employer had improperly in-
terrogated employees concerning their interest in the union.356
The employer contended that reinstatement with backpay was in-
appropriate because the employees were disloyal and unfit for future
employment: (1) eight of the thirteen discharged employees met with
parents, without prior authority, and responded to the parents' ques-
345. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941); NLRB v. Apico Inns of
Cal., Inc., 512 F.2d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 1975).
346. Apico Inns, 512 F.2d at 1175.
347. Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 185 (1973).
348. Apico Inns, 512 F.2d at 1176;see, e.g., NLRB v. Yazoo Valley Elec. Power Ass'n, 405
F.2d 479, 480 (5th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. National Furniture Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 280, 286-87
(7th Cir. 1963); cf. NLRB v. Max Factor & Co., 640 F.2d 197, 205 (9th Cir. 1980) ("The
standard as to forfeit the Act's protection.").
349. See supra text accompanying note 344.
350. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1947).
351. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 217 (1965).
352. NLRB v. Miller Redwood Co., 407 F.2d 1366, 1370 n.2 (9th Cir. 1969); NLRB v.
Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748, 755 (1st Cir. 1954).
353. 644 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1981).
354. Id at 840.
355. Id at 838-39.
356. Id at 841.
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tions regarding conditions at the employer's day-care center;357 and
(2) three other employees distributed an anti-employer leaflet while
picketing the employer.358
The court termed the coercive interrogations and wrongful dis-
charges egregious and the unauthorized meeting innocuous, 359 noting
that the employees' conduct was not of such nature as to threaten fu-
ture employer-employee relations.36 ° The court concluded that under
the circumstances reinstatement was necessary. 36' The court also up-
held the reinstatement of the employees discharged for distributing dis-
paraging leaflets.362 Observing that the leaflets were prepared and
distributed in response to unlawful interrogations and discharges, the
court held that an employer may not provoke misconduct and then rely
on such behavior as a ground for discharge.363
In F. W. Woolworth Co. ,34 the Board established a rule for calcu-
lating backpay awards. An employee must be made whole for any loss
of pay resulting from a wrongful discharge. 365 Loss of pay is computed
on the basis of each separate calendar quarter during the period from
the employee's firing to the date of an offer of reinstatement.366 If the
employee obtains other work during the interim, loss of pay is deter-
mined by deducting net earnings during the interim from the amount
the employee would have earned for each quarter.36 7
In NLRB v. FHite Chief, Inc. ,368 the Regional Director instituted
proceedings to determine the amount of backpay due an employee re-
sulting from his unlawful firing in 1974.369 In October, 1978, the Re-
gional Director issued the backpay specification, which alleged that the
employer's liability for backpay from July, 1974 to September, 1978
357. Id at 839.
358. Id at 841. The court noted that it could not condone the leaflet which was written in
strong language and made serious and partially true accusations. Id
359. Id (citing NLRB v. Max Factor & Co., 640 F.2d 197, 205 (9th Cir. 1980) (court
ordered reinstatement of discharged employee who directed offensive and abusive language
at employer's personnel manager, spent excessive hours on union affairs, and neglected pro-
duction work)).
360. 644 F.2d at 841.
361. Id
362. Id at 842.
363. Id (citing NLRB v. M. & B. Headwear Co., 349 F.2d 170, 174 (4th Cir. 1965)).
364. 90 N.L.R.B. 289 (1950).
365. Id at 291.
366. Id at 292-93.
367. Id
368. 640 F.2d 989 (9th Cir. 1981).
369. Id at 990.
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totaled over $32,000 and set a backpay hearing for January 16, 1979.370
On that day, before the hearing, the employee disclosed to the General
Counsel that he had additional interim earnings from four separate
employers totaling $8,000. 1 Thus, the employer's alleged liability ap-
proximated $24,000.
At the backpay hearing, the ALJ found that the employee had
wilfully concealed interim earnings in order to obtain more backpay
than he was entitled to receive.372 The ALJ opined that because of his
fraud the claimant should be penalized by disallowing all backpay
from the date that the claimant was first employed by a concealed in-
terim employer until the claimant first disclosed these earnings, and the
judge recommended an award to the claimant of $5,856. 373 The Board
found that because the claimant "voluntarily" supplied the General
Counsel, albeit at the eleventh hour, with additional information (the
concealed $8,000), the award should be increased to the full $24,000.
371
The Ninth Circuit declined to enforce the Board's increased
award.375 The court noted that under section 10(c) of the Act the
Board is empowered "'to take such affirmative action including rein-
statement of employees with or without backpay, as will effectuate the
policies of the Act.' 376 The court concluded that the Board's increased
award would reward a claimant for dishonesty.
377
Generally, supervisors are excluded from the coverage of the
NLRA.378 Courts, however, have ordered reinstatement of supervisors
in three situations: (1) when a supervisor is disciplined for refusing to
commit an unfair labor practice;379 (2) when a supervisor is disciplined
for testifying before the Board;380 and (3) when a supervisor who hired
his own crew is discharged as a pretext for terminating his pro-union
crew. 38' In these situations reinstatement has been ordered, but only to
370. Id
37 1. Id at 990-91.
372. Id
373. Id at 991.
374. Id
375. Id at 992.
376. Id (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976)) (emphasis added).
377. 640 F.2d at 993.
378. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
379. Belcher Towing Co. v. NLRB, 614 F.2d 88, 91 (5th Cir. 1980); Gerry's Cash Mkts.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d 1021, 1022 (1st Cir. 1979); Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. NLRB,
551 F.2d 204, 206-08 (8th Cir. 1977).
380. King Radio Corp. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 14, 21-22 (10th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. South-
land Paint Co., 394 F.2d 717, 721 (5th Cir. 1968); Oil City Brass Works v. NLRB, 357 F.2d
466, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1966).
381. Pioneer Drilling Co. v. NLRB, 391 F.2d 961, 963 (10th Cir. 1968).
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remedy harm done to rank and file employees.382
In NLRB v. Nevis Industries, Inc. ,383 an employer who had re-
cently acquired a hotel refused to retain the supervising chief engineer
and his entire engineering crew.384 The Ninth Circuit enforced the
Board's order to reinstate the engineering crew 385 but denied enforce-
ment of its order to reinstate the chief engineer.386 The court agreed
with the Board that nonretention of the chief engineer may have had a
coercive effect on the employees.387 The court observed, however, that
reinstating a supervisor whenever his firing might have a coercive effect
on employees would override Congress' express policy not to protect
pro-union activities of supervisors.388  The court concluded that rein-
statement of the employees themselves would eliminate any coercive
effect on the employees.3 9
The Board has issued an order related to reinstatement to the ef-
fect that an employer must retain work in-house when it has been
found to have subcontracted a certain part of its operation to avoid
unionization.390 Courts have refused to enforce orders to resume activ-
ity in-house when resumption of the subcontracted activity would re-
quire a major capital expense.39'
In NLRB v. A & H. Masonry Supply, Inc. ,392 the employer sold
and delivered building materials to contractors.393 All six of the em-
ployees signed authorization cards, and the union petitioned for an
382. Berry Schools v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 692, 698-99 (5th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Local 962,
Pulp & Paper Workers, 498 F.2d 26, 28-29 (9th Cir. 1974), enforced onpetion after remand,
510 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1975).
383. 647 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1981).
384. Id at 907.
385. Id at 911. The court agreed with the Board's finding that the new owner's refusal to
retain the engineering crew was a violation of §§ 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. Id at 909.
386. Id at 911.
387. Id The Board reasoned that "employees cannot be expected to perceive the distinc-
tion between the employer's right to prohibit union activity among supervisors and their
right to engage freely in such activity themselves." Id
388. Id; e.g., NLRB v. Southern Plasma Corp., 626 F.2d 1287, 1295 n.8 (5th Cir. 1980).
389. Id; cf. Pioneer Drilling Co. v. NLRB, 391 F.2d 961, 963 (10th Cir. 1968) (reinstate-
ment of supervisors proper where it is the only means to dissipate coercive effect of em-
ployer's actions, e.g., where discipline of supervisor used as conduit for disciplining
employees).
390. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); NLRB v. North
Carolina Coastal Motor Lines, 542 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Jackson Farmers,
Inc., 457 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1972).
391. NLRB v. Townhouse T.V. & Appliances, Inc., 531 F.2d 826, 831-32 (7th Cir. 1976);
NLRB v. American Mfg. Co. of Tex., 351 F.2d 74, 80-81 (5th Cir. 1965).
392. 627 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1980).
393. Id
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election.394 Thereafter, the employer fired five employees, elevated the
sixth to a managerial position, and sold its trucks.395 Subsequently, the
Board certified the union as the exclusive bargaining agent, but the em-
ployer refused to bargain because all but one of its employees had been
terminated.396 Finding the employer in violation of the Act, the Board
ordered the employer to cease and desist from unfair labor practices, to
reestablish its trucking operation, to offer reinstatement and backpay to
the discharged employees, and to bargain with the union.
397
The Ninth Circuit held that the Board's unfair labor practice find-
ings were supported by substantial evidence. 398 The court, however,
refused to require the employer to reestablish its trucking operations
because, due to its small size and minimal profit margin, the employer
would have to make an excessive capital outlay to purchase or lease
suitable trucks. 39 9 Because the court refused to require the employer to
reestablish its trucking operations, the court declined to enforce the
Board's reinstatement order.4°° Instead, the court remanded the case to
the Board, suggesting that a more appropriate remedy would be to
compensate employees until they regained equivalent employment
40 1
or until a bargain or impasse was reached between the employer and
the union on the subcontracting question. °2
3. Orders to produce evidence
The duty to bargain in good faith, imposed by section 8(a)(5) of
the Act,' 3 may be violated by an employer's refusal to furnish infor-
mation to a union when that information is relevant to the union's ne-
gotiation or administration of a collective bargaining agreement.4°
Information pertaining to wages, hours or conditions of employment of
unit employees is presumptively relevant, and must be disclosed unless
394. Id at 1013-14.





400. Id at 1015.
401. Id; see, e.g., Jay Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 573 F.2d 438, 446-47 (7th Cir.), cer. denied,
439 U.S. 859 (1978).
402. 647 F.2d at 1015; see, e.g., NLRB v. Townhouse T.V. & Appliances, Inc., 531 F.2d
826, 832 (7th Cir. 1976).
403. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
404. Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 303 (1979); NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co.,
385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956).
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the employer establishes its irrelevance. 40 5 However, when the infor-
mation sought concerns nonunit employees or is not ordinarily perti-
nent to collective bargaining, the union has the initial burden of
showing its relevancy.4°6 The Board and the courts have employed a
liberal, discovery-type standard to determine what constitutes relevant
information." 7 If the union has established a reasonable basis to sup-
port possible contract violations, then the information sought to help
prove such violations is relevant." Refusal to disclose even relevant
information, however, is not always a failure to bargain in good faith.
An employer's reasons for nondisclosure and the negotiating conduct
of the parties must be considered." 9
In Press Democrat Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 41° the Board ordered
four newspaper publishing companies (the employers) to disclose to a
union, which represented full-time, salaried employees, the aggregate
amounts each company paid to independent correspondents for edito-
rial product.41 1 The Board found that this information was relevant to
the union's wage demands for union members and that the employers'
failure to disclose violated their duty to bargain in good faith.412
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Board's determination that the
nonunit compensation data were relevant and potentially helpful to the
union in framing unit wage demands.413 Unit and nonunit personnel
performed nearly identical work, and the compensation paid to
nonunit correspondents was therefore particularly relevant for contract
negotiations with unit members.41 4
The court also considered the Board's order that the employers
405. San Diego Newspaper Guild, Local 195 v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 1977).
406. Id at 867-68; see also Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 77, 84 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 928 (1969); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 69 (3d Cir.
1965).
407. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432,437-39 (1967); K-Mart Corp. v. NLRB, 626
F.2d 704,707-08 (9th Cir. 1980); San Diego Newspaper Guild, Local 195 v. NLRB, 548 F.2d
at 867 n.7 (9th Cir. 1977).
408. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. at 437-39; P.R. Mallery & Co. v. NLRB, 411
F.2d 948, 954-56 (7th Cir. 1969). This standard applies equally to unit and nonunit informa-
tion, although as to nonunit information, the burden of proof shifts to the union to show the
relevancy of that information. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 69 (3d Cir.
1965).
409. Shell Oil Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 615, 618 (9th Cir. 1972); Emeryville Research
Center v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1971).
410. 629 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1980).
411. Id at 1322.
412. Id
413. Id at 1326.
414. Id
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disclose the aggregate amount paid for nonunit editorial product. The
union had requested disclosure of compensation paid to individual cor-
respondents, but the Board held that individual compensation informa-
tion should remain confidential.415 Noting that partial disclosure may
be justified upon a clear showing of need for confidentiality," 6 the
court determined that neither the Board's findings nor those of the ALJ
adequately supported the Board's conclusion that disclosure be modi-
fied by confidentiality. 17 Accordingly, the court remanded to the
Board for clarification of its reasons for limiting the union's right to
disclosure.418
In NLRB v. Associated General Contractors, Inc. ,419 the Ninth Cir-
cuit found that a roster of open shop and open shop specialty members
of a general contractors association was relevant to union investigations
of collective bargaining contract violations.420 The association argued
that the Board's disclosure order violated its members' first amendment
rights of expression and association and would subject ihem to violence
and harassment.42' The association further argued that disclosure was
not justified because it independently reviewed open shop applicants to
insure that they were not subject to existing collective bargaining
agreements.422
The court found that the association's refusal to provide the roster
was a failure to bargain in good faith.423 The court noted that because
415. Id
416. Id;see, e.g., Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 318 (1979) (employer not
required to reveal aptitude test questions used for employee promotion because secrecy criti-
cal and test questions might fall into hands of employees); Shell Oil Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d
615, 620 (9th Cir. 1972) (company not required to reveal identity of nonstriking workers
because company showed clear and present danger of harassment).
417. 629 F.2d at 1327.
418. Id The court noted that the Board should have explored alternative methods of
collecting and disclosing data so as not to deny the union access to relevant information. d
419. 633 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1980).
420. Id at 772-73. Because the information sought did not directly relate to unit employ-
ees, the unions had the initial burden of showing relevancy. The unions met this burden by
introducing evidence of common ownership of some union and open shop contractors.
Common ownership is one of four factors used by the Board to show that two or more
employers may be treated as one and, thus, subject to the same collective bargaining agree-
ment. Therefore, by showing common ownership of some union and open-shop contractors,
the union provided a reasonable basis for further investigations of contract violations. Id
In addition, the court stated that the potential misuse of the roster (for organizational pur-




423. Id at 773.
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there was no showing that the unions would engage in violent, harass-
ing, or unlawful conduct upon receipt of the roster, the association's
first amendment claim was unfounded.424 The court cited NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co. 425 for its finding that the association's rights of ex-
pression and association were outweighed by the government's interest
in regulating (requiring disclosure) "to protect substantial rights of em-
ployees or to preserve harmonious labor relations in the public inter-
est."' 426  Additionally, the court found that the association's
independent view of open shop applicants did not justify nondisclo-
sure.427 The court reasoned that the association's review would not
provide the union with sufficient information to allow the union to de-
termine for itself whether possible contract violations had occurred.4 2 8
D. Judicial Review and Enforcement
1. Issues not raised before the Board
Section 10(e) of the Act 429 provides in part that "[n]o objection
that has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency,
shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge
such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary
circumstances. 43 °
The Ninth Circuit's continued adherence to the application of that
section is illustrated by its recent ruling in NLRB v. Maxwell.431 In
Maxwell, the Board had relied solely on an AL's determination that
the employer had violated section 8(a)(1) by discharging an employee
for attempting to enforce the overtime provisions of the collective bar-
gaining agreement.432 The employer did not argue, either before the
424. Id at 772.
425. 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969).
426. 633 F.2d at 772 n.9.
427. Id at 772.
428. Id; see Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 70 (3d Cir. 1965) (employer's
argument that it acted in good faith in checking status of nonunit employees without merit
and union entitled to information to assist in deciding whether to instigate grievance pro-
ceedings and to guide union in contract negotiations).
429. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976).
430. Similarly, under the Board's Rules and Regulations, any exception to a finding of
the ALJ not specifically argued before the Board is deemed to have been waived. 29 C.F.R.
§ 102.46(b) (1980); see Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 311-12 n.10 (1979);
NLRB v. Ochoa Fertilizer Corp., 368 U.S. 318, 322 (1961); NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co.,
344 U.S. 344, 350 (1953); NLRB v. Don Burgess Constr. Corp., 596 F.2d 378, 389 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 940 (1979).
431. 637 F.2d 698 (9th Cir. 1981).
432. Id at 701. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976), makes it an
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Board or before the Ninth Circuit, that the employee's request for over-
time pay was not a protected activity under the Act. The employer,
however, could have argued that the employee's conduct was not con-
certed activity, and, therefore, was unprotected.433 Because the issue
had not been raised, the court refused to consider whether the Board
had applied the proper standard in deciding whether the discharge vio-
lated the Act.434 Thus, the central question presented to the Board in
Maxwell was whether the employee was fired because of his attempts
to be paid overtime.
435
Relying upon the AL's determination that he had been dis-
charged for that reason, the Board concluded that such a discharge vio-
lated section 8(a)(1). The Ninth Circuit subsequently found substantial
evidence to support the Board's decision and ordered the decision
enforced.436
2. Scope of review
Section 10(e) of the Act also provides that "[t]he findings of the
Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evi-
dence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive. 437
When a court reviews the substantiality of evidence supporting the
Board's decision, it must consider tI-. entire record, including evidence
opposing the Board's view.438 When reviewing case records, however,
courts are obliged to respect Board expertise in certain specialized
fields439 such as the composition of appropriate bargaining units,440 the
relevancy of union requests for information," and representation elec-
tions.442 Even in matters which do not require Board expertise, a court
unfair labor practice for an employer to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees" in the
exercise of their rights to engage in collective bargaining and other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining.
433. 637 F.2d at 701. The court cited NLRB v. Adams Delivery Serv., Inc., 623 F.2d 96,
100 (9th Cir. 1980), and its discussion of the Interboro doctrine, which provides that the
compliant of a single employee will be deemed concerted activity "if motivated by the intent
to enforce a provision of the collective bargaining agreement." Id at 100 (citing NLRB v.
Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495, 500 (2d Cir. 1967)).
434. 637 F.2d at 701 n.l.
435. Id at 701.
436. Id at 704.
437. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976).
438. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
439. Id
440. NLRB v. Big Three Indus., Inc., 602 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1979).
441. San Diego Newspaper Guild, Local 195 v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 1977).




may not overturn the Board's choice between two conflicting views
even though the court would and could have justifiably made a differ-
ent choice had the matter been before it de novo.4 3
a. conflicts between Board and ALfindings
In Payn Save Corp. v. NLRB,44 the Ninth Circuit recently reaf-
firmed the proposition that the scope of review does not change merely
because the ultimate findings of the Board are contrary to those of the
ALJ. 5 A contrary ALJ decision is simply part of the record and nec-
essarily detracts from support for the Board's decision. However, the
standard of review is not altered, and the Board's decision must be up-
held if supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole." 6
In Payn Save, the Ninth Circuit upheld the Board's conclusion
that the employer violated section 8(a)(1) by maintaining and selec-
tively applying a rule prohibiting political or controversial lapel but-
tons, including union buttons.' 7  The employer discharged two
employees for wearing pro-union buttons to work. The Board reversed
the AL's finding that the employer's ban on controversial buttons had
not been disparately applied. Such application of the controversial
button rule was necessary for the Board's finding of an unfair labor
practice." 8 Examining the record as a whole, the court found that the
Board's decision was supported by substantial evidence.449
b. deference to Board expertise
i. relevancy of union requests for information
An employer may be required to furnish information to a union
when that information is relevant to the union's negotiation or admin-
istration of a collective bargaining agreement.450 The Board's determi-
nation as to the relevancy of the information sought is given great
443. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. at 488.
444. 641 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1981).
445. Id at 700 n.3 (citing NLRB v. Big Bear Supermkts. No. 3, 640 F.2d 924, 928 (9th
Cir. 1980)).
446. NLRB v. Big Bear Supermkts. No. 3, 640 F.2d at 928; see Loomis Courier Serv., Inc.
v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Warren L. Rose Castings, Inc., 587
F.2d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1978).
447. 641 F.2d at 697.
448. Id
449. Id at 701-02.
450. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v.
NLRB, 399 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1968).
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weight by the courts.45 These determinations are, accordingly, subject
to only limited judicial review. 452 Thus, in K-Mart Corp. v. NLRB,
453
the Ninth Circuit deferred to the Board's determination that a union
representing employees at one of the employer's retail distribution cen-
ters was entitled to information related to wage increases at the em-
ployer's other distribution centers.454 The court agreed with the Board
that this information was relevant to the union's negotiations with the
employer and enforced the Board's order. The court reasoned that
when an employer defends its wage scale offer by asserting that it is set
in accordance with community standards, information regarding wage
increases at other distribution centers should be made available to sub-
stantiate the employer's claims.455 K-Mart's refusal to furnish this in-
formation, therefore, constituted an unfair labor practice.45 6
ii. representation elections
The Board is presumed to have certain expertise in the supervision
of elections, and courts should defer to the Board's decisions absent an
abuse of discretion.45 7 In Michem, Inc. ,458 the Board promulgated a
rule to assist in determining when words spoken between representa-
tives of any party to an election and the voters waiting to cast their
ballots are so distracting that the election should be invalidated.
Briefly, the Michem rule provides that if a representative engages in
prolonged conversations with voters, the election should be overturned.
However, any chance, isolated, or innocuous comment to a voter will
not void the election.
45 9
In NLRB v. Vista Hill Foundation,460 the Ninth Circuit upheld the
Board's determination that a representation election was valid. The
Board concluded that statements made by a union observer to prospec-
451. San Diego Newspaper Guild, Local 195 v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 1977)
(Board's determination of relevancy of union information request given great weight either
because it is finding of fact, conclusive if supported by substantial evidence, or because it is
mixed question of fact and law within particular expertise of Board).
452. K-Mart Corp. v. NLRB, 626 F.2d 704, 707 (9th Cir. 1980).
453. 626 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1980).
454. Id at 707.
455. Id
456. Id
457. Hecla Mining Co. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 309, 313 (9th Cir. 1977); see Summa Corp, v.
NLRB, 625 F.2d 293, 295 (9th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Bighorn Beverage, 614 F.2d 1238, 1243
(9th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Metro Truck Body, Inc., 613 F.2d 746, 748 (9th Cir. 1979).
458. 170 N.L.R.B. 362 (1968).
459. Id at 362-63.
460. 639 F.2d 479 (9th Cir. 1980).
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tive voters were merely innocuous comments and did not constitute
electioneering. 46' Noting that "the Board is presumed to have a certain
expertise in conducting and evaluating elections," the court refused to
allow the employer leave to present additional evidence in the form of
a second affidavit by the employer's election observer.462 The affidavit
contained information concerning six conversations overheard by the
observer. The employer had previously provided a similar affidavit to
the Regional Director during the investigation. The court concluded
that because there was a clear inference that the Board considered
everything presented, including the employer's previous affidavit,463 the
second affidavit had no effect on the outcome of the enforcement pro-
ceeding.464 The court noted that deferral to the Board's decision was
especially appropriate in this case because the Board was in a better
position to interpret the meaning of "innocuous comments" as defined
in Michem and to apply its own standards for evaluating representation
elections.
465
c. no de novo review
A reviewing court may not conduct a de novo review of testimony
to make credibility determinations.46 In NLRB v. Anchorage Times
Publishing Co. ,46 the Board adopted the AL's findings that an em-
ployer committed unlawful interrogations. On appeal, the employer
argued that testimony in the record tended to undermine particular fac-
tual findings. Noting that in each of the contested findings the conflict
in testimony concerned a question of witness credibility, the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that these findings were not subject to dispute.468
461. Id. at 484-85.
462. Id at 483 (quoting Hecla Mining Co. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d at 313).
463 The court drew its inference from the Board's statement that it had "'reviewed the
record in light of the exceptions and the brief."' 639 F.2d at 482-83. The Board also stated,
"'[i]n our opinion the Employer's exceptions raise no substantial or material issue of fact or
law requiring reversal of the Regional Director's findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions, or warranting a hearing."' Id at 483.
464. Id
465. Id at 484.
466. NLRB v. Adams Delivery Serv., Inc., 623 F.2d at 99.
467. 637 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835 (1981).
468. Id at 1364.
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II. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Discharges
It is an unfair labor practice to discharge an employee for the exer-
cise of section 7 rights.4 69 An employer who discharges an employee for
engaging in a protected activity violates section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
470
Additionally, to constitute a violation of section 8(a)(3), the discharge
must be discriminatory, with a resulting discouragement of union
membership.47' To establish a violation of section 8(a)(1), it is only
necessary to demonstrate that the discharge had the effect of interfering
with employee rights.472 A violation of section 8(a)(3), however, turns
upon whether the discharge was motivated by an anti-union
purpose.473
The Supreme Court has held that where conduct is so destructive
of section 7 rights as to carry its own indicia of unlawful motivation,
proof of anti-union intent is unnecessary if the employer fails to estab-
lish legitimate business reasons for such conduct.4 74 The Ninth Circuit
requires an affirmative showing of unlawful motivation unless the em-
469. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and (3) (1976) provide in pertinent part:
[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization ...
470. NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21, 23 (1964).
471. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26,32 (1967); American Ship Bldg. Co.
v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 286 (1965).
472. In Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 (1965), the
Court stated that a violation of section 8(a)(1) presupposes an act which is unlawful even
absent a discriminatory motive. In NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. at 23, the Court
held that section 8(a)(1) is violated if an employee is discharged for misconduct arising out
of a protected activity, despite the employer's good faith, when it is shown that the miscon-
duct did not occur.
473. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. at 33; NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. at
286-87; Radio Officer's Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 43-44 (1954).
474. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 380 (1967) (proof of anti-union moti-
vation unnecessary when employer's conduct could have adversely affected employee rights
and when employer does not establish motivation by legitimate objectives); American Ship
Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. at 311 (some instances of employer conduct so prejudicial to
union interests and so devoid of significant economic justification that no specific evidence
of intent to discourage membership required); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. at 287 (no specific
evidence of intent necessary when employer practice inherently destructive of employee
rights and not justified by important business ends); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S.
221, 231 (1963) (conduct carrying its own indicia of intent barred per se by Act unless over-
riding business purpose justifies invasion of union rights); Teamsters, Local 357 v. NLRB,
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ployer's actions are inherently destructive of section 7 rights.47 5 Ac-
cording to the Ninth Circuit, inherently destructive acts include
permanent discharges for participation in union activities, the granting
of superseniority to non-strikers, and other actions creating visible and
continuing obstacles to the future exercise of employee rights.
476
Under section 8(a)(3), the employer's real motive for discharge is
always decisive.4 77 Proof of an anti-union motivation may make un-
lawful certain employer conduct which would otherwise have been
lawful.478 The Board will be permitted to strike a proper balance when
there are both lawful and unlawful motives.479 In mixed motive cases,
the test in the Ninth Circuit had been whether anti-union animus was
the moving or dominant cause of the discharge.48 0 However, the Ninth
365 U.S. 667, 675 (1961) (some conduct may by its nature imply the required intent; natural
foreseeable consequences of certain actions may warrant such inference).
475. Ad Art, Inc. v. NLRB, 645 F.2d 669, 678 n.9 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing NLRB v. Great
Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. at 33) (some conduct so inherently destructive of employee
interests that it may be deemed proscribed without need for proof of underlying improper
motive); Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc. v. NLRB, 632 F.2d 721, 726 (9th Cir. 1980) (without
finding of anti-union animus, no unfair labor practice unless conduct so inherently destruc-
tive of employee rights that foreseeable consequences bear own indicia of motive); NLRB v.
Lantz, 607 F.2d 290, 299 (9th Cir. 1979) (where conduct inherently destructive of § 7 rights,
no need to prove that improper motive dominant).
476. Portland Willamette Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 1331, 1334 (9th Cir. 1976).
477. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. at 287; Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc. v. NLRB, 632 F.2d at
726; NLRB v. Klaue, 523 F.2d 410,413 (9th Cir. 1975) (where employer not aware of union
activities, discharge cannot be motivated by anti-union animus and violation of § 8(a)(3)
will not be found).
478. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. at 33 (citing Labor Board v. Erie Resis-
tor Corp., 373 U.S. at 227).
479. 388 U.S. at 33-34 (citing Labor Board v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. at 229).
480. Ad Art, Inc. v. NLRB, 645 F.2d at 678-79; NLRB v. Adams Delivery Serv., Inc., 623
F.2d at 99 (anti-union animus must be moving cause of discharge to support violation of
Act); L'Eggs Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1980) (distinguishing
NLRB v. Lantz, 607 F.2d at 299, where partial motivation found sufficient to support viola-
tion of section 8(a)(3)); NLRB v. Bighorn Beverage, 614 F.2d at 1242 (in mixed motive
cases, test is whether business reason or protected union activity is moving cause for dis-
charge); Stephenson v. NLRB, 614 F.2d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 1980) (rejected partial motiva-
tion theory, which found violation where discharge motivated in any part by anti-union
animus, and requiring that anti-union animus be moving or dominant cause of discharge).
The following circuits have also adopted the moving cause standard: NLRB v. William S.
Carrol, Inc., 578 F.2d 1, 4 (Ist Cir. 1978) (primary motivation required for 8(a)(1) and (3)
cases); NLRB v. Gentithes, 463 F.2d 557, 560 (3d Cir. 1972) (anti-union animus must be
substantial or motivating cause of discharge); Frosty Morn Meats, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.2d
617, 621 (5th Cir. 1961) (anti-union animus must be dominant motive to support violation).
Other circuits have adopted a standard requiring that the discharge be motivated to some
extent by anti-union animus, but it need not be the dominant motivation: NLRB v. Glad-
ding Keystone Corp., 435 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1970) (discharge must be at least partially
motivated by union activities); Neptune Water Meter Co. v. NLRB, 551 F.2d 568, 569 (4th
Cir. 1977) (anti-union animus need only be factor in discharge); NLRB v. Townhouse T.V.
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Circuit, inNLRB v. Nevis Industries, Inc. ,481 adopted the test for mixed
motive cases established by the Board in Wright Line, a Division of
Wright Line, Inc. 482 The Wright Line test provides that the General
Counsel must make a prima facie showing sufficient to support the in-
ference that protected conduct was a motivating factor in the em-
ployer's decision to discharge an employee. Once a prima facie case is
established, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the
same decision to discharge would have been made even in the absence
of the protected conduct.483
In Nevis, the employer discharged some engineers employed at a
hotel. There was evidence that the discharges were due to the em-
ployer's desire to de-unionize the hotel. The employer asserted that the
discharges were based on the poor work attitude of the engineers. The
Board, applying the Wright Line test, found the employer in violation
of sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, because the employer's asserted
business reasons were merely pretextual.484
In enforcing the Board's order, the Ninth Circuit held that the
"rule articulated by the Board in Wright Line is a reasonably defensible
interpretation of the Act, and is entitled to acceptance" by the Ninth
Circuit.485 The court found that the Wright Line rule is "consistent
with the reality that the employer has the best access to proof of moti-
vation," and represents "an acceptable balance between protection of
employees' rights and preservation of employers' rights to discharge
employees for valid business reasons. 48 6
The Wright Line test now replaces the motivating factor or domi-
nant motive test formerly used by the Ninth Circuit. Most courts ad-
dressing alleged violations of section 8(a)(1) or (3), as did the Nevis
court, will analyze the motives for discharge in accordance with Wright
Line, but will ultimately make a factual determination that the alleged
business motive was or was not pretextual. Under the new rule, how-
ever, when there are multiple independent causes of discharge, and at
& Appliances, Inc., 531 F.2d 826, 828 (7th Cir. 1976) (discharge need only be motivated in
part by anti-union animus); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 554 F.2d 996, 1002 (10th
Cir. 1977) (violation of Act will be found where anti-union animus motivates the discharge
in part); Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 547 F.2d 575, 590 (D.C.
Cir.) (violation of Act will be found where discharge is motivated by anti-union animus),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966 (1977).
481. 647 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1980).
482. 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980).
483. Id at 1089.
484. 647 F.2d at 909-10.




least one cause is lawful, an employee will no longer be reinstated, even
when it can be shown theoretically that the unlawful motives
predominated.
The Ninth Circuit recently decided several cases using the moving
cause standard. These cases were decided prior to Nevis, and are ana-
lyzed here for the purpose of discussing any possible impact of the
Wright Line test.
InAdArt, Inc. v. NLRB,4 8 7 the employer allegedly discharged one
of its employees for filing grievances and complaints. The employer
claimed that the discharge was based on a series of incidents that dis-
rupted the work force and violated company rules. The union filed a
grievance over the discharge and proceeded to arbitration. The arbi-
trator ruled that there was just cause for the dismissal because the em-
ployee had violated reasonable company rules by disrupting a
management meeting and insisting on filing complaints without a
union steward. The Board refused to defer to the arbitrator and found
that the discharge was motivated "in large part" by anti-union animus.
In enforcing the order, the court held that there was no difference be-
tween the Board's finding that the discharge was motivated "in large
part" by anti-union animus and the court's requirement of a dominant
unlawful motive.488 The court held that while no proof of unlawful mo-
tivation is necessary when the employer's actions are inherently de-
structive of section 7 rights, the isolated discharge of a single employee,
as in this case, is not an inherently destructive act and, therefore, re-
quires proof of specific unlawful motivation.489
In NLRB v. Max Factor & Co. ,490 an employee was discharged for
taking a strong advocacy role in favor of the union. The court sup-
ported the Board's finding that the steward's use of profane and abu-
sive language during grievance discussions was not so flagrant as to
forfeit the protection of sections 8(a)(1) and (3). The court rejected as
pretextual the company's alleged business reasons for discharging the
employee. The court identified the standard in this mixed motive case
as being first, whether the improper acts of the steward during the con-
duct of protected activities were so indefensible as to forfeit the Act's
protection, and second, whether those acts were the moving cause for
487. 645 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1980).
488. Id at 679.
489. Id at 678 n.9 (citing Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. at 33 for the proposition
that acts inherently destructive of § 7 rights require no specific proof of motivation, and
Western Exterminator Co. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1114, 1117 n.2 (9th Cir. 1977), for the propo-
sition that some acts are inherently destructive of § 7 rights while other acts are not).
490. 640 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981).
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discharge.491
The court used two separate standards in this case. While neither
standard departs from past analyses by the Ninth Circuit, the first stan-
dard is not really a mixed motive standard, but rather a determination
as to whether or not activity resulting in discharge is a protected
activity.
In Golden Day Schools, Inc. v. NLRB, 4 92 employees were dis-
charged for various union activities. The company raised the defense
that seven of the employees were discharged for participating in meet-
ings with parents in an effort to induce withdrawal of the children from
the school; three other employees were discharged for circulating leaf-
lets that were viewed as being disloyal to the school.493 The court
viewed the employer's statements of motivation as self-serving and not
conclusive as a cause for discharge.49 4 Instead, the court found that
anti-union animus was the sole motivation behind the discharges and
refused to apply the mixed motive test.495
In determining whether the employee-prepared leaflets met the
standards justifying discharge as established in NLRB v. Local Union
No. 1224, IBEW, 4 96 the court applied the principle that greater leeway
should be afforded an employee's reaction to provocative action by an
employer.497 This principle is a refinement of the test used by the
Ninth Circuit, which requires a showing that the steward's conduct was
not so flagrantly improper as to deprive the union activity of protection
under the statute.498 In this case, the court decided that the leaflets fell
far short of the malicious tone required to justify the discharge.499
In NLRB v. Anchorage Times Publishing Co. , an employer de-
nied an employee a part-time position because the employee voted for
the union in an upcoming representation election. The employee re-
491. Id at 204-05.
492. 644 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1981).
493. In NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464, 467-68, 472 (1953), the
Court upheld the discharge of some employees for distributing a handbill disloyal to the
employer. The discharge was supported by § 10(c) of the Act. The critical distinction in
that case was that the disloyalty did not occur while the employees were engaged in pro-
tected activities.
494. 644 F.2d at 838-39.
495. Id
496. 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
497. 644 F.2d at 841-42.
498. NLRB v. Max Factor & Co., 640 F.2d at 205.
499. 644 F.2d at 841. The leaflets contained serious charges against the school and its
facilities. Not all of the charges were true. Some of the complaints involved cleanliness,
teacher's duties, and care of the children. Id
500. 637 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835 (1981).
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signed as a result of being denied the part-time work. The court found
that the employee was discharged for discriminatory reasons. The
court noted that both the employer and the NLRB treated the resigna-
tion as a discharge and, therefore, also treated the refusal to provide the
employee with part-time work as a discharge. The court affirmed past
holdings that although an employer is free to discharge an employee
for good reasons, bad reasons, or for no reason at all, there will be a
violation of section 8(a)(1) or (3) of the Act if anti-union animus is the
moving or "but for" cause of the discharge."' The court ruled that the
General Counsel of the NLRB must show more than mere circumstan-
tial inferences drawn from a general history of anti-union activity by
the employer." 2 In this case, the finding that the employer's anti-union
animus was a critical factor in the discharge was supported by substan-
tial evidence. 0 3
In PayN Save Corp. v. NLRB, 5° the court found a violation of
sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act when employees were discharged for
wearing union buttons in violation of a company rule. The court held
that the discharges were discriminatory because the company rule
which was originally restricted to political buttons, was expanded to
include union buttons in response to union activity.50 5 The court held
that the ban on union buttons was an interference with the employees'
protected rights under section 75°1 and was motivated by anti-union
animus."°7 The court noted that Pay'N Save discriminatorily applied
its rule because it allowed other employees to wear non-political but
potentially controversial buttons.50
In three other recent cases during the survey period, the court
found anti-union animus to be the motivating factor in discharges. In
NLRB v. Circo Resorts, Inc. , a Board finding that two employees
were discharged for engaging in union organization was enforced, de-
spite allegations by the employer of economic reasons for the dis-
charges.5 10 In NLJB v. R & H Masonry Supply, Inc. ," the court
501. Id. at 1366-67.
502. Id at 1367.
503. Id
504. 641 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1981).
505. Id at 701-02.
506. Id at 700.
507. Id at 702.
508. Id at 701.
509. 646 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1981).
510. Id at 405. The court did not state what the economic reasons were alleged to be, but
did note the presence of other statements and circumstances which showed anti-union ani-
mus. Id
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enforced a Board finding of illegal discharges where the company con-
tracted out work in order to avoid bargaining with the union.5 2 In
Bellingham Frozen Foods, Inc. v. NLRB,5 13 the court upheld a Board
finding that the employer violated sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by
terminating an employee for engaging in union activities.
All of the above cases applied the Ninth Circuit's former mixed
motive standard, which required that anti-union animus be the moti-
vating factor before a violation of the Act would be found. The change
from the moving cause standard to the Wright Line test may, however,
be more semantical than substantial. The moving cause standard, in
essence, requires a showing by the General Counsel that the employee
would not have been discharged but for engaging in protected activi-
ties. In either case, the employer has not violated section 8(a)(1) or (3)
in situations where the protected activity is a factor in the discharge,
but the employer would have discharged the employee for legitimate
business reasons in any event. Both tests seek to discover the true moti-
vation for discharge.
Although the Wright Line test appears to signal a shift in the bur-
den of proof from the General Counsel to the employer in those situa-
tions where the General Counsel sets out a prima facie case of unlawful
interference, this shift is more illusory than real. Section 10(c) of the
Act requires a violation to be proved by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.514 The prima facie case that the General Counsel sets out must,
therefore, meet that standard. The result is that the General Counsel
must prove, under either the moving cause standard or the Wright Line
test, that engaging in a protected activity was ultimately the reason for
the employee's discharge.
B. Interrogation and Polling
Employer interrogation of employees is violative of the Act when
511. 627 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1980).
512. Id at 1014. The employer was a small firm that owned its own delivery trucks.
After the employer learned that a union was attempting to organize the truck drivers, all of
the trucks were sold and the work previously done by the employees was accomplished by
individual contracts. Some of the same employees were hired by contract. Id
513. 626 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1980).
514. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976) provides:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken [in a hearing] the Board shall be
of the opinion that any person. . . has engaged in or is engaging in any. . . unfair
labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and
cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and
desist from such unfair labor practice.
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it is coercive s s or tends to interfere with employee rights to organize,
form, join, or assist labor organizations." 6 Although questioning or
polling employees about their union sympathies is not a per se viola-
tion of section 8(a)(1) of the Act,517 courts will find such a violation
when the totality of the circumstances indicates that an interrogation is
coercive or reasonably tends to restrain or interfere with the exercise of
protected rights.518
The Ninth Circuit has used the indicia set forth in Bourne v.
NLRB 519 and the tests announced in Struksnes Construction Co. 2o to
determine if an interrogation or polling of employees violates the
Act. 52  The Bourne court set out five indicia of a coercive interroga-
tion: (1) a history of employer hostility towards the union, (2) informa-
tion sought in order to act against the responding or other employees,
(3) an interrogator high in the company hierarchy, (4) an unnatural
formality in the circumstances of the questioning, and, (5) a truthful
employee response to the questions.522 The Board, in Struksnes, held:
Absent unusual circumstances, the polling of employees by an
employer will be violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act unless
the following safeguards are observed: (1) the purpose of the
poll is to determine the truth of a union's claim of majority,
(2) this purpose is communicated to the employees, (3) assur-
ances against reprisal are given, (4) the employees are polled
by secret ballot, and (5) the employer has not engaged in un-
fair labor practices or otherwise created a coercive
atmosphere. 23
515. NLRB v. Gissell Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 583 (1968).
516. Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 1977); Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters, Local 364 v. NLRB, 435 F.2d 668, 669 (9th Cir. 1970).
517. NLRB v. Gissell Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 609 (1968); Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc.
v. NLRB, 632 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing NLRB v. Supertoys, Inc., 458 F.2d 180,
182 (9th Cir. 1972)), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 984 (1981); NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d
571, 584 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1080 (9th
Cir. 1977)), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 906 (1981).
518. A. & R. Transport, Inc. v. NLRB, 601 F.2d 311, 313 (7th Cir. 1979); Penasquitos
Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Monroe Tube Co., 545
F.2d 1320, 1328 (2d Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Crystal Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 308 F.2d
626, 628 (6th Cir. 1962).
519. 332 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1964).
520. 154 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967).
521. The Ninth Circuit expressly adopted the Bourne indicia in NLRB v. Hotel Conquis-
tador, Inc., 398 F.2d 430, 434 (9th Cir. 1968). The Struksnes tests were adopted in NLRB v.
B.C. Chevrolet, Inc., 582 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1978), and in NLRB v. Supertoys, Inc., 458
F.2d 180, 182 (9th Cir. 1972).
522. 332 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1964).
523. 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1063 (1967).
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In NLRB v. Gissell Packing Co. ,524 the Supreme Court specifically
adopted the Struksnes tests to determine the legality of polling.5 2- The
Struksnes tests are designed to analyze whether an employer's attempts
to verify a union claim of majority representation in an organization
campaign interfered with the employees' right to organize. 26 The
Bourne indicia, on the other hand, are designed for application to em-
ployer interrogations. 27
Still another test, formulated by the Board in Johnnie's Poultry
Co. ,528 was subsequently applied by the Seventh Circuit. 29 This test
requires the employer to (1) communicate to the employee the purpose
of the questioning, (2) make assurances that there will not be reprisals,
(3) assure that employee participation is voluntary, (4) make no coer-
cive statements during the questioning, (5) make the questioning free
from an atmosphere of employer hostility, and (6) question the em-
ployee only within the necessities of a legitimate purpose.530 Other cir-
cuits have used one or more of the above tests to determine if an
unlawful interrogation has taken place.531
Although both the Bourne indicia and the Johnnie's Poultry test
are designed for application to employer interrogations, they differ in
terms of specific factors. A notable difference is the requirement under
the Johnnie's Poultry test that the employer provide assurances that the
employee's participation in the questioning is voluntary and that there
will be no reprisals for refusing to participate. The Bourne indicia do
not contain such a requirement, but instead seek to determine whether
524. 395 U.S. 575 (1968).
525. Id at 609.
526. 165 N.L.R.B. at 1062-63.
527. 332 F.2d at 48.
528. 146 N.L.R.B. 770, 775 (1964), enf. denied on other grounds, 344 F.2d 617 (7th Cir.
1965).
529. A. & R. Transport, Inc. v. NLRB, 601 F.2d 311, 313 (7th Cir. 1979).
530. 146 N.L.R.B. at 775.
531. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have used the Struksnes tests to analyze interroga-
tions. NLRB v. C. & P. Plaza Dept. Store, Div. of C. & P. Shop. Contractor, Inc., 414 F.2d
1244, 1249 (7th Cir. 1969), cert,. denied, 396 U.S. 1058 (1970); NLRB v. Southwire Co., 429
F.2d 1050, 1055-56 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971). The D.C. Circuit,
however, has rejected the Strucksnes tests, relying instead on the Bourne indicia. Teamsters,
Local 633 v. NLRB, 509 F.2d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Seventh and Fifth Circuits
have also rejected the Bourne indicia, see NLRB v. Gogin, 575 F.2d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 1978);
NLRB v. Varo, Inc., 425 F.2d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 1970), in addition to the other two tests.
The Second Circuit, the originator of the Bourne indicia, has held that only three of the five
indicia need be present to sustain a violation. NLRB v. Scolar's Inc., 466 F.2d 1289, 1291
(2d Cir. 1972). The Second Circuit has also held that the absence of any one of the Bourne
indicia would not exonerate the employer. NLRB v. Monroe Tube Co., 545 F.2d 1320, 1328
(2d Cir. 1976). Finally, the Second Circuit has rejected the Johnnie's Poultry test. Id
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the employer intends to take action against employees based on the
information gained by the questioning. In either case, the courts seek
to prohibit questioning in an atmosphere of coercion.
The Ninth Circuit recently employed a combination of the tests set
forth above. In NLRB v. Los Angeles New Hospital,532 the employer
interrogated members of an authorized grievance committee concern-
ing union organizing.5  The interrogators did not guarantee immunity
against reprisals to the employees. In addition, the employer failed to
communicate to the employees a valid purpose for the questioning; the
interrogator held the highest position in the employer's hierarchy; and
the employees were asked for the names of others involved in the or-
ganizing. All of these facts created the reasonable impression that the
information was being sought in order to take action against individual
employees.534 The court, therefore, determined that the employees
were subjected to coercive interrogations.535
In NLRB v. Anchorage Times Publishing Co. ,536 the court found
that the employer, during an organization campaign, had interrogated
employees about their union sympathies. The interrogations were con-
ducted over a period of several months by high-ranking company offi-
cials and contained veiled threats against employees who exhibited
union sympathies.537 The court rejected the employer's argument that
there was no evidence of actual coercive effect, and held, instead, that
evidence of actual intimidation is not necessary for an interrogation to
violate the Act. 38
The Anchorage Times court also rejected the employer's argument
that the interrogations should not be considered unfair labor practices
because such conduct fell outside the critical period in an organizing
532. 640 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981).
533. Id at 1019.
534. Id at 1020.
535. Id
536. 637 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1981).
537. One employee approached the general manager of the Times regarding manage-
ment's failure to reveal wage scales to the employees. The manager asked the employee if
there was a conspiracy being plotted by employees in the newsroom and advised the em-
ployee that if he was dissatisfied, he could work elsewhere. Id. at 1363 n.6.
In another incident, three employees were appointed group leaders on a probationary
basis. At the same time, they were asked whether they were pro-union. The ALJ found this
to be an implied threat that their promotions depended upon their union sympathies. Id
538. Id at 1364. See also Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1080 (9th
Cir. 1977). Other federal circuit courts have reached a similar conclusion. See, e.g., NLRB
v. Donald E. Hernly, Inc., 613 F.2d 457, 464 (2d Cir. 1980) (lack of express threats triggers
use of Bourne indicia).
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campaign.5 39 The employer relied on the so-called "critical period doc-
trine" enunciated by the Board in Ideal Electric and Manufacturing
Co. 540 This doctrine establishes a time limit for the consideration of
employer or union actions in determining whether a contested election
was improperly influenced by unfair labor practices.54 '
The Ninth Circuit determined that the critical period doctrine was
merely a guide to the relevancy of employer misconduct directed to-
ward the outcome of an election, and not a time bar on the filing of an
unfair labor practice charge concerning unlawful interrogations.542
However, application of the critical period doctrine to interrogations as
independent violations of section 8(a)(1) is not appropriate in the case
of a contested election because no court has required an election peti-
tion to be filed as a condition precedent to the finding of an unfair
labor practice.543
Using the same hybrid formula, the court, in Golden Day School,
Inc. v. NLRB, 54 found interrogations to be coercive and, therefore,
violative of section 8(a)(1), when thirteen participants of a union or-
ganizing meeting were interrogated about the meeting.545 Eight of the
employees were fired immediately and the remaining five were fired
during a picketing demonstration.54 One employee was asked to re-
nounce her union membership. 547 The court found evidence of strong
anti-union bias in the timing, nature and extent of the individual
interrogations. 4
In four additional survey cases, the Ninth Circuit analyzed inter-
rogations in a similar manner. In NLRB v. Circo Resorts, Inc. , the
Ninth Circuit affirmed violations where the employer's interrogations
were accompanied by anti-union statements and a pattern of conduct,
including discharges, which evidenced anti-union bias. 50 In NLRB v.
R & H Masonry Supply, Inc. , the Ninth Circuit enforced a Board
539. 637 F.2d at 1364-65.
540. 134 N.L.R.B. 1275, 1278 (1961).
541. Employer conduct occurring prior to the filing of an election petition by the union is
considered relevant to the outcome of the contested election. Id
542. 637 F.2d at 1365.
543. Compare supra notes 522, 523, 528 and accompanying text.
544. 644 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1981).
545. Id at 836-37.
546. Id at 837.
547. Id at 836.
548. Id at 838.
549. 646 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1981).
550. Id at 405-06.
551. 627 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1980).
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order based upon a violation of section 8(a)(1) of the Act when three
employees were questioned regarding the signing of union authoriza-
tion cards. The court noted that the questioning was accompanied by
five discharges and the contracting out of work ordinarily performed
by the employees involved in the organizing campaign." 2 In NLRB v.
Davis,553 the court upheld an enforcement order where the employer
repeatedly interrogated employees about their attitudes toward the
union. The interrogations were accompanied by threats of reprisal and
by promises of wage increases to discourage union support. 4
Finally, in NLRB v. Peninsula Association for Retarded Children
andAdults,555 the Board found two violations of section 8(a)(1) where
the employer held noncoercive interrogations of unit employees. A
third violation was found where an interrogation was accompanied by
a coercive statement." 6 Without analysis, the court labeled the three
violations as relatively insignificant. 7 The court refused to enforce
the Board's bargaining order based on these violations and found that
the record failed to establish jurisdiction over the particular em-
ployer. 5 5  The court noted that even if jurisdiction had existed, the vio-
lations were too minor to warrant a bargaining order.559
C. Surveillance
It is an unfair labor practice to interfere with, coerce, or restrain
employees in the exercise of their right to engage in concerted activity
by maintaining surveillance over a union.560 Although merely creating
the impression of surveillance is notper se unlawful, if it is accompa-
nied by words or acts which would lead a court to infer unlawful inter-
ference with the right to engage in concerted activity, the surveillance
will be held unlawful.
561
552. Id at 1014.
553. 642 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1981).
554. Id at 353.
555. 627 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1980).
556. Id at 204.
557. Id at 204-05.
558. Id
559. I d at 205.
560. NLRB v. Miller Redwood Co., 407 F.2d 1366, 1368 (9th Cir. 1969); Hendrix Mfg.
Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 100, 104 n.7 (5th Cir. 1963) (surveillance illegal because it indicates
employer's opposition to unionization and gives impression of threat of economic coercion
and retaliation).
561. NLRB v. Miller Redwood Co., 407 F.2d at 1368 (activities which led employees to
believe employer was keeping union activities under surveillance coerced and restrained
employees in violation of section 8(a)(1)); NLRB v. S & H Grossinger's, Inc., 372 F.2d 26, 28
(2d Cir. 1967) (unlawful surveillance found when management publicly thanked certain em-
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In NLRB v. Anchorage Times Publishing Co. ,562 a newspaper edi-
tor told two employees that management would be watching to see who
attended an NLRB hearing on a representation petition. The editor
advised one employee to attend the hearing in the normal course of his
duties as a labor reporter and advised the other employee to stay away
from the hearing. Noting that an impression of surveillance can be as
coercive as actual surveillance, the Ninth Circuit concluded that this
constituted an unfair labor practice.5 6
D. Wage Increases
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act prohibits conduct immediately favorable
to employees which is expressly undertaken to interfere with their free-
dom to choose an exclusive bargaining representative. 5 4  Granting
benefits while an election is pending, for example, is a prima facie vio-
lation of section 7, and accordingly a violation of section 8(a)(1) be-
cause it tends to undermine union support by suggesting that the source
of benefits may dry up if the election results in union representation.
5 65
Management is not, however, precluded from taking reasonable steps
to operate its business. Consequently regularly-timed wage increases
may be granted 56 6 unless the timing of the increase is actually moti-
vated by union activities. 67 The presence or absence of such motiva-
tion is normally determined by examining the employer's intent. 68
In NLRB v. Anchorage Times Publishing Co. ,569 the employer for-
mulated a program for wage reviews and periodic wage increases prior
to the start of a union organizing campaign. The Board found that the
ployees for making reports about union meetings); NLRB v. Security Plating Co., 356 F.2d
725, 728 (9th Cir. 1966) (interference found when employer questioned employees about
union activities, made threats, and promised benefits if union was defeated); NLRB v.
Prince Macaroni Mfg. Co., 329 F.2d 803, 806 (Ist Cir. 1964) (sufficient indication of illegal
surveillance found when employer disclosed to employee knowledge of how many employ-
ees attended union meeting); Hendrix Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 100, 104 n.7 (5th Cir.
1963).
562. 637 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1981).
563. Id at 1366. The court also found actual surveillance based on the Director of Circu-
lation's request that certain employees attend a union meeting and report back. ld at 1365.
564. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964).
565. NLRB v. Styletek, Div. of Pandel-Bradford, Inc., 520 F.2d 275, 280 (1st Cir. 1975).
566. Oshman's Sporting Goods, Inc. v. NLRB, 586 F.2d 699, 705 (9th Cir. 1978); NLRB
v. Otis Hospital, 545 F.2d 252, 254-55 (1st Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Styletek, Div. of Pandel-
Bradford, Inc., 520 F.2d 275, 280 (1st Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Gruber's Super Market, Inc., 501
F.2d 697, 701 (7th Cir. 1974).
567. NLRB v. Charles Batchelder Co., 646 F.2d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 1981); NLRB v.
Southwire Co., 429 F.2d 1050, 1057 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971).
568. Free-Flow Packaging Corp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1978).
569. 637 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835 (1981).
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company deviated from the plan so as to grant fifteen percent of the
employees wage increases in the two days immediately preceding the
election. Approximately half of these increases were granted three or
more weeks later than prescribed in the wage review plan, and approxi-
mately one quarter of the increases were granted two or more weeks
earlier than scheduled. The court rejected the company's explanation
regarding the timing of the increases. It affirmed the Board finding that
the company intended the wage increases to influence voting in the
election, in violation of section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
570
In NLRB v. Circo Resorts, Inc. ,571 wage increases were granted to
two employees during an organization campaign. The increases were
granted following protests by the employees regarding disparity in
wages. The Board found a violation of section 8(a)(1) based on the
timing of the increases.57 2 However, relying on its ruling in Anchorage
Times, the Ninth Circuit deleted that portion of the Board's order re-
lating to wage increases, stating that the Board had not given consider-
ation to the employer's justification for wage increases but rather had
based its finding solely on the timing of the increases. 73
In two additional cases, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Board orders
where a finding was made that the employer had offered benefits to
employees in return for their termination of union activity. In NLRB v.
Max Factor and Co. , the employer offered a union steward either a
management position or a scholarship to law school if she would cease
her union activities. The court found that the offer violated section8(a)( 1).57
In NLRB v. Davis,5 76 the employer offered wage increases to em-
ployees who supported the employer's anti-union position during a
union organizing campaign. The court upheld a Board order finding a
violation of section 8(a)(1) on the ground that the employer unlawfully
offered wage increases in order to influence the election.577
E. Concerted Activity
Sections 7 and 8(a)(1) of the Act afford employees protection from
employer interference with their right to engage in concerted activi-
570. Id at 1368.
571. 646 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1981).
572. Id at 405.
573. Id at 405-06.
574. 640 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981).
575. Id at 204.
576. 642 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1981).
577. Id at 353-54.
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ties." 8 Section 7, however, does not apply to unlawful activities, vio-
lence, breaches of contract, or acts of disloyalty to the employer
unnecessary to effect legitimate concerted activities. 79 An employee
must be acting with or on behalf of other employees and not solely on
his or own behalf to rely on section 7.580 Some concerted activities may
be so attenuated in relationship to the individual employee's working
conditions that they lose section 7 protection.58 ' Protected activities
under section 7, however, may include activities outside the scope of
the employer-employee relationship.582
An employee is engaged in concerted activity when the union aids
him or her in filing a grievance, even if the employee's understanding
of the contract is proved inaccurate and the grievance unfounded.583
The Second Circuit, in NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc. ,584 held
that "[a]ctivities involving attempts to enforce the provisions of a col-
lective bargaining agreement may be deemed to be for concerted pur-
poses even if in the absence of such interest by fellow employees."' 85
The Ninth Circuit has held that when an individual employee files a
safety complaint and no collective bargaining agreement exists, the In-
terboro doctrine does not apply and the employee is not protected
578. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be af-
fected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condi-
tion of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title.
579. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17 (1962).
580. NLRB v. C & I Air Conditioning, Inc., 486 F.2d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 1973).
581. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 568 (1978).
582. Id at 565; see, e.g., Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 569 (1978) (union newsletter
urging employees to write to political officials regarding "right to work" statute closely re-
lated to conditions of employment and, therefore, protected); Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 802 n.8 (1945) (solicitation of membership in organizing campaign
protected); Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. General Teamster Local Union 326, 624
F.2d 1182, 1184 (3d Cir. 1980) (engaging in sympathy strike by honoring lawful primary
strike is concerted activity protected by § 7); Gibbs Die Casting Aluminum Corp., 174
N.L.R.B. 75, 79 (1969) (complaints by group of employees to health department about nox-
ious fumes at work site constituted concerted activity).
583. NLRB v. Adams Delivery Serv., Inc., 623 F.2d 96, 100 (9th Cir. 1980); NLRB v.
H.C. Smith Constr. Co., 439 F.2d 1064, 1065 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
584. 388 F.2d 495, 500 (2d Cir. 1967).
585. Id
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under section 7.586 The Ninth Circuit has specifically questioned the
Interboro doctrine as a "legal fiction presenting an unwarranted expan-
sion of the definition of concerted action unsupported by a statutory
basis. 587 In NLRB v. C & 1Air Conditioning, Inc. ,588 the Ninth Circuit
held that where an employee refused work due to alleged unsafe condi-
tions, but did not file a grievance, the employee was not protected
under section 7. The court distinguished Interboro as limited to situa-
tions involving enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement.589
Despite its questioning of the Interboro doctrine, however, the Ninth
Circuit, in NLRB v. Adams Delivery Service, Inc. ,590 stated that "[t]he
Interboro doctrine has been adopted 'in principle' by this court."5 91
Recently, in NLRB v. Maxwell,592 an employee was discharged for
attempting to collect overtime pay pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement. The employee was the only one to make a complaint and
did not file a grievance. The court held that the employee was dis-
charged for attempting to enforce a provision of the collective bargain-
ing agreement and was, therefore, involved in protected activity. 9 3
In Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. NLRB, 594 the employer suspended a
union chief steward for sixty days because he assisted an employee in
filing a grievance. In addition, the employer had ordered the steward
and the employee to use a dirty table outside the premises to write up
the grievance. The court held this to be a substantial basis for finding
that the employer violated section 8(a)(1) by discouraging resort to the
grievance procedure.1
95
In AdArt, Inc. v. NLRB,596 an employee was fired for processing
his own grievance. The court stated that "[a]n employer commits an
unfair labor practice when it discharges an employee who seeks, with
the aid of the union or fellow employees, to grieve complaints."5 97 The
court noted that the administrative law judge did not make a finding as
to whether the employee had attempted to "usurp the powers of a
union steward" by processing his own grievance, and had thereby lost
586. NLRB v. Bighorn Beverage, 614 F.2d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1980).
587. Id
588. 486 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1973).
589. Id. at 978.
590. 623 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1980).
591. Id at 100.
592. 637 F.2d 698 (9th Cir. 1980).
593. Id at 701.
594. 638 F.2d 140 (9th Cir. 1981).
595. Id at 141.
596. 645 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1980).
597. Id at 678.
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the protection of the Act.598 The court reviewed the record and found
that the employee had formerly processed grievances through a stew-
ard, but had not done so in the particular instance that ultimately led to
his dismissal. The court determined that one instance alone does not
establish a pattern of processing one's own grievances.5 99
In NLRB v. Cofer,co the court upheld the Board's finding that
three employees at a motel were fired because they jointly filed a com-
plaint regarding pay. The court held that when employees unite to
seek higher wages from a government agency administering the mini-
mum wage laws, they are engaging in concerted activity protected by
section 7 of the Act.60
In NLRB v. Southern California Edison Co. ,6o2 an employee was
suspended for refusing to cross a picket line to perform assigned work
at a customer's place of business.6 0 3 The court upheld the Board's in-
terpretation of the Act to protect an employee who honors a lawful
picket line at a customer's place of business.6 4 Noting that refusal to
cross a picket line will be protected if motivated by mutual aid and
protection,605 the court stated that a sympthetic strike to aid other un-
ions generally promotes labor goals and, thus, represents a form of mu-
tual aid and protection.60° The court, however, acknowledged that the
right to strike or the right to engage in sympathy strikes may be waived
by the collective bargaining agreement.6 7 It then held that the lan-
guage and evidence bearing on the parties' intent was insufficient to
negate the deference due the Board's determination that no waiver
existed.60 8
F Solicitation
The right of employees to organize and bargain collectively, as es-
598. Id
599. Id
600. 637 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1981).
601. Id at 1313.
602. 646 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1981).
603. Id at 1361. The picket line was against a company where Edison, solely for its own
benefit, maintained an instrument that gathered experimental data. If the employee had
crossed the picket line, it would not have affected the performance of the company's opera-
tions. d at 1363.
604. Id at 1364.
605. Id Section 7 requires that an activity be for mutual aid and protection in order to be
afforded the protection provided by the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1975).
606. 646 F.2d at 1364.
607. Id
608. Id at 1369.
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tablished by section 7 of the Act,6"9 includes the right to communicate
at the job site regarding organization.61° "Absent special circumstances
relating to production or plant discipline, an employer may not issue a
broad rule prohibiting union solicitation by its employees on company
property."' 61' The Board, therefore, is free to characterize particular
restrictions on solicitation as presumptive interferences with section 7
rights. 12
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Act to require that special
consideration be given to the needs of patients in health care institu-
tions in situations where the patients may be affected by union solicita-
tion.613 Thus, bans on solicitation in immediate patient care areas are
not presumptively invalid.6 14 However, when a facility has failed to
justify a prohibition as necessary to avoid the disruption of operations
or disturbance of patients, the Board may require that a hospital permit
solicitation during nonworking time in nonworking areas.615
In NLRB v. Los Angeles New Hospital,1 6 an employee, during his
break time, read union literature to three other employees in a hospital
lounge. Hospital management informed him of the ban on solicitation
in that room because it was considered to be a part of an adjacent oper-
ating room and, therefore, an immediate patient care area. The court,
however, found that the lounge was isolated from the operating room
and that no patients ever entered it. 6 17 Thus, the court put the burden
on the hospital to show that the ban on solicitation was necessary.61 8
To carry that burden, the hospital alleged that the ban was re-
quired because loud noises from the lounge disturbed patient care. The
court found the alleged incidents were too isolated to support a show-
ing of sufficient disruption of operations to warrant a complete ban on
solicitation.619
In addition to the hospital exception, there are other solicitation
bans on company property which are not presumptively invalid. It is
well established that an employer is entitled to prohibit union solicita-
609. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
610. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 491 (1978).
611. NLRB v. Essex Wire Corp., 245 F.2d 589, 593 (9th Cir. 1957).
612. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 493 (1978); Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 (1945).
613. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 498 (1978).
614. Id at 507; see also NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 779 (1979).
615. NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 787 (1979).
616. 640 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981).
617. Id at 1021.
618. Id
619. Id at 1022.
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tion during working hours. 62 ° An employee, however, has the right to
wear union insignia during working hours, except under special cir-
cumstances relating to efficiency or plant discipline.62 ' Wearing union
buttons is not a per se guaranteed right; there must be an express pur-
pose in wearing the buttons which furthers the goal of mutual aid and
protection.622 Moreover, the considerations involved in determining
whether the wearing of union insignia during working hours may be
banned include the image presented to the public by the employees,623
safety measures, 624 production of a sanitary or pure product,625 avoid-
ance of disharmony among employees,626 and avoidance of distractions
for workers in production jobs.627
In Payn Save Corp. v. NLRB, 628 the employer banned all union
buttons during an organizational campaign, as well as other insignia
that were either political or controversial. 629 The employer argued that
its ban on union buttons was justified by its concern over the image
projected to the public by its employees. 630 The court enforced the
Board's order striking down the ban against union buttons because
there were no special circumstances warranting such a ban.63' The
court noted that Pay'n Save had not uniformly applied its rule and that
the circumstances therein were distinguishable from NLRB v. Harrah's
Club ,632 and Davison-Paxon Co., Division of RH Macy & Co. v.
NLRB,633 where bans were upheld, primarily because there was signifi-
cant employer interest in the dress and presentation of employees to the
public. 634 In Harrah's Club, all emblems, badges, buttons, jewelry and
other ornaments had been banned for many years. 63s The company
rule was confined .to employees who came in contact with the public
620. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793,'803 n.10 (1945); NLRB v. Essex
Wire Corp., 245 F.2d 589, 593 (9th Cir. 1957).
621. Fabri-Tek, Inc. v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 577, 584-85 (8th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Essex Wire
Corp., 245 F.2d 589, 593 (9th Cir. 1957).
622. NLRB v. Harrah's Club, 337 F.2d 177, 179 (9th Cir. 1964).
623. Id at 180.
624. Andrews Wire Corp., 189 N.L.R.B. 108, 109 (1971).
625. Campbell Soup Co., 159 N.L.R.B. 74, 82 (1966).
626. United Aircraft Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. 1632, 1633 (1961).
627. Fabri-Tek, Inc. v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 577, 583 (8th Cir. 1965).
628. 641 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1981).
629. Id at 699-700.
630. Id at 701.
631. Id at 701-02.
632. 337 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1964).
633. 462 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1972).
634. 641 F.2d at 701 n.10.
635. 337 F.2d at 177, 178 n.2.
[Vol. 16
LABOR LAW SURVEY
and did not extend to nonwork areas or places not open to the pub-
lic.636 In Davison-Paxon Co., the employees were allowed to wear but-
tons the size of a dime or nickel.63 7 A ban against the wearing of
buttons the size of a half-dollar on the selling floor was determined to
be reasonable because the company was afraid of antagonizing custom-
ers with the larger, bolder buttons.638 The Pay'n Save court further
distinguished Harrah's Club and Davison-Paxon Co. by noting that the
buttons were banned in Harrah's Club because of the failure to state an
express purpose connected with the employees' concerted activities
639
and in Davison-Paxon Co. in order to avoid animosity between union
and anti-union factions.640
G. Statements to the NLRB
It is an unfair labor practice to discharge or otherwise discriminate
against an employee for filing charges or giving testimony under the
Act." It is also an unfair labor practice to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce an employee with regard to statements made to the NLRB.64
Interference with an employee's right to make such statements will be
found when an employer intimidates the witness-employee to such a
degree that testimony is altered or repudiated. 643 Moreover, the
Supreme Court has held that statements made to the Board are exempt
from Freedom of Information Act requests unless the witness actually
testifies at a hearing. The rationale behind such a rule is that unless
these statements are protected from disclosure, the reporting employee
would be subject to influence by the employer.644 Under certain condi-
tions, however, it will not be unlawful for an employer to ask an em-
ployee to voluntarily provide a copy of his or her statement to the
Board.
645
636. Id at 180.
637. 462 F.2d at 365.
638. Id at 369-70.
639. 641 F.2d at 701.
640. Id
641. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1976).
642. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB, 373 F.2d 655, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1967); NLRB v.
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 750, 753 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 830 (1965);
Henry I. Siegal Co. v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1964).
643. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 239-40 (1978).
644. Id
645. NLRB v. Martin A. Gleason, Inc., 534 F.2d 466, 481 (2d Cir. 1976) (propriety of
request for employee's statement turns on voluntary nature of employee's compliance with
request and employer's need for information); Robertshaw Controls Co. v. NLRB, 483 F.2d
762, 767-68 (4th Cir. 1973) (no violation when valid reason exists for obtaining statement
and compliance is voluntary with assurances against reprisals); W.T. Grant Co. v. NLRB,
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Employer requests for statements have traditionally been treated
in one of two ways. In some circuits, these requests are considered per
se unlawful if not accompanied by assurances against reprisal or if the
employer fails to show a real need for statement in trial preparation.646
Other circuits have adopted a rule which calls for a balancing of inter-
ests between the employer's need to prepare for trial and the potential
coercion.M7
In NLRB v. Maxwell, 48 the Ninth Circuit adopted the rule that
there is a per se violation of the Act when an employer requests a copy
of an employee's statement to the Board without assuring the employee
that no reprisals will follow from a refusal to supply the statement. The
court also specified that this rule remains operative even if there is a
showing that the requested statement is needed for trial preparation. 49
The employer in Maxwell asked an employee for a copy of a state-
ment made to the NLRB, but did not provide assurances against repri-
sals for failure to comply with the request or show that the statement
was needed for trial preparation. There was, however, no evidence that
the employee was unwilling to cooperate with the employer, or that he
337 F.2d 447, 449 (7th Cir. 1964) (request for information not violative of Act when em-
ployee not coerced, compliance with request purely voluntary, and company followed proce-
dure previously approved by Board in Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 325, 334
(1962)); Texas Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 128, 133 (5th Cir. 1964) (in allowing employer
to interrogate employee about pending charges court must strike balance between inherent
coercive nature of interrogation and employer's legitimate need to prepare for trial); Joy Silk
Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (employers may interview employ-
ees when (I) requested statement is to be used to discover facts within limits of issues raised
by the General Counsel's complaint, (2) request for information does not go beyond necessi-
ties of trial preparation, (3) request for information does not pry into extent of employee's
union activity or otherwise restrain employee's right to join or assist union, and (4) probative
value of questions asked by employer are sufficiently relevant to charges made in complaint
to justify risk of intimidating employee).
646. NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d 894, 898 (2d Cir. 1971); Retail Clerks Int'l
Ass'n v. NLRB, 373 F.2d 655, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1967); W.T. Grant Co. v. NLRB, 337 F.2d 447,
449 (7th Cir. 1964).
647. NLRB v. Martin A. Gleason, Inc., 534 F.2d 466, 480 n.8, 481 (2d Cir. 1976) (per se
violations specifically rejected; instead, propriety of request turns upon whether there was
voluntary compliance and whether employer needed information); Robertshaw Controls
Co. v. NLRB, 483 F.2d 762, 768-69 (4th Cir. 1973) (per se rule set out in Retail Clerks Int'l
Ass'n v. NLRB, 373 F.2d 655 (D.C. Cir. 1967), not followed in lieu of standard requiring
valid reason for obtaining statements and finding of voluntary compliance with request).
But see Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (test utilized
balances determination of probative value of questions relating to unfair labor practice
charges against risk of intimidating employee). This "balance-of-interests" test was also
adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Texas Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 128, 133 (5th Cir.
1964).
648. 637 F.2d 698 (9th Cir. 1981).
649. Id at 702-03.
LABOR LAW SURVEY
was actually coerced. 5° It, therefore, appeared that the employee vol-
untarily provided the employer with a copy of his statement. 5'
The court found these circumstances analogous to employer inter-
rogation of employees regarding union activities.65 The court distin-
guished requests for statements made to the NLRB from other
interrogations because employers' direct requests for employees' state-
ments have an inherent chilling effect on the administration of the Act
(Le., employees will fear reprisal for what they may say to investigating
Board agents if they know that employers may obtain copies of their
statements).653 The court, therefore, established a more stringent "per
se" rule rather than the "totality of circumstances" rule because "any
less stringent [standard] presents too great a risk of interference with
the Board's enforcement of the Act.
'654
H Union Unfair Labor Practices
It is an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights.655 Included
within the protection of section 7 is the right to refrain from union ac-
tivities.656 The policy behind this provision is to insulate employees
from retaliatory actions taken by employers or unions as a result of
their refusal to engage in union organizing activities. 657  Thus, if a
union rule invades or frustrates the policy which prohibits interference
with an employee's right to refrain from union activities, it may not be
enforced.658 A union may not, for example, discriminate against non-
union employees when the foreseeable consequence or likely effect of
650. Id at 701.
651. Id
652. Id at 702.
653. Id at 702-03. Additionally, the court noted that "Ithe possibility that an employer's
request will have a coercive effect on testimony is even present when the employee's state-
ment is favorable to the employer for 'those known to have already given favorable state-
ments are then subject to pressure to give even more favorable testimony.'" Id at 702
(quoting NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 240 (1978)).
654. 637 F.2d at 702.
655. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(A) (1976) ("Provided, that this paragraph shall not impair the
right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or
retention of membership therein. . . ."). See also Communications Workers, Local 1104 v.
NLRB, 520 F.2d 411, 415 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976).
656. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) ("except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in section 8(a)(3) ....").
657. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954).
658. Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 429 (1969); Communications Workers, Local 1104
v. NLRB, 520 F.2d 411, 415 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976).
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the discrimination is to encourage union membership. 59
Recently, in International Association of Machinists, Lodge 720 v.
NLRB,66 0 a union refused to grant unemployment stamps to non-
members. These stamps were used by members to pay for monthly
union dues at a drastically reduced rate while they were unemployed.
The Ninth Circuit struck down this policy, holding that a union is pro-
hibited from discriminating between dues-paying members and non-
members who are required to make dues equivalency payments as a
condition of employment. 6 '
It is also an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(2) of the Act
for a labor organization to cause an employer to terminate an employee
on some ground other than the employee's failure to tender the peri-
odic union dues and initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of
employment. 62 In contrast, the fairness of union discipline which is
designed to protect legitimate interests and which does not interfere
with the employer-employee relationship or otherwise violate a policy
of the Act, may not be considered by the Board.6 It is the consenual
basis of union membership which makes disciplinary action against
members non-coercive within the meaning of section 8(b)(l)(A).6 4
In acting to protect a legitimate interest, however, a labor organi-
zation may not cause an employee to be discharged for non-compliance
with a union security clause or membership requirement without first
informing him or her of all obligations.665 The union must, for exam-
ple, provide a statement to the member as to the precise amount and
number of months for which union dues are payable, as well as an
explanation of the method used in computing such amount.666
In NLRB v. Construction Teamsters, Local 291,667 an employee in-
advertently failed to pay his union dues for a three month period. At
the start of the next three month period the employee paid his dues.
The union mailed the employee a delinquency notice for the earlier
659. NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Union, Local 13, 549 F.2d 1346, 1352-53
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977).
660. 626 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1980).
661. Id. at 123.
662. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1976).
663. NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 78 (1973); NLRB v. Retail Clerks Union, Local
1179, 526 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1975).
664. NLRB v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 1179, 526 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1975).
665. General Teamsters, Local 162 v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 665, 668 (9th Cir. 1978); NLRB v.
Hotel, Motel and Club Employees' Union, Local 568, 320 F.2d 254, 258 (3rd Cir. 1963).
666. Teamsters Local 122, 203 N.L.R.B. 1041, 1041-42 (1973); Conductron Corp., 183
N.L.R.B. 419, 426 (1970).
667. 633 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1980).
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quarter and at the same time requested that the employer discharge
him. When the employee learned of the missing payment he unsuc-
cessfully sought to apply his later payment to the earlier period. The
Board found that the union had failed to notify the employee either of
his loss of good standing or the requirements for restoration to good
standing prior to seeking and securing his discharge. The facts indi-
cated that the union had afforded other employees this opportunity.66 8
The court held that before a union may cause a member to be dis-
charged from his employment for delinquent dues, the union must take
whatever steps are necessary to ascertain if the delinquency was due to
the member's ignorance or inadvertance.
669
Pursuant to section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, it is an unfair labor prac-
tice for a union to restrain or coerce an employee in the exercise of his
right to refrain from engaging in concerted activity.67° Although there
is an internal affairs exemption to section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, this
exemption does not apply when the union's application of its internal
rules is contrary to national labor policy.67 ' For example, a union rule
which forbids the crossing of a picket line during a strike is enforceable
against union members by expulsion or a reasonable fine.672 The same
rule, however, could not be enforced if the discipline impeded a na-
tional policy against illegal secondary picketing.673 It is, therefore, an
unfair labor practice to levy a fine against a union member who re-
frains from engaging in unlawful concerted action promoted by the
union.
674
In NLRB v. Glaziers, Local 1621,675 two employees were found
guilty of violating union by-laws by working for an employer and dis-
regarding picket lines. The two employees had entered the premises
through a neutral reserved gate and were working for a neutral subcon-
tractor. The court held that while the picketing was legal, encouraging
the two employees to perform an illegal secondary boycott in violation
of section 8(e) of the Act violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.676
668. Id. at 1298.
669. Id at 1299.
670. NLRB v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 1179, 526 F.2d 142, 144 (9th Cir. 1975).
671. Id at 145.
672. Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 428 (1969).
673. NLRB v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 1179, 526 F.2d 142, 146-47 (9th Cir. 1975).
674. Morton Salt Co. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 416,421 (9th Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded,
414 U.S. 807 (1973), on remand, 510 F.2d 428 (1975).
675. 632 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1980).
676. Id at 91-92.
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I Hot Cargo Agreements
Under section 8(e) of the Act, it is an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization and an employer to enter into a hot cargo agree-
ment 677 whereby the employer agrees to cease doing business with any
other employer.678 It is also an unfair labor practice under section
8(b)(4)(B) of the Act to force an employer to cease doing business with
any other employer by means of an economic strike or other coercive
action.679 The prohibition against hot cargo agreements does not, how-
ever, extend to the construction industry for work performed at a con-
struction site.680 Thus, a labor organization may, without violating
section 8(b)(4)(B), picket or strike to obtain a hot cargo agreement
under the construction industry proviso of section 8(e).68' Agreements
so obtained are lawful, but only to the extent that they are made in the
context of a collective bargaining relationship, 8 2 and would reduce
friction between union and non-union workers who are forced to work
in close proximity, as well as protect the continuity of work and bene-
677. A hot cargo agreement is basically a contract between an employer and a labor or-
ganization against a third party whereby the employer agrees to refrain from doing business
with the third party as long as the third party refuses to accede to whatever demands the
labor organization may have made upon it. National Woodwork Mfr's Ass'n v. NLRB, 386
U.S. 612, 634 (1967). Such secondary boycotts were labeled "hot cargo" clauses because of
their prevalence in Teamsters union contracts. Id
678. Section 8(e) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to
enter into any. . . agreement. . . whereby such employer. ..agrees to. . .re-
frain from. ..dealing in any of the products of any other employer. ..Provided,
That nothing in this subsection shall apply to an agreement between a labor organ-
ization and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting
* * * of work to be done at the site of the construction.
29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976).
679. Section 8(b)(4)(B) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization. . .(4)(i) to. . . en-
courage any individual. . . to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his
employment to use. . . any goods. ..or to perform any services. . .(ii) where
in either case an object thereof is (B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using
• ..products of any other. . . manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any
other person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain
with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor
organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the
provisions of section 159 of this title: Provided, That nothing contained in this
clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any
primary strike or primary picketing.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976).
680. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976).
681. Construction Laborer's Union, Local 383 v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 422, 425 (9th Cir,
1963).
682. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 633 (1975).
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fits for the employees. 83 In addition, these agreements are enforceable
only by judicial means.684 In Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Lo-
cal 100,85 the union sought and picketed for an agreement from an
employer to use only subcontractors affiliated with the particular signa-
tory union. The union did not represent, nor did it seek to represent,
any employees of Connell Construction Company.686 The Supreme
Court found that this type of agreement fell outside the construction
industry proviso. The Court declined, however, to rule on whether a
union could picket to enforce an otherwise lawful hot cargo clause
under section 8(e).6
Pacyfc Northwest Chapter of the Associated Builders & Contractors,
Inc. v. NLRB 688 consisted of two consolidated cases which presented
similar issues. One case involved a collective bargaining agreement
which permitted the union to strike in order to enforce a clause which
prohibited subcontracting with non-union firms. The other case in-
volved the picketing of an employer by a union in an attempt to secure
a similar clause.689
The Ninth Circuit first determined that both clauses were designed
to force an employer to cease doing business with a non-union subcon-
tractor and were, therefore, subject to section 8(e) of the Act.69° The
court also determined that the clauses fell within the construction in-
dustry proviso of section 8(e), regardless of the possibility that the
clauses would extend to particular job sites where only non-union
workers would be present.6 9 1 This second determination was made in
spite of the language in Connell which suggested that section 8(e) ex-
tends only to common situs relationships on particular job sites.692
The Ninth Circuit supported its view by finding overwhelming
practical difficulties in confining the subcontractor agreements only to
job sites where actual union/non-union conflict occurred among work-
ers. The court then held that actual conditions in the construction in-
683. See id at 628-32.
684. Acco Constr. Equip., Inc. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 848, 852 (9th Cir. 1975); Construction
Laborer's Union, Local 383 v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 422, 424 (9th Cir. 1963). Accord Donald
Schriver, Inc. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 859, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
685. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
686. Id at 619-20.
687. Id at 633 n.14.
688. 654 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 814 (1981).
689. Id at 1305-06.
690. Id at 1307.
691. I. at 1312-13.
692. 421 U.S. at 633.
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dustry were favorable to broad subcontractor clauses in contracts. 93
Finally, the Ninth Circuit, while admitting that Connell could lead
to a contrary result, concluded that the Connell Court was most con-
cerned with the existence of a collective bargaining relationship, re-
gardless of the presence or absence of union workers at the job site.694
The court reaffirmed previous Ninth Circuit standards by finding
no violation when a union pickets or strikes to obtain a hot cargo clause
protected by section 8(e).6 95 However, the court also reaffirmed previ-
ous law by finding that strikes or other coercive activity, when used to
enforce a lawful section 8(e) clause, violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).6 96
A four-judge dissent rejected the majority's reading of Connell
and, instead, adopted the view that the section 8(e) construction indus-
try proviso required a collective bargaining relationship between both
the parties and job sites where union employees worked. 697 The dissent
focused on the overall purpose of section 8(e) to prohibit the secondary
boycott from being used as a union organizing device, 698 and on the
purpose of the construction industry proviso to avoid job site friction
between union and non-union workers.699 The dissent argued that its
reading of Connell met both of those objectives.7 "°
The dissent's reasoning appears to be more consistent with that of
the Connell Court which focused on the above noted goal of avoiding
job site friction in the construction industry. The majority's ruling may
allow the union to organize those job sites where no union members
previously worked by use of coercive picketing. This result seems to be
contrary to the section 7 policy against interference with an employee's
right to refrain from organizing.
In Swanson-Dean Corp. v. Seattle District Council of Carpenters,0
the Ninth Circuit applied the result of PacYc Northwest. The court
had deferred submission of Swanson-Dean until the en banc decision in
Pacfic Northwest had been rendered.7°2 Because the issue presented to
the court in Swanson-Dean was identical to that resolved in Pacific
693. 654 F.2d at 1321-22.
694. Id at 1322.
695. Id at 1323. See supra note 684 and accompanying text.
696. Id at 1324. See also Donald Schriver, Inc. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 859, 887 (D.C. Cir.
1980), cited with approval in Pacfic Northwest, 654 F.2d at 1324.
697. 654 F.2d at 1325 (Sneed, J., dissenting, joined by Choy, Anderson, and Farris, JJ.).
698. Id at 1327.
699. Id at 1326.
700. Id at 1327.
701. 646 F.2d 376 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2903 (1982).
702. 646 F.2d at 377.
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Northwest, however, the court merely incorporated the Pacific North-
west holding.
70 3
III. THE REPRESENTATION PROCESS AND UNION ELECTIONS
A. Appropriate Bargaining Units
1. Single plant unit
The Board has exceptionally broad discretion in determining
whether a bargaining unit is appropriate,7° although a single bargain-
ing unit is presumed to be appropriate.7 5 When a single plant unit is
involved, the Board considers the following factors: "the similarity in
skills, interests, duties and working conditions; the functional integra-
tion of the plant; interchange and contact among employees; the em-
ployers' organizational and supervisory structure; the employees'
desires; the bargaining history; and the extent of union organization
among employees. '7°6 The Board's determination will not be over-
turned unless there has been an abuse of discretion.
70 7
Recently, in NLRB v. Circo Resorts, Inc. ,708 the Board had ap-
proved a small bargaining unit of stagehands as being separate from a
unit of manual employees although both groups were employed by one
hotel and casino complex. The court recognized the critical determi-
nant to be "whether the employees share a substantial community of
interest sufficient to justify their mutual inclusion in a single bargaining
unit.' '7°9 The administrative law judge found that the stagehands were
an appropriate bargaining unit because they performed identical du-
ties, they were trained in this area, and they confined their work to a
particular area of the hotel and did not work with other maintenance
workers. Giving deference to the Board's determination, the court up-
held the bargaining unit.710
703. Id
704. Section 9(b) of the NLRA provides in pertinent part that "[t]he Board shall decide
... whether ... the unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining shall be the
employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof." 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976); see
Pacific Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Sunset
House, 415 F.2d 545, 547 (9th Cir. 1969).
705. NLRB v. Lerner Stores Corp., 506 F.2d 706, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1974).
706. Pacific Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir. 1978); see Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 153 (1941).
707. See NLRB v. J.C. Penney Co., 620 F.2d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1980).
708. 646 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1981).
709. Id at 406 (quoting Pacific Southwest Airlines, 587 F.2d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir. 1978)).
710. 646 F.2d at 406.
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2. Multiple plant unit
When a multiple plant bargaining unit is involved, the Board con-
siders the following factors: "functional integration of the business,
centralized control of management, similarity of working conditions,
collective bargaining history, local power to hire and fire, lack of em-
ployee interchange, [and] geographical distance.
711
In Spring City Knitting Co. v. NLRB,71 2 the Ninth Circuit ad-
dressed whether a single or multiple plant bargaining unit should be
designated.713 Spring City had a main plant employing 700 workers in
Glendale, Arizona and a smaller plant employing 150 workers in Flag-
staff, Arizona, 140 miles away. The Board certified each plant as a
separate bargaining unit.1 Certification was based on three factors:
(1) "significant autonomy" of local plant managers at their respective
plants; (2) lack of significant employee interchange between plants; and
(3) the geographical separation between plants.715 The court concluded
that it was proper for the Board to rely on these factors and that each
was supported by substantial evidence.716
The court found substantial evidence to support the Regional Di-
rector's conclusion that there was a lack of significant interchange be-
tween plants over the six year period preceding the hearing. The court
stated that the frequency of employee interchange is a "critical factor"
in determining whether employees at different plants share a sufficient
"community of interest" to justify inclusion in a single plant unit.717
This lack of employee interchange indicated an insufficient community
of interest and therefore supported separate bargaining units.
7 18
Spring City argued that the Regional Director attributed too much
authority to the Flagstaff plant managers and that insufficient local au-
tonomy favored a multiple plant unit.719 The evidence showed that the
manager had the authority to hire and fire employees. This, together
with a low employee interchange, a 140 mile geographic separation be-
tween plants, and a lack of collective bargaining history, supported the
conclusion that the Regional Director's decision was not an abuse of
discretion. Therefore, the court held that the bargaining units chosen
711. See NLRB v. Sunset House, 415 F.2d 545, 548 (9th Cir. 1969).
712. 647 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1981).
713. Id at 1013-16.
714. Id at 1013.
715. Id
716. Id at 1016.






3. Managerial and supervisory employees
The Board's broad discretion in determining the appropriate bar-
gaining unit includes the factual question of whether certain employees
are "supervisorial" or "managerial. '721 Managerial employees are not
defined by the NLRA but have been judicially excluded from its cover-
age by the Supreme Court.722 The Court has defined managerial em-
ployees as those who "formulate and effectuate management policies
by expressing and making operative the decisions of their em-
ployer. ' 723 An employee will be excluded as managerial "only if he
represents management interests by taking or recommending discre-
tionary actions that effectively control or implement employer
policy.
' 724
Supervisory employees are specifically defined in section 2(11) of
the NLRA725 and excluded from coverage in section 2(3).726 An em-
ployee who uses independent judgment in the exercise of any of the
powers enumerated in section 2(11) is a supervisor and cannot be in-
cluded in a bargaining unit.727
Recently, in Walla Walla Union Bulletin, Inc. v. NLRB, 72 8 the
Ninth Circuit addressed whether there was substantial evidence to sup-
port the Board's conclusion that an editorial page editor of a newspaper
was not a managerial employee who should be excluded from a bar-
720. Id at 1016.
721. See NLRB v. Adrian Belt Co., 578 F.2d 1304, 1311 (9th Cir. 1978); Laborers and
Hod Carriers, Local 341 v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 834, 837 (9th Cir. 1977); Kaiser Eng'rs v.
NLRB, 538 F.2d 1379, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1976).
722. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 681-82 (1980); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974); see also Stephens Inst. v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 720, 726 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993 (1980).
723. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 682 (1980).
724. Id at 683 (university faculty person with extensive control over academic, personnel
and institutional policies found to be managerial employee and thus excluded from Act's
coverage).
725. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976) provides:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest of the
employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, re-
ward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their
grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the fore-
going the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but
requires the use of independent judgment.
726. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) provides that "[t]he term 'employee'. . .shall not include
... any individual employed as a supervisor."
727. See NLRB v. Harmon Indus., Inc., 565 F.2d 1047, 1049 (8th Cir. 1977); NLRB v.
Gray Line Tours, Inc., 461 F.2d 763, 764 (9th Cir. 1972).
728. 631 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1980).
1983]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LW REVIEW
gaining unit of newsroom employees. Clark, the editor, participated in
writing, editing, and selecting certain articles. He also voted with edi-
torial board management representatives in the selection of editorial
topics. The Ninth Circuit held that the Board's conclusion was not
supported by substantial evidence.72 9 The court reasoned that the evi-
dence indicated that Clark was a managerial employee because he ex-
ercised "independent discretion and formulate[d] policy independent
of his employer."73 Further, managerial status was favored because his
responsibilities created a potential conflict of interest between his em-
ployer and the union.'
The Walla Walla court also addressed whether the record sup-
ported the Board's conclusions that the photo, sports, and wire editors
were not supervisors and thus, were appropriately included in the bar-
gaining unit.732 The court found substantial evidence to support the
Board's conclusions. 733 The court's finding rested on the following fac-
tors: the photo editor co-ordinated photography without supervising or
disciplining other employees and accordingly was found to share a
community of interest with the rest of the newsroom employees; the
sports editor had no supervisory authority to hire, fire, discipline, or
supervise other sports employees nor did he handle any grievances; the
wire editor, assisted by a staff, merely selected important news items
from the wire services and then passed them on to the news editor.3
B. Representation Proceedings and Elections
Section 9(a) of the NLRA provides that a majority of employees
may select an exclusive representative to bargain collectively with their
employer.735 Section 9(c) of the Act gives the Board the power to con-
duct an election upon a petition filed by an employee, union, or
employer.736
729. Id at 613. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 691 (1980).
730. 631 F.2d at 613.
731. Id
732. Id at 612.
733. Id at 614.
734. Id
735. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment.
736. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1976) provides:
(1) Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such regula-
tions as may be prescribed by the Board-
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1. Conduct invalidating elections
The Board has broad discretion to establish procedures that insure
fair representation elections.737 A union representation election will
usually be set aside only if the election process is "significantly
impaired. 73 s
a. breach of consent election agreement procedures
A party to an agreement authorizing a consent election is entitled
to expect that the other party and the Board representative will uphold
those provisions which promote fairness and are consistent with Board
poliCy.739 An election will be set aside only when a breach of the agree-
ment significantly impairs the fairness of the election.74 °
Recently, in Summa Corp. v. NLRB,74 ' the Ninth Circuit ad-
dressed whether a union's breach of a consent election agreement justi-
fied setting aside an election. A consent election stipulation provided
for an equal number of employer and union observers at the polling
place. The Board agent acquiesced to a union member's request to act
as an extra observer, thereby creating a union breach of this provision.
The court found that the provision was material to the election process
because each party relied on its own observers' presence to challenge
voters and to monitor the election process. 742 Neither party wanted the
other to gain any advantage in this respect. Further, the court reasoned
(A) by an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor organ-
ization acting in their behalf. . . or
(B) by an employer...
the Board shall investigate such petition and. . . shall provide for an appropriate
hearing upon due notice. ... If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing
that such a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret
ballot and shall certify the results thereof.
737. NLRB v. Metro-Truck Body, Inc., 613 F.2d 746, 748 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Sauk
Valley Mfg. Co., 486 F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1973).
738. See, e.g., NLRB v. Heath Tec Div./San Francisco, 566 F.2d 1367, 1372 (9th Cir.)
(rumors that employees would be deported for failing to vote does not significantly impair
election), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 832 (1978); Heavenly Valley Ski Area v. NLRB, 552 F.2d
269, 272 (9th Cir. 1977) (union's material misrepresentations regarding overtime pay and
end of season bonus not significant impairment, because employer had opportunity to re-
ply); NLRB v. G.K. Turner Assoc., 457 F.2d 484, 487 (9th Cir. 1971) (cumulative impact of
union misrepresentations regarding company profits, sympathy strikes, union fines, dis-
charge of supervisors, and initiation fee waivers held significant impairment of election re-
quiring nullification).
739. See generally Delta Drilling Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 109, 114 (5th Cir. 1969); M.W.
Breman, 115 N.L.R.B. 247 (1956).
740. See, e.g., Grant's Home Furnishing, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 1305, 1306 (1977) (Board
agent's breach of consent election agreement in arriving five minutes late not prejudicial).
741. 625 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1980).
742. Id at 295.
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that the union breach, coupled with the Board agent's acquiescence,
could have created an impression in the voters' minds of union pre-
dominance and Board partiality.743 For these reasons, the court set
aside the election even without a showing of actual prejudice to the
employer.7 "
b. electioneering
The Board has generally banned electioneering at or near a polling
place.745 In Michem, Inc. ," the Board adopted a standard determin-
ing whether conversations at the polling place between representatives
of either party and employees waiting to vote necessitated a new elec-
tion. The Board applied a strict rule against prolonged conversations
or last minute electioneering. 47 The Board emphasized, however, that
an innocuois comment or inquiry by a party to a voter would not nec-
essarily void an election.748
In two recent cases employers sought to nullify elections because
union observers or officials allegedly engaged in prohibited election-
eering. In the first, NLRB v. Vista Hill Foundation, 4 a union observer
allegedly engaged in six separate conversations with voters, each lasting
less than two minutes. The Ninth Circuit upheld the Board's conclu-
sion that the election had been properly conducted.750 The court noted
that the Board impliedly found that all six conversations were of the
type referred to in Michem, Inc., as "chance, isolated, innocuous com-
ment or inquiry."'751 In reviewing the Board's decision, the court fo-
cused on the length and nature of the exchanges. Four of the
conversations were merely greetings and comments about the weather.
Two conversations bore directly on the election. In one, a voter asked
the union observer if he would be the union representative if the union
was approved. In another conversation, the observer stated that if the
employee voted for the union then he (the observer) "would not be in
so much trouble" with the employer. The court recognized that the
743. Id
744. Id at 295-96.
745. Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 430 (1953).
746. 170 N.L.R.B. 362 (1968).
747. Id at 362 ("[Tlhe potential for distraction, last minute electioneering or pressure,
and unfair advantage from prolonged conversations between representatives of any party to
the election and voters waiting to cast ballots is of sufficient concern to warrant a strict rule
against such conduct, without inquiry into the nature of the conversations.").
748. Id at 363.
749. 639 F.2d 479, 484 (9th Cir. 1980).
750. Id at 485.
751. Id at 484 (quoting Michem, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 362, 363 (1968)).
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latter comment "begins to approach the kind of electioneering con-
demned in Michem. '752 The court, however, deferred to the Board's
finding that both comments were innocuous.75 3 It concluded that no
individual conversation involved in Vista Hill was sufficient to support
reversal of the election and that the six conversations in the aggregate
did not constitute the type of "prolonged conversations" that represent
a "potential for distraction, last minute electioneering, and unfair
advantage.
75 4
The dissent in Vista Hill pointed out that there were other voters
in line that probably heard the two conversations that bore directly on
the election.755 These five to seven additional voters may have been
influenced to vote for the union because of the conversations they over-
heard." 6 Because the election was so close (forty to thirty-two in favor
of the union), the dissent concluded that the election should have been
set aside.757 The dissent further suggested that the union observer en-
gaged the voters in conversation in order to ingratiate himself to the
union and thereby to influence the voters.758
Although the dissent's points are well taken, it fails to take into
account the deferential review standard applied to a Board decision
based on its own expertise in applying its own standards for evaluating
a representation election.759 Assuming this review standard was
proper, the majority opinion correctly applied it to arrive at the appro-
priate result.
In the second case, South Pac'c Furniture, Inc. v. NLRB, 760 em-
ployees were waiting in a room adjacent to the balloting area when a
union observer stated "[c]ome on and vote, exercise your power.
761
The court recognized that "sustained" or "prolonged" conversation at
the polls, regardless of its context necessitate a new election.762 The
court, however, declined to characterize the "essentially neutral state-
ment" by the observer as a conversation, much less as a sustained
one.763 Further, the court concluded that the statement was not elec-
752. 639 F.2d at 484.
753. Id
754. Id at 484-85 (quoting Michem, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 362 (1968)).
755. 639 F.2d at 485 (Choy, J., dissenting).
756. Id
757. Id at 480, 485.
758. Id at 485.
759. See id at 484.
760. 627 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980).
761. Id at 174.
762. Id at 175 (quoting Michem, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 362 (1968)).
763. 627 F.2d at 175.
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tioneering because it could not have inhibited the free choice of the
voters in selecting their representatives."M
c. ballots
A ballot in a representation election that does not conform to the
proper designation procedure will not be counted unless the voter's in-
tent has been clearly manifested.765 Ballots with marks in both squares
have been held to be both invalid76 6 and valid7 67 by the Board depend-
ing upon whether there was a clear manifestation of the voter's intent.
Recently, in NLRB v. Leonard Creations of California, Inc. ,768 a
voter had marked a ballot with a completed "X" in the "No" box, and
with a slash in one direction and a half slash in the other direction in
the "Yes" box. The Ninth Circuit found little support for the Board's
conclusion that the voter's intent was unclear. The court stated that the
voter's intent to vote "no" was clearly indicated by the completed "X"
in the "No" box 769 and held that the ballot should have been
counted.770
d unfair laborpracticesprior to an election
If, prior to an election, an employer engages in unfair labor prac-
tices, the election may be set aside.7
764. Id
765. NLRB v. Metro-Truck Body, Inc., 613 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1979) (ballot insertion
of "si" in "yes" box properly counted as "yes" vote), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980);
NLRB v. Sauk Valley Mfg. Co., 486 F.2d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 1973); accord NLRB v. To-
bacco Processors, Inc., 456 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1972) (improper not to count as "no" votes,
vote ballots with blank face and "no" written on back); NLRB v. Titche Goettinger Co., 433
F.2d 1045, 1048 (5th Cir. 1970) ("no" written on blank side of ballot sufficient to reject union
representation).
766. See, e.g., Caribe Indus. and Elec. Supply Inc., 216 N.L.R.B. 168-69 (1975) (ballot
void where marked with vertical line in "No" square and complete "x" in "Yes" square);
Gerber Plastic Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 269, 270 (1954) (ballot void when marked with short diag-
onal line in "Yes" square and heavily marked "x" with wavy line in "No" square).
767. See, e.g., Abtex Beverage Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 1271 (1978) (ballot with "x" in both
"Yes" and "No" boxes held valid when "No" box was obliterated with circular markings
indicating intent to vote "Yes"); Belmont Smelting & Refining Workings, Inc., 115 N.L.R.B.
1481-83 (1956) (diagonal line in "Neither" box and clear and complete "x" in a different box
held valid vote).
768. 638 F.2d 111 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 452 U.S. 955 (1981).
769. Id at 113.
770. Id
771. NLRB v. Chatfield-Anderson Co., 606 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1979) (unfair labor
practices committed by employer prior to election justified its nullification).
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e. miscellaneous
In NLRB v. Belcor, Inc. ,772 the Ninth Circuit addressed whether
the Board should have ordered a hearing on certain factual issues
raised by an employer in support of its claim that an election should be
set aside before issuing a bargaining order.7 7 3 The employees had
voted for the union by a substantial margin. Belcor, the employer, filed
a number of objections regarding the conduct of the election.
The Regional Director, without conducting a hearing, overruled
these objections and issued a report to the Board recommending that it
also overrule the objections. The Board adopted the Regional Direc-
tor's report and certified the union as the employees' bargaining repre-
sentative. Belcor then refused to bargain with the union and was
charged with violating section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA. Refusing
to consider Belcor's objections to the conduct of the election, the Board
ordered Belcor to bargain with the union.7
The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the rule that if there is a material
issue of fact created by the Regional Director's report and the corre-
sponding exceptions to it, a hearing must be held.775 Thus, the issue
became whether Belcor's exceptions raised any material issues of fact
necessitating a hearing.
Belcor introduced employee affidavits stating that prior to the elec-
tion a union adherent had promised the affiants initiation fee waivers
in return for their signatures on recognition slips. Eight employees
may have signed for this reason.776 The Board, however, argued that
the union adherent's illegal offers could not be attributed to the union
itself.777 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the evidence could support
a finding that the union either authorized or condoned the union ad-
herent's conduct and that the Board erred in failing to resolve the issue
without a hearing.778
Belcor also offered evidence that the "24 hour rule" adopted by the
Board in Peerless Plywood Co. 71 9 was violated. This rule bans
772. 652 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1981).
773. Id at 858.
774. Id
775. Id at 859 (citing NLRB v. Claxton Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 1364, 1366-67 (5th Cir.),
modoed on other grounds, 618 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1980)).
776. 652 F.2d at 860. In NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270 (1973), the Court held
that this type of conduct could warrant setting aside an election, if the employees' free choice
had been impaired.
777. 652 F.2d at 860.
778. Id
779. 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
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mandatory meetings of employees for campaign speeches twenty-four
hours before an election.780  Belcor proffered an index card that re-
ferred to a mandatory meeting at someone's house, within twenty-four
hours of the elections. Because the Regional Director's report con-
cluded that the employees treated the meeting as an informal get-to-
gether without any supporting documentation, the court held that
resolution of the issue required a hearing.78
2. Contract bar rule
Under section 9(c)(1) of the NLRA,782 the Board may hold a rep-
resentation election when it finds that a question of representation ex-
ists; 783 the Board, however, has limited the application of this section
under the contract bar rule. The rule bars a representation election
when there is a valid collective bargaining agreement in existence for a
period not to exceed three years unless the petition for redetermination
of a union's representation status is filed more than sixty and less than
ninety days before the contract ends.78 The rule's purpose is to pre-
serve stability between the parties to the agreement and to give employ-
ees an opportunity to change or eliminate their union.78 - The rule is
not applied, however, when there is a union schism786 or when the
union is defunct.787 In determining whether to impose a contract bar
when an incumbent union issues a valid disclaimer of representational
interest, the Board has usually balanced the need to preserve industrial
stability with the need to protect the employees' opportunity to change
780. Id at 429.
781. 652 F.2d at 861. Belcor's evidence regarding coercion, sabotage, electioneering, im-
proper use of voting lists, lack of Spanish ballots, and union misrepresentation was rejected
by the court as failing to raise any material issue of fact requiring a hearing. Id at 861-62.
782. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976).
783. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976) provides in pertinent part that "the Board shall investi-
gate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation
affecting commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice."
784. General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1962) (contract bars petition filed
earlier than 90 days before end of its three year term); see Bob's Big Boy Family Restaurants
v. NLRB, 625 F.2d 850, 851 (9th Cir. 1980) (contract bars petition filed 59 days before end of
three year term); see also Pioneer Inn Assoc. v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 835, 838-39 (9th Cir. 1978)
(contract bar rule applied to employer who refused to adhere to contract because of doubt of
union majority representation).
785. East Mfg. Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 5, 6 (1979).
786. Hershey Chocolate Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 901, 906-10 (1958) (basic intra-union con-
ffict resulting in employer being confronted with two labor organizations, both claiming
employee representation), enforcement denied on other grounds, 297 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1961).
787. 121 N.L.R.B. at 911 (union unwilling and unable to represent employees at time its
status questioned).
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their bargaining representative.8 8 Recently, however, in American
Sunroof Corp.- West Coast, Inc. ,789 the Board did not apply this balanc-
ing approach but concluded that the contract did not bar an election of
a new union following an incumbent union's valid disclaimer of
interest.790
In NLRB v. Circle A & W Products Co. ,791 the Ninth Circuit ad-
dressed whether a collective bargaining agreement barred an election
of a new union after the incumbent union formally disclaimed repre-
sentational interest. The incumbent union, Local 49, had represented
Circle A & W's employees when a three year collective bargaining
agreement went into effect on January 1, 1977.792 On March 30, 1977,
the employees voted to remove a union security clause which gave Lo-
cal 49 the authority to require union membership as a condition of em-
ployment. As a result, Local 49 formally disclaimed its
representational interest in the employees. Subsequently, a new union,
Local 206, filed a representation petition. At the representation hearing
the Regional Director rejected Circle A & W's contention that the con-
tract barred Local 206's petition and directed that an election be held.
Local 206 was then elected as the bargaining representative. Following
Circle A & W's refusal to bargain with Local 206, the Board issued a
bargaining order.793
At the hearing, Circle A & W argued that employees may obtain a
new bargaining representative during the term of the contract only
when there is a union schism or when the union is defunct.794 Al-
though it recognized this argument, the court relied on the recent
Board decision in American Sunroof Corp.- West Coast, Inc. ,795 where
the Board held that the contract bar defense was not applicable under
similar circumstances despite the employer's interest in the stability of
the contract.7 96 The court ruled that a new bargaining representative
could not be obtained if the motive underlying severance from the in-
788. See East Mfg. Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 5, 6-7 (1979) (union disclaimer ineffective to
prevent contract bar to election).
789. 243 N.L.R.B. 1128 (1979).
790. Id at 1129. The disclaimer was prompted by a petition for deauthorization filed and
signed by 39 of 40 employees. The petition requested an election to decide whether the
employees desired to remove a union security clause in the collective bargaining agreement.
Id at 1128.
791. 647 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1054 (1981).
792. Id at 925.
793. Id
794. Id
795. 243 N.L.R.B. 1128 (1979).
796. 647 F.2d at 925-26.
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cumbent union was to avoid the collective bargaining contract.797 The
court further ruled that this illegal motive may be presumed when a
union disclaimer is "insignificant, minor, or contrary to the policies of
the Act. 798
Despite the Board's failure to articulate its reasons for not apply-
ing the contract bar rule, the court enforced the bargaining order.799
The court's conclusion rested on Circle A & W's failure to allege that it
was the intent of Local 49 or the employees to avoid the collective bar-
gaining agreement °.8 1 Circle A & W's assertion that the sole reason for
the change in bargaining representative was the dispute over the union
security clause supported the inference of a legitimate disagreement of
policy between Local 49 and the employees, rather than an attempt to
avoid the collective bargaining agreement.8 0'
The dissent noted the current uncertainty regarding the applica-
tion of the contract bar rule when a union makes a valid disclaimer of
interest.8 2 It pointed out that the majority contributed to this uncer-
tainty by endorsing the relevant policies of the pre-American Sunroof
precedent while upholding the inapplicability of the contract bar rule
solely on the grounds of Local 49's valid disclaimer.0 3 For these rea-
sons, the dissent concluded that the case should have been remanded to
the Board with instructions to explain its decision suspending the con-
tract bar rule. °4
C. Recognition without Election
Union recognition is not limited to the Board election and certifi-
cation procedures established under section 9(c) of the NLRA. An em-
ployer has a duty to bargain whenever the union presents "convincing
evidence of majority support." 05 Majority status can be established
through a showing of convincing support by a union. 0 6 Additionally,
majority support may be shown by a union's presenting cards signed by
a majority of employees authorizing union representation in collective
797. Id at 926.
798. Id There are circumstances, however, where an employee's right to effective repre-
sentation will require a new representative. Id at 926 n.2.
799. Id at 926.
800. Id
801. Id at 926-27.
802. Id at 927.
803. Id
804. Id
805. NLRB v. Southland Paint Co., 394 F.2d 717, 724 (5th Cir. 1968).
806. See, e.g., NLRB v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 112 F.2d 756, 757 (2d Cir. 1940);




A union may obtain recognition by a Board-issued bargaining or-
der when an employer commits unfair labor practices which either pre-
clude a fair election or justify setting it aside. In NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co. ,"'8 the Supreme Court held that a bargaining order was
proper when it was shown that the union had obtained a card major-
ity.8 09 The Court further held that the employer's unfair labor prac-
tices tended to "undermine majority strength and impede the election
processes" such that a fair election or rerun election was precluded.8"0
1. Representation by a majority of authorization cards
The Gissel Court adopted the rule that unambiguous union au-
thorization cards may be counted to determine majority status to sup-
port a bargaining order unless it was proved that an employee was told
that the card would be used solely to obtain an election."1' The Ninth
Circuit recently decided three cases in which an employer challenged
the validity of union authorization cards used by the Board to justify a
bargaining order.
In NLRB v. Anchorage Times Publishing Co. ,12 the Board con-
cluded that seven employees had not been improperly solicited when
told that the authorization cards would be used to arrange an election.
The employees' affidavits indicated they could not remember whether
this was the cards' sole purpose.81 3 The Ninth Circuit stated that with-
out direct testimony of improper solicitation, it could not substitute the
Board's factual finding with a determination that "Union adherents
had 'deliberately and clearly' cancelled the card's Union authorization
purpose."8"4 For this reason, the court upheld the Board's finding that
the authorization cards were valid.
807. See United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 69-71 (1956);
NLRB v. J.M. Machinery Corp., 410 F.2d 587, 591 (5th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Southland
Paint Co., 394 F.2d 717, 724 (5th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862,
868 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576 (1938).
808. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
809. Id at 596-97.
810. Id at 614.
811. Id at 606-09. The Court stated that "employees should be bound by the clear lan-
guage of what they sign unless that language is deliberately and clearly cancelled by a union
adherent with words calculated to direct the signer to disregard and forget the language
above his signature." Id at 606; see Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268, 1269
(1963).
812. 637 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835 (1981).
813. Id at 1369.
814. Id
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InNLRB v. Davis,'15 the Ninth Circuit upheld the Board's finding
that the union had obtained a valid signature card majority. The
court's decision rested on management's failure to prove that the union
had represented that the cards were solely for arranging an election."
16
Finally, in Pay'n Save Corp. v. NLRB,81 7 the Ninth Circuit held
that union cards, which unambiguously authorized union representa-
tion, were valid and could properly be used to find majority support.
The court reasoned that the retailer-employer had failed to show that
any signatures were obtained by any misrepresentations. 8"
2. Unfair labor practices
a. free election process undermined
A bargaining order is properly issued when the Board finds that an
employer's unfair labor practices are so severe as to undermine union
majority strength and impede the election process.819 In NLRB v.
Anchorage Times Publishing Co. ,820 the union held a card majority but
lost the election. The election was subsequently set aside because of
the employer's unfair labor practices.8 2' The Board issued a bargain-
ing order after finding that the employer's unfair labor practices were
pervasive and severe enough to prevent a fair rerun election. 22 The
employer had subjected employees to unlawful interrogations, surveil-
lance, threats, and discharge because of union sympathies, and had in-
creased wages immediately prior to the election. Finding substantial
evidence to support the Board's conclusion, the Ninth Circuit upheld
the order.
8 23
In NLRB v. Davis,24 an employer committed unfair labor prac-
tices by discharging employees who had signed union authorization
cards, by threatening discharge for participation in union activities, and
by making certain anti-union statements. The Ninth Circuit agreed
with the Board's conclusion that the employer's conduct would have a
long-lasting and possibly permanent effect on the employees' freedom
815. 642 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1981).
816. Id at 353.
817. 641 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1981).
818. Id at 703.
819. See supra note 850 and accompanying text.
820. 637 F.2d 1359.
821. Id at 1370. See infra note 830 and accompanying text.
822. 637 F.2d at 1370.
823. Id at 1369-70.
824. 642 F.2d 350.
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to choose a bargaining agent.825 Therefore, any remedy short of a bar-
gaining order would have been ineffective.826
In Payn Save v. NLRB, the Ninth Circuit held that an employer
had committed an unfair labor practice by suspending and later dis-
charging two employees for wearing union campaign buttons during a
81union organizational campaign. 27 Pay'n Save alleged an unwritten
policy prohibiting employees from wearing political, controversial, or
offensive insignia on store jackets. The policy was intended to avoid
offending customers. The employer argued that its union button ban
was justified as a "special consideration" because it involved a legiti-
mate concern about the image conveyed to customers.8 28 The court
recognized the rule that absent "special considerations," the right to
wear union buttons to work is protected by section 7 of the NLRA.829
In support of its argument, Pay'n Save relied on NLRB v. Harrah's
Club 3 ' and Davison-Paxon Co. v. NLRB.83'
The Ninth Circuit found both cases distinguishable. In Harrah's
Club, the court found a "special consideration" in the need by an em-
ployer "to project a certain type of image to the public. '8 32 However,
Pay'n Save was distinguished from Harrah's Club because the latter
involved no union organizational. campaign.8 33 Although the Fifth
Circuit, in Davison-Paxon, had upheld a ban on union buttons during
an organizational campaign, this case was distinquished from Pay'n
Save because it involved animosity between union and anti-union fac-
tions at the store, justifying the union button ban.8 34 Further, in Pay'n
Save, the court found that substantial evidence supported the Board's
finding of discriminatory enforcement of the button rule, whereas no
selective enforcement was found to exist in Harrah's Club or Davison-
Paxon .835 The Pay'n Save court concluded that this selective enforce-
ment constituted an unfair labor practice. 36 Moreover, the court en-
forced the bargaining order because it found Pay'n Save's unfair labor
practices had a" 'tendency to undermine majority strength and impede
825. Id. at 356.
826. Id
827. 641 F.2d at 702.
828. Id at 700.
829. Id (citing 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976)).
830. 337 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1964).
831. 462 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1972).
832. 337 F.2d at 180.
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the election process.' "837
In NLRB v. Circo Resorts,838 the Ninth Circuit held that a hotel-
casino employer had committed unfair labor practices during the or-
ganization of stagehand employees by interrogating them concerning
their union sympathies, and by discharging two employees who had
been soliciting union authorization card signatures. 839 Although the
court found the practices insufficient to require a bargaining order as a
matter of law,8" considering the union's majority status and the greater
need for an order when a small bargaining unit is involved, the court
deemed the bargaining unit appropriate . 4 1 The court noted that these
practices tended to undermine the union's majority strength and inter-
fered with a fair election." 2
Finally, in NLRB v. Cofer, 43 an employer committed unfair labor
practices when it terminated four motel maids, who constituted a card
majority, for organizing to seek higher wages. The employer argued
that the Board's bargaining order should not have been issued because
(1) the Board erred in finding that a bargaining demand had been
made by the union; (2) the employee terminations had occurred before
the employer knew that the union was involved; and (3) there was no
evidence that a free representation election would not now be
possible. 844
The Ninth Circuit rejected the first contention, as it found substan-
tial evidence to support the Board's finding that a bargaining demand
had been made." s The second contention was rejected because the
court considered immaterial the employer's awareness of the union's
role when the employees were fired. The court reasoned that because a
bargaining order could have been issued to protect the maids' organiza-
tional activity had they taken all the actions themselves, and because
the employer was aware of the maids' early concerted efforts to obtain
wage increases to comport with the minimum wage, a bargaining order
could properly be issued even if the employer was not aware of a subse-
quent incidental acquisition of an already existing union
837. Id at 703 (quoting Gissel, 395 U.S. at 614).
838. 646 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1981).
839. Id at 405.
840. Id at 406.
841. Id
842. Id
843. 637 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1981).
844. Id at 1314-15.




The third contention was rejected because whether a fair election
is possible is determined as of the time the election was or could have
been held and not at the time of enforcement. 47 Otherwise, an em-
ployer could refuse a bargaining demand and hope that the delay
would cause a favorable change in the circumstances. 48  Therefore,
because of the severity of the unfair labor practices suffered by the ma-
jority of the motel maids, the court enforced the bargaining order.
8 49
b. minimal impact on the election process
In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. ,850 the Supreme Court identified a
category of "minor or less extensive unfair labor practices, which, be-
cause of their minimal impact on the election machinery, will not sus-
tain a bargaining order." '851  In NLRB v. Peninsula Association for
Retarded Children andAdults,852 an employer committed unfair labor
practices by interrogating employees prior to an election. The Ninth
Circuit held that the Board's bargaining order was not justified. 3 The
court based its holding on the following factors: (1) two of the three
interrogations were non-coercive; (2) all interrogations occurred at least
four months prior to the election; and (3) the manager directly respon-
sible for the violations, and most of those employed at the time the
violations occurred were no longer working for the employer when the
election was held.854 The court concluded that these factors, taken to-
gether, indicated the bargaining order was not warranted. 5
3. Union recognition by a successor employer
Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for
846. Id at 1315; see Gissel, 395 U.S. at 603.
847. 637 F.2d at 1315.
848. Id; NLRB v. Tri St. Shores, 477 F.2d 204, 207 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1130 (1973); see NLRB v. L.B. Foster Co., 418 F.2d 1, 4 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 990 (1970).
849. 637 F.2d at 1315.
850. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
851. Id at 615; see NLRB v. Chatfield Anderson Co., 606 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1979);
NLRB v. Pilgrim Foods, Inc., 591 F.2d 110, 120 (1st Cir. 1978).
852. 627 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1980).
853. Id at 204.
854. Id at 204-05. The court noted that a number of courts had declined to enforce a
bargaining order when violations as serious or more serious had occurred. Id at 204 (citing
NLRB v. Pilgrim Foods, Inc., 591 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1979); First Lakewood Ass'n v. NLRB,
582 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. East Side Shoppe, 498 F.2d 1334 (6th Cir. 1974);
NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc., 472 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1972)).
855. 627 F.2d at 205.
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an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees subject to the provisions of Section [9(a)]. ' 56 This
section has been applied to successor employers.
In NLRB v. Burns International Securiy Services, Inc. ,857 a major-
ity of an employer's security guard employees were represented by a
union which had a collective bargaining agreement with the guard's
prior employer. The successor employer had taken over for the prede-
cessor when the latter lost its contract to provide security protection for
a factory. The successor then hired the predecessor's old guards, who
constituted a majority of its employees. The Supreme Court held that a
successor employer may be ordered to bargain with an incumbent
union when the bargaining unit remains unchanged and a majority of
the employees hired by the successor are represented by the union. 88
The Court stated that Board certification of a union carries an almost
conclusive presumption that the union's majority status continues for a
reasonable time when the same employer is involved. 59 The Court
extended this presumption to a successor employer. A change of em-
ployers is presumed not to affect Board certification as long as a major-
ity of employees continue to be employed by the successor.8 60 A
successor employer may rebut this presumption by establishing either
that the union no longer represents an employee majority, or that there
are circumstances indicating a good faith doubt about the union's ma-
jority status.86'
In NLRB v. Edjo, Inc. ,862 the Ninth Circuit applied the presump-
tion to a successor employer, Edjo, who had purchased a trucking busi-
ness from an employer whose twenty-one drivers were represented by a
union. Edjo hired all twenty-one of its predecessor's drivers and, in
addition, hired eight new drivers. In support of its refusal to bargain
with the union, Edjo argued that the union lacked majority support
because eight of the rehired employees had expressed dissatisfaction
856. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or other
conditions of employment.
857. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
858. Id at 281.
859. Id at 279 n.3.
860. Id at 279; see, eg., NLRB v. Denham, 469 F.2d 239, 244 (9th Cir. 1972) (presump-
tion applied to successor employer where predecessor employer voluntarily recognized
union).
861. NLRB v. Denham, 469 F.2d 239, 244 (9th Cir. 1972).
862. 631 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1980).
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with the union.863 The Board, however, applied a "new hire presump-
tion," which means that newly hired employees will be considered as
supporting the union in the same proportion as the original employees.
Edjo failed to rebut this latter presumption.864 The court found that
the Board's use of the "new hire presumption" was consistent with
Burns International.8 65 The court concluded that Edjo had a duty to
bargain with the union and enforced the bargaining order.
8 66
Judge Blumenfeld, in a concurring opinion, concluded that the
Board's use of the "new hire presumption" was unnecessary because
the facts indicated that Edjo was not a successor employer but rather a
parent to the predecessor.867 Further, even if Edjo was a successor, the
use of the "new hire presumption" was not necessary because Edjo in-
tended to and did retain all of the predecessor's employees, and it was
thus appropriate for him to consult with their union before employ-
ment terms were fixed.
868
IV. THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCESS
A. Negotiation of the Collective-Bargaining Agreement
1. The duty to bargain in good faith
To effectuate the purpose of the NLRA, section 8(a)(5) of the
Act 869 provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer 870 to
863. Id at 607.
864. Id; see NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 303 (9th Cir. 1978) (new hire
presumption applied where high employee turnover present), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921,
rehl' denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979); NLRB v. Crimptex Inc., 517 F.2d 501, 503 n.3 (Ist Cir.
1975) (new hire presumption applied to replacements of striking employees).
865. 631 F.2d at 607 (citing NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs. Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972)).
The court suggested three ways that an employer could rebut the presumption:
1. He may demonstrate that less than a majority of his employees were employed
by his predecessor.
2. Alternatively, he may show that a majority of the holdover employees reject
the union (and thus imply that a majority of the newly hired employees also reject
the union).
3. Finally, he may demonstrate that the newly hired employees in fact reject the
union, thus overcoming the new hire presumption.
631 F.2d at 607.
866. Id at 608.
867. Id (Blumenfeld, J., concurring).
868. Id; see 406 U.S. at 294-95.
869. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
870. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976) defines "employer" as:
any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not
include the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any
Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any person
subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or any labor
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refuse to bargain collectively 7 1 with the representatives8 72 of its em-
ployees.873 Under a parallel section of the Act it is an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization 74 to refuse to bargain collectively
with the employer. 875 Under the Act, parties to a collective bargaining
process have a mutual obligation to meet and confer in good faith. As
with other provisions of the Act, the courts have been called upon to
define what constitutes "good faith" bargaining by both management
and labor.
a. suiface bargaining
Although the parties are required to bargain collectively in good
faith to negotiate an agreement, section 8(d) of the Act 76 expressly pro-
vides that neither party is under a statutory duty to make any conces-
sion or agree to any proposal that arises during the contract
negotiations. The absence of a statutory duty to reach an agreement,
coupled with the express obligation that the parties must meet and con-
fer, requires the Board and the courts to distinguish between "surface"
and "hard" bargaining.877
One commentator stated that the purpose of the surface bargain-
organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the
capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.
871. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976) provides that collective bargaining is:
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of
the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written
contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party.
872. 29 U.S.C. § 152(4) (1976) defines the term "representatives" to include any individ-
ual or labor organization.
873. Under 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976), the term "employee" includes "any employee" and
is not limited to the employees of a particular employer. It includes any individual whose
employment has ceased due to a current labor dispute or unfair labor practice. Specifically
excluded from the class of employees covered by the Act are agricultural laborers, domestic
servants, an individual employed by his or her parents or spouse, independent contractors,
supervisors, or individuals whose employer is subject to the Railway Labor Act.
874. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1976) defines "labor organization" as:
any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee
or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole
or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages,
rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
875. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1976).
876. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976) provides that "such obligation [to bargain collectively]
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession."
877. "Surface bargaining" has been defined as the act of "going through the motions of
negotiating" absent an intent to reach agreement. Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith,
71 HARv. L. Rav. 1401, 1413 (1958).
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ing prohibition is to protect "the bargaining status of the union."8 7
Accordingly, most decisions which have found the presence of surface
bargaining have focused on the conduct of employers. 79 Labor orga-
nizations, however, have also been found to engage in surface
bargaining. 8 0
Because an employer might have several valid and complex rea-
sons for refusing to accept a seemingly reasonable union proposal,
commentators have suggested that the Board should not "draw an in-
ference of bad faith from the unreasonableness of [the employer's] po-
sition."8 '' When the Board undertakes to review the reasonableness of
a party's proposal, it runs the risk of impinging upon the freedom en-
joyed by the parties to negotiate their own contract.8 8 2
In Queen Mary Restaurants Corp. v. NRLB ss3 the Ninth Circuit
observed that an attempt to distinguish surface from hard bargaining
"often forces the trier [of fact] to draw difficult inferences from conduct
to motivation. ' 8 4 Despite the professed reluctance of courts to inquire
into the motivation of an allegedly intransigent party, the Ninth Circuit
made this inquiry in K-Mart Corp. v. NRLB s.8 85 The court upheld the
Board's finding that the employer had engaged in surface bargaining.
The ludicrousness of the employer's proposals convinced the court that
the Board's finding was supported by substantial evidence and should
be upheld. The court reasoned that a wage offer which included no
increase in fringe benefits, contained salary raises ranging from 4% for
starting employees to less than 1% for those with up to eighteen months
experience, and which had no increase for employees with more than
eighteen months experience was evidence that the employer was not
bargaining seriously.
886
b. refusal to furnish requested information
An employer has an obligation to provide the union with certain
878. Id
879. E.g., NLRB v. Selvin, 527 F.2d 1273, 1277-78 (9th Cir. 1975).
880. See, e.g., Greensboro News Co., 222 N.L.R.B. 893 (1976), enforced, 549 F.2d 308
(4th Cir. 1977).
881. E.g., Cox, supra note 877, at 1419.
882. See, GORMAN, BASIc TExT ON LABOR LAW 489 (1976).
883. 560 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1977).
884. Id at 407.
885. 626 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1980).
886. Id at 707 & n.3. The court agreed with the Administrative Law Judge's characteri-
zation of these wage proposals as "meager" and held that the employer's delay in presenting
its proposal was "substantial evidence to support the inference [of surface bargaining]." Id
at 707.
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relevant information concerning the collective bargaining process.88 7 A
liberal, discovery-type standard is used to determine if the information
requested is relevant to the union's duties.888 An employer's failure to
furnish the requested information constitutes a violation of the duty to
bargain in good faith.8 89 The Ninth Circuit has held certain informa-
tion to be presumptively relevant,89° but when the requested informa-
tion does not fall into this category, the union has the threshold burden
of proving its relevancy to the bargaining process.
891
In NLRB v. Associated General Contractors, Inc.,892 the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that a multi-employer bargaining unit's refusal to furnish the
union with a roster of contractors, whose firms were in the Open Shop
or Open Shop Specialty classifications, was a violation of its duty to
bargain in good faith. The court found that the information sought by
the unions was relevant to their investigation of potential 'contract vio-
lations by individual members of the unit. The court further concluded
that the information should have been disclosed under the liberal, dis-
covery-type standard of relevancy even though no actual violations had
been established. 93
The court accepted the unions' position that they needed the infor-
mation to conduct their own investigation of possible contract viola-
tions. The unit claimed that disclosure was unnecessary because it had
conducted its own review, but the court rejected this argument on the
ground that a review by the unit was not responsive to the union's need
to conduct its own determination of the status of contract violations.
8 94
The court also held that the potential misuse of the roster by the union
for organizational purposes did not make it irrelevant to the unions'
duties in administering the contract.895 The court dismissed the unit's
887. E.g., Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 303 (1979); NLRB v. Acme Indus.
Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956).
888. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432,437 (1967); San Diego Newspaper Guild v.
NLRB, 548 F.2d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 1977).
889. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976); NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571, 584 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 906 (1981).
890. Information regarding wages, hours, or conditions of employment is presumptively
relevant and must be furnished to the union unless the employer can rebut the presumption
by proving a lack of relevance. Western Mass. Elec. Co. v. NRLB, 573 F.2d 101, 105 (1st
Cir. 1978); San Diego Newspaper Guild v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 1977).
891. San Diego Newspaper Guild v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 863, 867-68; Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 77, 84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 928 (1969); Curtiss-Wright
Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 68 (3d Cir. 1965).
892. 633 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1980).
893. Id at 771.
894. Id at 772.
895. Id The court distinguished NLRB v. A.S. Abell Co., 624 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1980)
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argument that disclosure would subject its members to violence and
harassment,8 96 and would constitute a violation of its first amendment
rights.
897
In Press Democrat Publishing Co. v. NLRB,8 98 the Ninth Circuit
upheld the Board's determination that information regarding amounts
paid to independent correspondents by newspaper publishers for edito-
rial product was relevant to wage demands made by the union.89 9 The
Board, however, had also determined that the employers' need for con-
fidentiality regarding compensation to individual employees out-
weighed the union's interest in receiving wage information about
specific nonunit individuals. The Board, therefore, fashioned a decree
ordering disclosure of only the total amount paid to nonunit correspon-
dents for editorial product.9°° The Ninth Circuit found the record de-
void of evidence supporting the Board's conclusion regarding
confidentiality and remanded the case to the Board for clarification of
its order.901
In K-Mart Corp. v. NLRB, 902 the Ninth Circuit followed the gen-
eral rule that information necessary to substantiate an employer's as-
sertions regarding the propriety of its wage scale must be furnished to
the union upon request. The court ordered the employer to furnish the
union with information regarding wage increases at the employer's dis-
tribution centers. The court held that this information was necessary to
substantiate the employer's assertion that its policy was to establish
(though employer able to rebut presumption of relevance by showing prior misuse of re-
quested information, union could still obtain information by making affirmative showing of
relevance) by pointing out that the union could still obtain the information by making an
affirmative showing of relevance. 633 F.2d at 772.
896. 633 F.2d at 772 (citing Shell Oil Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 615, 618-19 (9th Cir. 1972)).
The court found no "clear and present" danger which would accrue to the employer or its
members that might justify a refusal to furnish the roster.
897. 633 F.2d at 772 n.9.
898. 629 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1980).
899. Id at 1326. The Board had found that the information was relevant to the union's
wage demands, a mandated subject of bargaining, because the unit and nonunit workers
performed virtually identical editorial functions and furnished editorial material to the same
employer. Furthermore, the union was legitimately concerned about the use of nonunit
correspondents to perform unit work. Id
900. Id
901. Id at 1327. The Board has broad discretion in providing remedies for violations of
the Act. NLRB v. Seven Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346 (1953). Its orders may be
reviewed for abuse of discretion, however, because the Act does not contemplate the Board's
being given a "blank check for arbitrary action." 629 F.2d at 1327 (citing Detroit Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 316 (1979)).
902. 626 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1980).
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wage rates in accordance with local community standards. 9 3
2. The effect of a change in the bargaining unit
When an employer is charged with refusing to bargain, 9" a pre-
sumption arises that the union represented a majority of the unit em-
ployees at the time of the refusal.9 5 An employer may rebut this
presumption by demonstrating a "good faith" reasonable doubt as to
union majority support at the time of its refusal.9°6 The employer's
"good faith" doubt is objectively measured by what he or she knows
rather than by a subjective test of why he or she seeks to use that
knowledge.907 The employer's "reasonable doubt" must be supported
by unambiguous indicia of non-majority support for the union.90 The
strict standard of proof required by the Ninth Circuit to support this
"reasonable doubt" was illustrated in NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc. 
909
The Tahoe Nugget court rejected seven factors advanced by the em-
ployer as evidence of the loss of the union's majority status. These fac-
tors were: (1) employee discontent, as evidenced by statements
derogating the union allegedly made by employees to management; (2)
high employee turnover; (3) union inactivity, as shown by the fact that
no grievances had been processed over a span of years; (4) low level of
employee membership in the union; (5) the union's financial difficul-
ties; (6) a history of amicable bargaining between the parties; and (7)
admissions made by union leadership regarding the level of union sup-
port. The court considered each of these factors in turn and found that
903. Id at 707 (citing NLRB v. Truitt Mfg., 351 U.S. 149 (1956)). In Truitt, the Supreme
Court held that information was relevant when it was needed to verify an employer's claim,
made during a bargaining session, that it could not afford a wage increase. Id at 152-53.
The Ninth Circuit relied heavily upon General Electric Co. v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 1177, 1184
(6th Cir. 1972) ("Where, as here, the employer defends its wage scale by contending it is
'proper,' and implements a policy of paying wages commensurate with the local wage stan-
dards, then good faith bargaining requires the production of reasonable proof to substanti-
ate his claims.").
904. Under 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976) it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to
refuse to bargain in good faith with a union representing a majority of its employees.
905. NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 297 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 921 (1979).
906. NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571, 577 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
906 (1981).
907. "The good faith criterion is unconcerned with the employer's subjective motivation;
its focus is empirical and objective." NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d at 299; see also
Automated Bus. Systems v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Gulfmont Hotel
Co., 362 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1966).
908. NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 297 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 921 (1979).
909. Id
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they were singly and collectively unpersuasive. The court found that
"the inferences of loss of [u]nion support are ambiguous."910
In Sahara-Tahoe Corp. v. NLRB, 9 ' the employer offered evidence
of lack of union support similar to that rejected by the court in Tahoe
Nugget. The employer demonstrated that unit members had crossed a
picket line set up by a separate unit of employees within the union and
that more than 30% of the employees in the unit had signed a petition
entitled "Employees . . . who do not want to belong to any culinary
union."
9 12
In reviewing the evidence, the Board gave little weight to the peti-
tion because it was worded ambiguously, undated, and untimely.9 13
The Board further concluded that the crossing of the picket line was
only marginally relevant because the employer had not shown that the
picket line was instituted to create a work stoppage.
9 14
The Ninth Circuit upheld the Board's findings. The court noted,
however, that "evidence of a 30% support for decertification with other
indicia of nonsupport for the union can establish an employer's good
faith reasonable doubt of the union's majority status and justify its re-
fusal to bargain." 915 Under the facts of this case, the court concluded
that the petition by itself or coupled with the other evidence did not
unambiguously demonstrate a lack of employee support for the
union.
916
The court held that the employer needed unequivocal evidence of
the union's nonmajority status in order to arrive at a good faith reason-
able doubt justifying a refusal to bargain since "[i]n refusing to bargain
because of an alleged decline in union adherents, the employer is acting
as vicarious champion of its employees, a role no one has asked it to
assume."
917
3. Effect of a change in the employing unit
An employer who takes over a business is not bound to honor a
pre-existing labor contract entered into by the preceding owner unless
910. Id at 308.
911. 648 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 984 (1981).
912. Id at 555.
913. Id at 557.
914. Id at 555.
915. Id at 556 (citing J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 850, 859 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 893 (1978); National Cash Register Co. v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 189, 194
(8th Cir. 1974)).
916. 648 F.2d at 557.
917. Id (quoting Tahoe Nugget, 584 F.2d at 301).
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the Board makes a factual finding that the successor employer has as-
sumed the contract.91 When the bargaining unit remains intact, how-
ever, the new employer has a duty to bargain with the incumbent
union.9 19 This duty to bargain extends to unions that have been volun-
tarily recognized by the predecessor as well as those which have been
certified as the majority representative. 920 The duty to bargain with the
incumbent union is not imposed on the successor immediately upon his
or her purchase of the previous owner's stock or assets. The duty arises
when the new owner has hired his or her full complement of
employees.92'
In NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc.,92 2 the
Supreme Court enunciated the "perfectly clear" test, whereby a succes-
sor employer will be required to consult with the employees' bargain-
ing representative before it fixes terms and conditions when it is
perfectly clear by the employer's conduct that it plans to retain all the
employees in the unit.
9 23
In Bellingham Frozen Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 924 the Ninth Circuit
held that a successor employer cannot unilaterally change the terms
and conditions of employment of those employees that were retained
from the predecessor. In Bellingham, the successor employer asked the
retained employees in the production and maintenance unit to stay on
and assured them that they would be paid at the prevailing rate at the
time of the changeover. The new employer also indicated that it had
no plans for, nor did it announce, any changes in terms and conditions
of employment. When the employer subsequently denied any obliga-
tion to bargain with the incumbent union and unilaterally changed sev-
eral of the pre-existing terms and conditions of employment, the union
called a strike and filed a complaint with the Board.
925
The Ninth Circuit upheld the Board's order that the successor em-
ployer bargain with the agent of the production and maintenance unit
918. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 282-84 (1972).
919. Id at 284; see also NLRB v. Dent, 534 F.2d 844, 846 (9th Cir. 1976).
920. NLRB v. Denham, 469 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 411 U.S. 945 (1973).
921. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 295 (1972).
922. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
923. Although a successor employer is ordinarily free to set initial terms on which it
will hire the employees of a predecessor, there will be instances in which it is per-
fectly clear that the new employer plans to retain all of the employees in the unit
and in which it will be appropriate to have him initially consult with the employ-
ees' bargaining representative before he fixes terms.
Id at 294-95.
924. 626 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1125 (1981).
925. Id at 677.
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employees, that it redress any injuries suffered by employees by its re-
fusal to bargain, and that it discontinue those unfair labor practices
that precipitated the strike.926 The Bellingham court applied the "per-
fectly clear" test and found that the employer, by its conduct at the
time of the takeover and by virtue of its maintenance of the pre-existing
working conditions for a week after the changeover, had made it "per-
fectly clear" that it intended to retain all the employees in the produc-
tion and maintenance unit.
9 27
The union also charged that a member of the clerical staff of the
predecessor had been wrongfully terminated. The fact that a successor
employer is obligated to bargain with the agent for one bargaining unit
does not mean, however, that it is deemed a successor employer for all
purposes and must therefore bargain with representatives of each of its
bargaining units.9 28 Because the new employer had indicated its inten-
tion to provide its own clerical staff at the time of the changeover and
did not hire any of the predecessor clerical staff, the employer was held
not to be a successor employer with respect to the clerical unit. Accord-
ingly, the court set aside the Board's order reinstating the discharged
clerical worker.
9 29
In instances where new employees are added to the extant bar-
gaining unit, the Board will apply a "new hire" presumption that union
support in the new employee group is equivalent to that in the existing
unit.930 In NLRB v. Edjo, Inc.,931 the new employer purchased the
stock of the predecessor employer's trucking company and retained all
twenty-one of the predecessor's drivers. It immediately hired eight new
drivers and refused to recognize or bargain with the incumbent union.
The union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board, citing
the new employer's refusal to bargain with or recognize the incumbent
union, as well as the new employer's discontinuance of payments to the
union pension fund.932
The employer defended on the ground that it possessed a good
faith belief that the union no longer enjoyed a majority status among
the unit employees. The employer asserted that eight of the holdover
926. Id at 678.
927. Id at 679.
928. See Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., Hotel & Restaurant
Employees, 417 U.S. 249, 262-63 n.9 (1974).
929. 626 F.2d at 681.
930. See, e.g., Tahoe Nugget, 584 F.2d at 306; NLRB v. Crimptex, Inc., 517 F.2d 501, 503
n.3 (1st Cir. 1975).
931. 631 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1980).
932. Id at 606.
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employees were dissatisfied with the union and that by combining
those eight with the eight newly-hired employees, the unit was com-
posed of sixteen employees (of twenty-nine total) who did not wish
union representation.933 The Ninth Circuit upheld the Board's use of
the "new hire" presumption in holding that the new employer was in
fact a successor employer and was therefore obligated to bargain with
the union.934
In Hospital and Institutional Workers Local 250 v. Pasatiempo De-
velopment Corp.., 935 the successor employer purchased a convalescent
hospital after the previous owner's collective bargaining agreement had
expired. The successor subsequently discharged a holdover employee,
and the union petitioned to compel arbitration of the dismissal.
936
Because the contract between the predecessor employer and the
union had expired before the new employer discharged the employee,
the court held that the successor had no duty to arbitrate under the
preexisting labor contract.937 The court also rejected the union's con-
tention that the new employer agreed to arbitrate by maintaining the
terms and conditions of the expired labor contract and giving an oral
agreement to arbitrate. The court held that the oral promise did not
reflect the employer's intention to submit the matter to arbitration. The
new employer's maintenance of the terms and conditions of employ-
ment was merely consistent with its duty to bargain with the union as a
successor employer.
93 8
4. Effects of a strike
In NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 939 the Supreme Court held that a con-
tract may be both renewed and negotiable.940 The Lion Oil Court also
found that a strike in support of modification demands which occurs
933. Id at 607.
934. Id The employer was unable to overcome the presumption, thereby rendering inef-
fective its defense of good faith belief in the union's loss of majority support. Id
935. 627 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 US. 918 (1981).
936. Id at 1012.
937. Id The Ninth Circuit has previously held that a successor employer, although
under no duty to abide by the substantive terms and conditions of employment found in the
extant labor contract, nevertheless is held to a duty to arbitrate disputes arising under that
contract. See Bartenders and Culinary Workers Union Local 340 v. Howard Johnson Co.,
535 F.2d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir. 1976); Wackenhut Corp. v. International Union, United Plant
Guard Workers of Am., 332 F.2d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1964).
938. 627 F.2d at 1012.
939. 352 U.S. 282 (1957).
940. Id at 290.
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after the giving of the statutorily prescribed notice9 4 1 is not a violation
of section 8(d)(4),942 which prohibits a party from terminating or modi-
fying a collective bargaining agreement.
943
The Ninth Circuit relied on Lion Oil in reaching its decision in
KCW Furniture, Inc. v. NLRB. 91 In KCW Furniture, the parties
signed a three year agreement which was renewed automatically each
year thereafter unless either party gave "Notice of Opening" or "Notice
of Termination" within the time periods required under the contract.
The union sent a timely notice of opening to the employer, who re-
sponded some seven months later. Negotiations took place after the
date for automatic renewal had passed, yet neither side had given the
notice of termination which was required to end the agreement. When
negotiations proved unfruitful, the parties declared an impasse and the
employer implemented the terms of its final offer.94 5
The union fied an unfair labor practice charge with the Board,
who issued a complaint charging the employer with unilaterally chang-
ing the terms and conditions of employment during the term of a valid
labor agreement. 9 6 The employer offered two defenses to the charge.
First, it contended that the contract's duration and renewal clause was
ambiguous, arguing that a contract could be either renewed or negotia-
ble, but not both.947 The Ninth Circuit dismissed this contention, citing
the Lion Oil holding in which the Supreme Court clearly recognized
that a contract could be both renewed and negotiable.948
The employer next contended that the Board's construction of the
duration and renewal clause in the contract rendered that clause illegal
941. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976) provides in pertinent part that:
where there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract. . . the duty to bargain
collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify
such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification - (1)
serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed termi-
nation or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof, or in the
event such contract contains no expiration date, sixty days prior to the time it is
proposed to make such termination or modification.
942. 352 U.S. at 292-93.
943. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(4) (1976) provides in pertinent part that neither party may termi-
nate or modify a collective bargaining agreement:
unless the party desiring such termination or modification. . . (4) continues in full
force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the terms and conditions
of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until
the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later.
944. 634 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1980).
945. Id at 438.
946. Id
947. Id at 439.
948. Id
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since it would then be contrary to the requirement found in section
8(d)(4) of the NLRA.949 The employer argued that the original con-
tract contained an express reservation of the parties' right to economic
recourse in negotiations, except during the interval between notice of
opening and the expiration date. This reservation was alleged to be
illegal in light of the proscription of section 8(d)(4) against resorting to
strikes by a party seeking to terminate or modify a collective bargain-
ing agreement.
9 50
The Ninth Circuit disagreed. The court cited the holding of Lion
Oil, in which the Supreme Court had interpreted the term "expiration
date" to mean not only the termination date of the bargaining contract,
but also an agreed date during the existence of a valid contract at which
time the parties could modify its terms' and conditions. 95' The
Supreme Court had, therefore, reasoned that section 8(d)(4) does not
prohibit strikes which occur after the required notice is given, if the
contract itself provides that it may be reopened for purposes of modifi-
cation.952 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the employer's unilateral
implementation of its final offer was an unfair labor practice because
the collective bargaining agreement was never terminated.953
B. Administration of the Collective Bargaining 4greement
1. Grievance arbitration
Once a collective bargaining agreement has been reached, the par-
ties may choose to use the collective bargaining procedure to resolve
any conflicts which arise under the original agreement, or they may
agree to submit those conflicts to arbitration. Although the collective
bargaining process and arbitration are both used as vehicles for resolv-
ing labor disagreements, the procedures are not always
interchangeable. 954
In Aluminum Company of America v. International Union,95 the
Ninth Circuit cited the difference between the two procedures as one
ground for its holding that the employer's attendance control plan was
not subject to arbitration. The company unilaterally implemented an
949. 634 F.2d at 439; see supra note 943.
950. Id at 440.
951. Id (citing 352 U.S. at 290).
952. 352 U.S. at 291.
953. 634 F.2d at 441.
954. A party who is unsuccessful in resolving a labor dispute through collective bargain-
ing may not always seek resolution of that same dispute through arbitration. See, e.g., Al-
fred M. Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 403, 408-09 (9th Cir. 1978).
955. 630 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1980).
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attendance control plan which called for a review of an employee's at-
tendance record whenever the employee had accumulated a given
number of unexcused absences, tardies, or early leaves from work over
a twenty-six week period. Under the plan, the employer reserved the
right to impose either a five-day or open suspension upon an employee
whose attendance continued to be irregular following a written
warning.
956
The union filed a grievance, claiming the plan was "unfair," and
the arbitrator found the grievance to be subject to arbitration. The ar-
bitrator based his finding of arbitrability on the ground that the attend-
ance control plan might lead to the suspension or discharge of an
employee, an act which might be violative of the agreement's "just
cause" provision.957
The Ninth Circuit recognized the strong presumption in the law
for the arbitrability of grievances.958 The court noted, however, that
the application of any company policy might lead to a violation of the
agreement's "just cause" provision, and held that the company's at-
tendance control plan was not a proper subject for arbitration. The
court found no intent by the parties to vest an arbitrator with the juris-
diction to decide the fairness of a company policy which had not been
the subject of collective bargaining. Rather, the parties had intended to
leave such disputes as might arise under the "just cause" provision to
the collective bargaining process. The court found that the two meth-
ods of resolving disputes are not interchangeable because "a party may
not always seek to have resolved through arbitration those matters
which it was not successful in resolving through bargaining. ' 959
This result is sound, for the opposite holding might have caused
the employers to refuse a labor contract containing a "just cause" pro-
vision. If the court had held that an arbitrator can acquire jurisdiction
over any grievance arising from violations of company policy under a
"just cause" provision, an employer's right to manage its operation
would have been severely curtailed. Most, if not all, employers would
probably resist the inclusion of any "just cause" provision in their labor
956. Id at 1341 n.l.
957. Article I of the agreement provided:
Section 3. Direction of the Working Forces - Except as may be limited by the
provisions of this Agreement the operation of the plant and the direction of the
working forces, including the right to hire, lay off, suspend, dismiss and discharge
any employee for proper and just cause are vested exclusively with the Company.
d at 1342-43.
958. Id at 1343 (citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960));
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Howmet Corp., 466 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1972).
959. 630 F.2d at 1344.
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agreements. A "just cause" provision benefits both parties, and theAlu-
minum Company holding is appropriate because it does not penalize
the employer whose labor agreement contains such a provision.
As in 41uminum Company, the Ninth Circuit also looked to the
intent of the parties in deciding whether a specific grievance was arbi-
trable in Scjwfy Enterprises v. Northern California State Association of
IATSE Locals.960 In Sify, an arbitrator found that the employer
owned two theaters which had not been expressly included in the col-
lective bargaining agreement. Having found that the operation of
those theaters was subject to the agreement, the arbitrator then ordered
the employer to make the theaters' employees whole for any losses they
had suffered by not being accorded wages and working conditions
equal to those enjoyed by other employees subject to the agreement. 961
The Ninth Circuit rejected the employer's claim that the arbitrator
lacked jurisdiction to decide the issue, finding instead that the parties
had expressly agreed to have the issue decided by arbitration.962 The
employer further argued that the decision should have been voided be-
cause the arbitrator had considered evidence apart from the contract
itself. The Ninth Circuit rejected this contention, holding that the arbi-
trator had properly examined the history of the bargaining that led to
the agreement in order to ascertain the intent of the parties with respect
to the reach of the contract.963
The Ninth Circuit, in United Steelworkers of4merica, AFL-CIO v.
960. 631 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981).
961. Id at 125.
962. Id The court cited United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960) for the proposition that the employer was bound by the decision because it
had agreed to submit the matter to arbitration. The Steelworkers Court noted that:
[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit
to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed to submit. Yet to be consistent
with congressional policy in favor of settlement of disputes by the parties through
the machinery of arbitration, the judicial inquiry under § 301 must be strictly con-
fined to the question whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the griev-
ance or did agree to give the arbitrator power to make the award he made.
Id at 582. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Washington Employers, Inc., 557 F.2d
1345, 1349 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party is bound by an
award only if he agreed to submit the issue to arbitration.").
963. 631 F.2d at 125-26. Evidence that is extrinsic to the labor contract itself may be
relied upon by arbitrators who seek to know the intent of the parties at the time the agree-
ment was reached. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960) ("The labor arbitrator's source of law is not confined to the express
provisions of the contract, as the industrial common law - the practices of the industry and




Bell Foundry Co., 96 reversed the district court's holding that employee
discharges were not arbitrable under the collective bargaining agree-
ment. In Steelworkers, as part of the negotiations following expiration
of a previous contract, the employer sent the union a proposal on No-
vember 21. The proposal expressly stated that it would remain open
until December 1. On November 23, the employer sent a clarification
of one provision of its offer and acceded to the union's request that the
offer remain open "for a couple more days." 965 On November 30, the
employer mailed discharge notices to four striking employees. The
union accepted the employer's offer on December 1 and accepted the
employer's clarification after the employer brought it to the union's at-
tention. The contract that was agreed upon contained a provision for
the arbitrability of discharges.
966
The Ninth Circuit held that the discharged employees had a right
under the contract to have their discharges arbitrated. The court's
opinion seems destined for challenge, however, because of its internal
inconsistency. The court held that the modification of the original offer
did not revoke that offer and reversed the trial court on the ground that
the second contract had been formed at the time the discharges were
effective.967 In reaching this holding, the court began with the observa-
tion that the issue of contract formation is governed not by the Uni-
form Commercial Code but by general contract law.968 The court then
stated its agreement with the employer's position that the subsequent
modification of the offer had the effect of revocation, citing secondary
authority for this proposition. 969 Having concluded that a modification
of an offer acts as a revocation, the court then reversed itself and held
that the modification of the original offer did not revoke that offer.
964. 626 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1980).
965. Id at 140 n.2.
966. Id at 140.
967. Id at 141-42. The court offered two grounds for this holding, explaining "[tihere
appears to be no case holding that a refinement of language such as that involved here
operates as a revocation of an offer, and we are offered no practical justification for so hold-
ing." Id at 141.
968. Id at 140; see Teamsters Local 524 v. Billington, 402 F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1968).
969. 626 F.2d at 141. The court cited 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 39 at 164
(1963 & Supp. 1971); 1 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 55 at 178 (3d ed. 1957 &
Supp. 1979); and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 41 (rent. Draft Nos. 1-7,
1973).
1983]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
2. Judicial enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement
a. scope of section 301
Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act 970 pro-
vides that any district court having jurisdiction over the parties may
hear "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization. . . or between any such labor organizations" regardless
of the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties.97 Sec-
tion 301, however, does not grant a district court jurisdiction to hear an
intraunion dispute which does not affect external labor relations.972
In Lucas v. Bechtel Corp., 973 the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's dismissal of a union complaint brought under section 301. The
complaint alleged that the employer had paid, under color of a Stabili-
zation Agreement with the International and its constituent unions,
lower wages than those to which the union employees were entitled.974
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court had dismissed the
complaint without permitting the union to complete discovery. More-
over, the record did not support the employer's claim that section 301
jurisdiction was lacking because the controversy was merely an intra-
union dispute.9 75 The court, therefore, remanded the case to the dis-
trict court for a full exposition of the facts underlying the complaint.
976
Federal courts have jurisdiction over actions brought to enforce
collective bargaining agreements even where the conduct in question is
permitted or prohibited by the NLRA.977 In Orange Belt District Coun-
cil of Painters No. 48 v. Maloney Specialties, Inc., 978 the Ninth Circuit
970. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
971. Id § 185(a).
972. Stelling v. IBEW Local 1547, 587 F.2d 1379, 1384 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[I]f a controversy
is related only to a union dispute which will not affect external labor relations, § 301 does
not provide a basis for jurisdiction."), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979).
973. 633 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1980).
974. Id at 758.
975. Id at 759.
976. .d at 760.
977. The Supreme Court noted that:
In § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 156, Congress authorized federal
courts to exercise jurisdiction over suits brought to enforce collective-bargaining
agreements. We have held that such actions are judicially cognizable, even where
the conduct alleged was arguably protected or prohibited by the National Labor
Relations Act because the history of the enactment of § 301 reveals that "Congress
deliberately chose to leave the enforcement of collective agreements 'to the usual
processes of the law.'"
Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S.
274, 298 (1971) (citing Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 513 (1962)).
978. 639 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1980).
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upheld the district court's refusal to stay arbitration confirmation pro-
ceedings until after an unfair labor practice dispute between the parties
could be heard by the NLRB.979 Although the employer had agreed
not to subcontract any work to a nonsignatory in its agreement with the
union, it did so anyway. When the subcontractor refused to make con-
tributions to the union trust fund as the contract required, the union
filed a grievance against the employer. The employer did not appeal
the subsequent arbitration award entered against it but filed unfair la-
bor practice charges with the NLRB. The union then filed suit to en-
force the arbitration award.980
The Ninth Circuit held that the pending NLRB dispute did not
preclude federal court jurisdiction over the arbitration award enforce-
ment suit and affirmed the district court's assumption of jurisdiction to
hear the dispute. The court also found that the district court had im-
properly considered the employer's defense that. the subcontracting
clause it had violated was contrary to law and, therefore, unenforce-
able. However, because of the district court's finding that the result of
the arbitration award enforcement suit would have remained un-
changed even if the union had engaged in unfair labor practices, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision.981
b. statute of limitations
Section 301 of the NLRA contains no statute of limitations gov-
erning actions brought under it. In the absence of a congressional di-
rective on the issue, the Supreme Court has held that "timeliness of a
§ 301 suit, .. is to be determined, as a matter of federal law, by refer-
ence to the appropriate state statute of limitations. 98 2
The Supreme Court applied this rule of reference to the state stat-
ute of limitations for actions brought under section 301 in United Parcel
Service, Inc. v. Mitchell 9s3 The United Parcel Court held that New
York's ninety-day statute of limitations period for actions to vacate ar-
bitration awards barred a suit brought by an employee against his
union and the employer. The employee had been discharged after the
employer charged him with falsifying time cards and with other dis-
honest acts.984 The employee denied the charges and was represented
979. Id at 490.
980. Id at 488-89.
981. Id at 490-92.
982. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704-05 (1966).
983. 451 U.S. 56 (1981).
984. I.d at 58.
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by his union before a grievance panel.985 The panel upheld the em-
ployee's discharge in a decision which was binding on all the parties to
the collective bargaining agreement.
986
Seventeen months after the arbitration decision, the employee
brought suit in district court under section 301 of the NLRA, alleging a
breach of duty of fair representation by the union and breach of the
collective bargaining contract by the employer. 987 The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the ground
that the employee's action was one to vacate the arbitration award and
was therefore time-barred by application of New York's ninety-day
statute of limitation period. 988 The Second Circuit reversed, holding
that the trial court should have applied New York's six-year limitation
period98 9 for actions alleging breach of contract.990
The Supreme Court found that the discharged employee brought
his action under section 301(a) of the LMRA and "the indispensable
predicate for such an action is not a showing under traditional contract
law that the discharge was a breach of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, but instead a demonstration that the Union breached its duty of
fair representation." 991 The Court concluded that the employee's char-
acterization of his suit as one for breach of contract did not control the
issue of which limitation period attached because the employee was
required to prevail on his claim of breach of the union's duty to repre-
sent him fairly at arbitration before he could press his claim of breach
of contract by the employer.
992
The United Parcel holding supports the policy of effecting the "rel-
atively rapid disposition of labor disputes" which the Court had earlier
enunciated in UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal 993 United Parcel is also con-
sistent with the policy of judicial restraint with respect to overturning
arbitration awards, a policy expressed by the Court in Hines v. Anchor




988. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 7511(a) (McKinney 1980) provides: "An application to va-
cate or modify an [arbitration] award may be made by a party within ninety days after its
delivery to him."
989. Id § 213(2).
990. 624 F.2d 394, 397-98 (2d Cir. 1980).
991. 451 U.S. at 62.
992. Id at 63.
993. 383 U.S. 696, 707 (1966).
994. 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976) (except when employee's representation by union is "dis-




The statute of limitations period of the forum state governs actions
brought under section 301.996 In Waggoner v. Dallaire,99 7 the Ninth
Circuit applied California's four-year limitations period for actions
brought to enforce a monthly payments provision of a written con-
tract.998 The court reversed the trial court's ruling that the trustee's
action to recover allegedly delinquent trust fund contributions from the
employer was time-barred. The court held that because the trustees
brought their action on May 6, 1977, their claims for monthly trust
fund contributions from May 6, 1973 were timely under the forum
state's limitations period.9 99
The Ninth Circuit reversed each of the trial court's substantive rul-
ings and remanded the case for further proceedings." °  In remanding,
the Ninth Circuit instructed the trial court on the measure of damages
to be awarded the trustees upon a finding in their favor. The district
court did not reach the damage issue, but it indicated that if it had been
called upon to consider the question, it would have awarded the trust-
ees an amount which represented contributions only for any hours an
employee had worked in positions covered under the Master Labor
Agreement.00
c. exhaustion of remedies
The general rule in deciding whether a section 301 action brought
by an employee against an employer or the union for an alleged breach
of the collective bargaining agreement is "ripe" is that such a suit will
995. 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960) ("[T]he grievance machinery under a collective bargaining
agreement is at the very heart of the system of industrial self-government .... The process-
ing machinery is actually a vehicle by which meaning and content are given to the collective
bargaining agreement.")
996. See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
997. 649 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1981).
998. See Konjoyan v. Der Zakarian, 191 Cal. App. 2d 110, 113-14, 12 Cal. Rptr. 389, 391
(4th Dist. 1961); Lee v. DeForest, 22 Cal. App. 2d 351, 360, 71 P.2d 285, 290 (2d Dist. 1937).
999. 649 F.2d 1362, 1365 (9th Cir. 1981).
1000. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's rulings that: (1) the collective bar-
gaining agreement was an unenforceable adhesion contract; (2) an oral agreement between
the employer and a union official was an effective modification of the collective bargaining
contract's employee benefit trust provision; and (3) the trustee's claims were barred by appli-
cation of the statute of limitations. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that the
trustee's motion to disqualify the trial judge for personal bias was untimely because the
motion was made almost nine months after trial, after entry of a minute order awarding
judgment to the employer, and the trustees had made no showing of "good cause" for their
delay in filing the motion. Id at 1367-70.
1001. Id. at 1369.
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be entertained only after the employee has exhausted the grievance and
arbitration procedures established under that agreement.
1002
In Clayton v. UAW, 10o3 the United States Supreme Court consid-
ered another section 301(a) action brought by an employee, charging
the union with breach of its duty of fair representation and the em-
ployer with breach of the collective bargaining agreement. In Clayton,
the employee asked his union to file a grievance on his behalf on the
ground that he had been dismissed without just cause.'0 4 The union
initiated a request for arbitration but withdrew that request before ar-
bitration proceedings had begun, notifying the employee of its with-
drawal after the time for requesting arbitration had expired.100°5
The district court dismissed the employee's suit against the union
and the employer because he had failed to exhaust the union's internal
appeals procedure. 1'0 6 The Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal of the
suit against the union but reversed the dismissal as to the employer on
the ground that the internal union appeals procedure could not have
resulted in either a reactivation of his grievance or in his reinstatement,
the relief he sought in his section 301 action.' 7
The Supreme Court held that an employee need not exhaust an
internal union appeals procedure before bringing a section 301 suit if
that procedure could not result in his reinstatement as an employee or
the reactivation of his grievance. 1008 The Court, therefore, affirmed the
reversal of the employee's suit against the employer and reversed the
dismissal of his suit against the union. 1w9
The Court created a three prong test to decide whether a section
301 plaintiff is required to exhaust internal union procedures. A dis-
trict court may properly excuse the employee's failure to exhaust inter-
nal union procedures if it finds the existence of (1) such hostility to the
employee by union officials that he could not receive a fair hearing of
his claim; or (2) internal union procedures which would be inadequate
either to reactivate the employee's grievance or otherwise afford him
the full range of relief sought in the section 301 suit; or (3) an unreason-
able delay of the employee's opportunity to obtain a judicial hearing on
1002. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 563 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171, 184 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965).
1003. 451 U.S. 679 (1981).
1004. Id at 682.
1005. Id
1006. Id at 683-84.
1007. Id at 684.




the merits caused by the time necessary to exhaust the internal union
procedures. 0 10
The plaintiff in Clayton made no claim that union officials would
be so hostile to him that he would be unable to receive a fair hearing of
his claim were he required to exhaust his union's internal appeals pro-
cedure. In fact, the employee conceded that he would have received an
impartial hearing of his claim.10 "1 Because there was no allegation of
union hostility in Clayton, the issue was neither crucial to the case, nor
was it argued by the parties. Accordingly, the "hostility" component of
the three-prong Clayton test must be considered dictum and, therefore,
not controlling upon future section 301 suits.
With respect to the second prong of the Clayton test, the inade-
quacy of the internal union procedures to reactivate the employee's
grievance or otherwise provide him or her with the relief he or she
seeks by way of a section 301 suit, the Court ignored an important pur-
pose which can be served by requiring those procedures to be ex-
hausted. The internal union procedures have as their goal the
resolution of disputes between the employee and the union. It is this
"resolution" quality which the Court addressed in the second factor of
the Clayton test. However, the internal union procedure also serves as
a forum for fact-finding. During the course of this fact-finding, the em-
ployee may discover facts which lead him or her to change the theory
of a subsequent section 301 suit or to the realization that he or she has
no cause of action at all. The effect of this fact-finding process, which
is served by employing the internal union appeal procedure, was ex-
pressed in Justice Rehnquist's dissent: "Resort to the union appeals
procedures gives the union an opportunity to satisfy the employee that
its decision not to pursue a grievance was correct. If successful on this
score, litigation is averted."'
1 12
The third prong of the Clayton test provides that a district court
may exercise its discretion to excuse a plaintiff from exhausting internal
union procedures before bringing a section 301 suit if exhaustion would
unreasonably delay the employee's opportunity for a judicial hearing
on the merits of the claim. Because resort to internal procedures neces-
sarily results in delay of the employee's section 301 action, it is clear
that this factor will be invoked only upon a determination that the par-
ticular delay at issue would be an "unreasonable" one.
The requirement that a delay not be unreasonable poses several
1010. Id at 689.
1011. Id at 689-90.
1012. Id at 700 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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problems for the district court. First, a plaintiff desiring to invoke this
third Clayton prong to excuse his or her failure to exhaust internal rem-
edies must demonstrate the prospective unreasonableness of the delay
caused by resorting to the internal procedures. The employee must
present proof of, and the court must pass judgment on, the scenario
that would have taken place had he or she been forced to proceed
through the internal appeal process.
This focus on the purely prospective injuries to the plaintiff as a
consequence of the delay caused by potential exhaustion of the internal
union procedure necessarily requires the district court to weigh evi-
dence which is speculative. It is unrealistic to expect a district court to
sift through evidence of prospective injury and arrive at a just result.
Finally, assuming that the district court is able to assess the pro-
spective injury to plaintiff which would result from the delay caused by
exhaustion of the internal union appeal process, the court must then
under the third prong of the Clayton test decide whether that delay is
unreasonable. Given the absence of direction from the Court to district
courts on factual circumstances which would constitute an unreasona-
ble delay, it may be safely predicted that this third prong of the Clayton
test will spawn a body of case law in each of the circuits on the issue of
just what length and type of delay is "unreasonable." Because the
Clayton holding is destined to increase judicial intervention in the col-
lective-bargaining process, it will serve to undermine the Court's previ-
ously stated policy of encouraging private resolution of grievances
arising out of the collective bargaining process.
01 3
d federal substantive law
A section 301 claim is governed by federal substantive law, rather
than by state law. 0 14 The Ninth Circuit, therefore, applied federal law
regarding termination of contracts in Kaylor v. Crown Zellerbach,
Inc. 1015 In Kaylor, Crown Zellerbach used an in-house trucking opera-
tion to ship its goods and contracted with various companies to supply
it with drivers. The driver supply companies, who were solely respon-
sible for the drivers' wages and benefits, signed collective bargaining
agreements with the union. Crown Zellerbach was not a signatory to
those labor agreements.
0 1 6
Crown Zellerbach informed one of its driver supply companies
1013. See, e.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
1014. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
1015. 643 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1981).
1016. Id at 1365.
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that if its agreement was terminated, Crown Zellerbach would require
the successor supply company to offer its employees the same wage and
benefit levels offered by the predecessor supply company.1017 In 1975,
Crown Zellerbach discontinued its in-house trucking operation and
hired a common carrier to ship its goods. The common carrier offered
to hire the employees of the driver supply company it succeeded and
also offered to "dovetail" the employees into its existing driver seniority
list. 0 18 Believing that "dovetailing" would put some of them out of
work, the employees refused the common carrier's offer of employ-
ment. The NLRB dismissed a claim of'unfair labor practice brought
against Crown Zellerbach, and the employees filed suit.
10 19
The Ninth Circuit held that Crown Zellerbach and the driver sup-
ply companies had established an employment contract but had not
entered into a collective bargaining agreement. 10 20 The court found
that an employment contract for an indeterminate period is terminable
at will under either federal 0 21 or state law.102 2 The court concluded
that Crown Zellerbach had not committed an unfair labor practice and
affirmed the NLRB's dismissal of the employee's claim. 1023
Collective bargaining agreements are enforceable in federal court
against both employers and unions under LMRA section 301.1024 This
statute does more than merely confer jurisdiction on federal courts to
hear controversies arising from alleged breaches of collective bargain-
ing agreements. In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 1025 the
Supreme Court found that section 301 also "authorizes federal courts
to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective
bargaining agreements."'
1 26
The body of federal law which has developed since Textile Work-
ers includes Supreme Court rulings that an employee may sue his or
1017. Id
1018. Id at 1365-66.
1019. Id
1020. Id at 1367 n.2. The contract did not cover conditions of employment, but merely
identified those employees who would be employed by successor driver supply companies.
Id.
1021. Id at 1367; see Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 988, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
1022. See Pratt v. Local 683, Film Technicians of the Motion Picture & Television Indus.,
260 Cal. App. 2d 545, 67 Cal. Rptr. 483 (2d Dist. 1968).
1023. 643 F.2d at 1368. Because federal courts have no jurisdiction to entertain claims of
conspiracy, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment
against the employees on their claim that the union and the employers conspired to block
the collective bargaining agreement. Id
1024. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
1025. 3S3 U.S. 448 (1957).
1026. Id at 451.
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her employer directly for the employer's breach of the collective bar-
gaining agreement, 10 27 and that the employer may not bring a section
301 action against the union when the union has not condoned its
members' breach.11 8 Additionally, the Court held in Atkinson v. Sin-
clair Rining Co., 1029 that section 301 does not authorize an employer's
suit for damages against individual union officers and members whose
union violates the no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agree-
ment. 0 30  The Atkinson Court expressly reserved the question of
whether the employer could bring a section 301 damages action against
individual union members who violate a no-strike provision while act-
ing "in their personal and nonunion capacity" and not on behalf of
their union.
°3 1
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 32 the Supreme Court de-
cided the question left open by Atkinson. Citing the legislative history
of the statute, the Court held that an employer may not bring a section
301 action against individual employees for violating the no-strike pro-
vision of their collective bargaining agreement. 0 3 3 The Court reasoned
that the legislative history of the statute demonstrates that Congress
intended section 301 to be a vehicle by which employers could bring
damage suits against unions for breach of a no-strike provision in a
collective bargaining agreement but not against individuals.
0 34
An employer may make contributions to a trust fund on behalf of
its employees 0 35 Because an independent contractor is not an "em-
ployee" within the meaning of that term as defined in the NLRA,1
0 36
employer contributions to trust funds on behalf of an independent con-
tractor are not authorized by that statute. In determining whether a
particular individual is an employee or independent contractor, the re-
viewing courts apply common law agency principles. 0 37 The Ninth
Circuit has considered the factors found in the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
1027. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
1028. Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212 (1979).
1029. 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
1030. Id at 249.
1031. Id at 249 n.7.
1032. 451 U.S. at 401 (1981).
1033. Id at 417.
1034. Id
1035. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1976) makes it unlawful for an employer to pay money to employ-
ees under certain enumerated situations. However, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1976) provides
that this general prescription is not applicable to "money or other things of value paid to a
trust fund. . . for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of such employer, and
their families and dependents."
1036. See NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254 (1968).
1037. Id at 256.
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OND) AGENCY10 3 8 in distinguishing an employee from an independent
contractor. 1039
The Ninth Circuit applied these tests in Waggoner v. Northwest
Excavating, Inc. 1' In Northwest Excavating, the trustees of union
trust funds brought suit under section 301 to recover trust fund contri-
butions allegedly owed by the employer. The employer had refused to
make the contributions on the ground that the repair and maintenance
workers and the owner-operators of construction equipment used by
the employer were not employees. 1°4l
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the holding of the trial court that the
owner-operators were independent contractors rather than employ-
ees. 104 2 The court reasoned that the owner-operators were supervised
by the general contractor rather than the employer; they were free to
renegotiate their rate of pay with the general contractor; and the em-
ployer's only involvement was to record the number of hours worked
by the owner-operator. 10
43
The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the district court's finding that the
maintenance and repair person was an independent contractor since he
set his own hours and billing rates, was not supervised by the employer,
and had other customers besides the employer. 1044 The court further
found that by assigning to this independent contractor routine repair
work that had previously been performed by union employees, the em-
1038. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 220(2) lists these factors:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the
details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is
usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without
supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular operation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and
the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer,
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and
servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
1039. See Brown v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 699, 705 n.10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1008
(1972).
1040. 642 F.2d 333 (9th Cir. 1981), vacatedand remanded, 102 S.Ct. 1417, a1 9'd on remand,
685 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1982).
1041. Id at 335.
1042. Id at 337.
1043. Id
1044. Id
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ployer was in breach of the Master Labor Agreement °45
A court that reviews an arbitration award is not permitted to pass
on the merits of that award.'146 The Ninth Circuit acceded to this limi-
tation on the power of reviewing courts in Amalgamated Transit Union
v. Aztec Bus Lines. 1047 InAztec Bus Lines, an arbitrator ordered a two-
week suspension without pay as a sanction for an employee who had
operated a bus with faulty equipment, despite his knowledge that com-
pany policy called for him to take the vehicle out of operation. 0 48
The employer had sought to dismiss the employee and therefore
challenged the arbitrator's decision in district court on the ground that
the decision offended the public policy of promoting public safety on
the highways.' 49 In affirming the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the union, the Ninth Circuit noted that the effect





Section 7 of the NLRA protects the right to strike.' 0 5 1 Section 7
also protects employees engaged in sympathy strikes which involve
honoring picket lines established by other employees of a common em-
ployer. 10 52 This protection has been extended to employees honoring a
1045. Id at 337-38. The Master Labor Agreement provided, in part, that the signatory
contractors had the right to use independent contractors to perform major repairs on ma-
chinery and equipment, but "[a]ll other maintenance and repairs which are normally and
customarily performed by persons in the classification of Heavy Duty Repairman/Welder
shall be performed by employees covered by this Agreement." Id at 338.
1046. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
1047. 654 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1981).
1048. Id at 643-44.
1049. Id at 643.
1050. Id at 644.
1051. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). Section 7 of the NLRA provides in pertinent part that em-
ployees "shall have the right to. . . assist labor organizations. . . and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion."; see, e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 233 (1963) (section 7 guarantees
employees' right to engage in concerted activity, which includes right to strike).
1052. Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. General Teamster Local 326, 624 F.2d 1182,
1184 (3d Cir. 1980) (refusal of production and maintenance employees to cross picket line
established by driver employees at employer's plant protected); W-I Canteen Service, Inc. v.
NLRB, 606 F.2d 738, 743 (7th Cir. 1979) (refusal to cross picket line at employer's Rockford,
Illinois plant in support of strike by fellow employees who worked at employer's Madison,
Wisconsin plant protected). See, e.g., NLRB v. C.K. Smith & Co., 569 F.2d 162, 165 (1st
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picket line at their employer's customer's place of business, when such
activity is for "mutual aid or protection."' 1053 Activity for "mutual aid
or protection" is not limited to the employer-employee relationship.
10 54
An employee's right "to engage in protected activity must be balanced
against the employer's legitimate and substantial business
interests." 1
0 55
a. employer's place of business
In NLRB v. Southern Caifornia Edison Co., 10 56 the Ninth Circuit
addressed whether section 7 protects employees honoring a picket line
established by a sister union representing different employees of a com-
mon employer. 0 57  Two bargaining units of Southern California
Edison employees were represented by different unions. 0 5 8 Edison an-
Cir. 1977) (refusal of employees of one corporation to cross picket line established by em-
ployees of another corporation protected where both corporations were considered single
employer within NLRA); Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284, 287 (7th Cir.
1975) (refusal of employees in production and maintenance unit to cross picket line estab-
lished by clerical unit where both units worked for common employer held to be protected
activity).
1053. See, e.g., Redwing Carriers Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545, 1546-47 (1962) (section 7 pro-
tects drivers who refused to cross a picket line established at customer's place of business to
make certain deliveries for their carrier employer), enforced sub nom Teamsters Local 79 v.
NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964); NLRB v. Alamo
Express, Inc., 430 F.2d 1032, 1036 (5th Cir. 1970) (section 7 protects truckers who refuse to
cross picket line of another union to make routine pickup of merchandise at customer's
place of business); Teamsters Local 657 v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 204, 205 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per
curiam) (employees refusal to cross picket line at another employer's place of business is
protected activity under NLRA); NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply, 197 F.2d 111, 113 (2d
Cir. 1952), aft'd on other grounds, 345 U.S. 71 (1953).
1054. See, e.g., Kaiser Eng'rs v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 1379, 1384-85 (9th Cir. 1976) (section 7
protects employees' concerted activity in lobbying for changes in national labor policy re-
garding job security).
1055. NLRB v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 646 F.2d 1352, 1368 (9th Cir. 1981). See, e.g.,
Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545, 1547 (1962) (discharge and replacement of sym-
pathy strikers who refused to cross picket line at customer's place of business held necessary
to preserve and continue business dealings with the struck customer), enforced sub norm.
Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905
(1964); see generally NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378-80 (1967) (em-
ployer's failure to reinstate six economic strikers held unfair labor practice where employer
offered no legitimate and substantial business justification); NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers,
Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33-35 (1967) (employers' grant of vacation pay to any striking employees
who 'eturned to work not justified where employer offered no legitimate business motives
for such discriminatory conduct).
1056. 646 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1981).
1057. Id. at 1362.
1058. The primary striking unit of employees was represented by the Utility Workers of
America, and the potential sympathy strikers were represented by the International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers. Id at 1358.
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ticipated a strike by one unit and threatened to discipline and perma-
nently replace employees in the other unit who refused to cross their
sister union's picket line. Recognizing that the Board's interpretation
of the NLRA must be upheld if "reasonably defensible,"105 9 the court
upheld the Board's finding that the threatened employees had a statu-
tory right to honor their sister union's picket line.1°60 The court con-
cluded, therefore, that the threatened employees had a right under
section 7 to honor the picket line of their striking sister union. 10 61
b. customer's place of business
In Southern California Edison, the Ninth Circuit also considered
whether section 7 protects employees who refuse to cross a lawful pick-
et line at their employer's customer's place of business."°6 2 Blum, an
Edison employee, had been assigned to service a malfunctioning poly-
phase meter and to change a magnetic tape recorder cartridge located
on the premises of an Edison customer, Freightliner Corporation. The
data recorded on the tape, which would shortly expire, was solely for
Edison's use and did not benefit Freightliner. Blum refused to cross the
picket line established at Freightliner. He was replaced by another em-
ployee and the work was completed. The next day, Blum notified
Edison that he was ready to perform any work which did not require
him to cross a picket line. Subsequently, Blum was suspended for five
days pursuant to a company policy providing for suspension when an
employee refuses to perform regularly assigned duties. The Board con-
cluded that section 7 gave Blum the right to honor the picket line at
Freightliner.10
63
Edison argued that Blum's conduct lacked the "mutuality" re-
quired by section 7 because he had no direct economic interest in the
dispute at Freightliner and because his refusal to cross the picket line
did not affect Freightliner.'064 The court recognized that respect for the
integrity of the picket line is a major source of strength in the collective
bargaining process. 1065 Because the primary strikers know that they are
1059. Id at 1362.
1060. Id at 1369.
1061. Id
1062. Id at 1362.
1063. Id at 1363.
1064. Id
1065. Id (citing NLRB v. Union Carbide Corp., 440 F.2d 54, 56 (4th Cir.) (section 7 pro-
tects sympathy strikers who as matter of principle refuse to cross picket line maintained by
primary striking employees where both have common employer), cer. denied, 404 U.S. 826
(1971)).
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supported by sympathy strikers "the solidarity so established is 'mutual
aid' in the most liberal sense." 1066 The court then summarily upheld as
"reasonably defensible," the Board's conclusion that Blum's activity
was protected by the NLRA0
67
c. business justqcation
The Board in Southern California Edison found that Edison's
threat to replace any employee who honored a picket line at the Edison
premises was lawful. 06S It held, however, that Edison's threat to disci-
pline these employees violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.1069 Recog-
nizing that section 8(a)(1) protects employees engaging in lawful
activity "from even the idle threat of retaliation," the Ninth Circuit
upheld the Board's conclusion as a "reasonably defensible" interpreta-
tion of the Act.1°70
The Board also found that both the replacement and suspension of
Blum' °7' had no legitimate business justification.10 72 The Ninth Circuit
was unable to find substantial evidence supporting the Board's determi-
nation regarding Blum's replacement.10 73 Because the magnetic tape
Blum was to change would shortly expire, and because Edison had an
important interest in repairing the polyphase meter, the replacement
was permissible in order to "maintain reasonable, normal business op-
erations."' 1 74 The court, however, upheld the Board's finding that the
suspension lacked business justification, primarily because Edison had
relied on the no-strike provision of the contract to justify the suspen-
sion, rather than on business necessity.
10 75
2. Waiver of the right to strike
a. express contractual waiver
The right to strike and to engage in sympathy strikes may be
1066. Southern Cal Edison, 646 F.2d at 1364 (quoting Houston Insulation Contractors
Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1967)).
1067. 646 F.2d at 1364.
1068. Id at 1368.
1069. Id
1070. Id See NLRB v. Albion Corp., 593 F.2d 936, 939 (10th Cir. 1979) (statement by
employer that employee would never work for employer again held violation of § 8(a)(1)).
1071. See supra notes 1063-64 and accompanying text for a factual discussion of the case.
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waived by a collective-bargaining agreement. 10 76 A contractual waiver
of a statutory right, however, must be "clear and unmistakable.' 1 7 7 A
broad no-strike clause, coupled with other indicia of intent to waive the
right to engage in sympathy strikes, has been held sufficient to consti-
tute a waiver. 078 There is a split of authority over whether a general
no-strike clause precludes sympathy strikes. 1079 The collective bargain-
ing agreement's language and the factual circumstances of the labor
controversy are analyzed to determine whether the right has been
waived.1
0 80
In Southern Calfornia Edison, the Ninth Circuit upheld the
Board's determination that the collective bargaining agreement's broad
no-strike clause, even with a preamble acknowledging the employer's
duty to render continuous public service, failed to constitute a "clear
and unmistakable" waiver of the right to engage in sympathy
strikes. 1081 The union's history of unsuccessfully negotiating a picket
line clause indicated that the union understood the right had been
waived and that it sought to regain this right.10 8 2 The court stated that
a union's failure to negotiate a contractual confirmation of a right does
not constitute a waiver, 10 83 it is evidence of a waiver, but only if it
1076. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 279 (1956) (Court assumed that em-
ployees could contractually waive right to strike against employer's unfair labor practices
but held no such waiver in contract).
1077. See Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. General Teamster Local 326, 624 F.2d
1182, 1184 (3d Cir. 1980) (broad no-strike clause not "clear and unmistakable waiver" of
right to engage in sympathy strike); Gary Hobart Water Co. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284, 287-89
(7th Cir. 1975) (general no-strike clause did not constitute clear and unmistakable waiver of
right to engage in sympathy strike).
1078. See W-I Canteen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 606 F.2d 738, 745 (7th Cir. 1979) (broad no-
strike clause coupled with picket line clause, which permitted only specific sympathetic ac-
tivity at locations other than employer's premises, held to preclude sympathy strike at em-
ployer's premises); Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. NLRB, 455 F.2d 1088, 1092-93 (8th Cir.
1972) (broad no-strike clause coupled with picket-line clause prohibiting discharge of sym-
pathetic strikers held to permit discipline of employees who honored lawful picket line).
1079. Compare NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 79-81 (1953) and News
Union of Baltimore v. NLRB, 393 F.2d 673, 676-78 (D.C. Cir. 1968) with Delaware Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. General Teamsters Local 326, 624 F.2d 1182, 1187 (3d Cir. 1980) and
NLRB v. C.K. Smith & Co., 569 F.2d 162, 167 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 957
(1978).
1080. See W-I Canteen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 606 F.2d 738, 743 (7th Cir. 1979); Iowa Beef
Processors v. Amalgamated Beef Cutters, 597 F.2d 1138, 1144 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 840 (1979).
1081. 646 F.2d at 1365; but cf. Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. NLRB, 455 F.2d 1088, 1093-
94 (8th Cir. 1972) (contractual recognition of employer's duty of continuous operation as
public service recognized as factor in finding waiver of right to engage in sympathy strikes
without employer discipline).
1082. 646 F.2d at 1366.
1083. Id
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shows that the union thought the right had been waived by other con-
tractual provisions and that the union sought to regain the right.
10 84
The Board found that the proposed picket line clause was never
connected to the no-strike clause and that the negotiations failed to
indicate that a refusal to cross a picket line was prohibited by the no-
strike clause.1085 The union stated that it sought to clarify its rights and
to end the possible confusion among supervisors with respect to picket
line crossing. The Board concluded that the union's bargaining history
was not unequivocal evidence of a waiver. The court upheld this con-
clusion because it was "reasonable and not inconsistent with the Act's
policies."'
1086
b. waiver by arbitration clause
In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 1087 the
Supreme Court stated that "a no-strike obligation, express or implied,
is the quid pro quo for an undertaking by the employer to submit griev-
ance disputes to the process of arbitration."' 108 Accordingly, the prom-
ise to arbitrate carries with it a concomitant implied waiver of the right
to strike. 0 8 9 Absent an express agreement to the contrary, the duty not
to strike is limited to disputes over arbitrable issues. 0 90 Thus, a strike
over an unarbitrable issue will not violate a general no-strike clause
because the issue. would be beyond the scope of the no-strike
obligation.1' 9'
In Southern California Edison, the Ninth Circuit addressed
whether the union had waived its right to engage in sympathy strikes
by operation of an arbitration clause. 0 92 The arbitration clause pro-
vided that only "grievances involving interpretation or application of
this Agreement may be submitted to arbitration."'
11
3




1087. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
1088. Id at 248.
1089. See Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 381 (1974).
1090. Id at 382. ("[An] agreement to arbitrate and the duty not to strike should be con-
strued as having coterminous application.").
1091. See NLRB v. Gould, Inc., 638 F.2d 159, 164-65 (10th Cir. 1980) (right to engage in
sympathy strike not waived by no-strike clause where issue underlying primary strike was
not arbitrable); Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 624 F.2d 1182, 1187 (3d Cir.
1980).
1092. 646 F.2d at 1364-68.
1093. Id at 1367.
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(the Edison customer) and its own employees' union involved neither
Edison nor Blum's (the employee) union, it was not arbitrable under
the latter's collective-bargaining agreement and was therefore beyond
the scope of the no-strike obligation. 10 94 The court rejected Edison's
argument that Blum was obliged not to engage in a sympathy strike
until after arbitrating the question of whether the sympathy strike vio-
lated the agreement.10 5 The court reasoned that because the underly-
ing dispute was not arbitrable between Edison and Blum's union, Blum
was not required to refrain from his sympathy strike pending arbitra-
tion of the strike's permissibility.1 9 6 For this reason, the court con-
cluded that the sympathy strike could not be enjoined pending
arbitration of the scope of the no-strike clause. 1° 97
3. Strike injunctions
The Norris-LaGuardia Act1 98 prohibits federal courts from en-
joining acts related to concerted activity in cases growing out of or in-
volving labor disputes. 10 99 In Boys Markets the Supreme Court
established an exception to the Act's prohibition when the collective
bargaining agreement contains mandatory grievance and arbitration
procedures, and where the court determines that the parties are re-
quired to arbitrate the grievance underlying the strike." °° In Buffalo
Forge Co. v. United Steel Workers, "0' the Supreme Court narrowed
the Boys Market exception to exclude injunctions against sympathy
strikes. The Court reasoned that because neither the causes nor the
issue underlying the sympathy strike were subject to the arbitration
procedures of the sympathy striker's collective bargaining agreement,
and because the sympathy strike did not deny or evade an obligation to
1094. Id
1095. Id at 1368.
1096. Id
1097. Id See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steel Workers, 428 U.S. 397, 407-08, 408 n.10
(1976).
1098. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).
1099. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order
or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any
labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such
dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing. . . any of the following
acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment.
1100. 394 U.S. at 240-55.
1101. 428 U.S. 397 (1976) (district court had no jurisdiction to issue injunction against
sympathy strike by production and maintenance employees supporting primary strike by
clerical employees during negotiations for collective bargaining contract).
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arbitrate, there was no possible basis for implying from the arbitration
clause a promise to refrain from sympathy strikes.11 2 The Court fur-
ther decided that where there is a dispute over whether a sympathy
strike violated a no-strike clause, a district court's jurisdiction was lim-
ited to determining whether the dispute was arbitrable under the con-
tract. 10 3 The Court stated, however, that an injunction may not issue,
pending arbitration of the scope of the no-strike clause, because to hold
otherwise
would cut deeply into the policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
and make the courts potential participants in a wide range of
arbitrable disputes under the many existing and future collec-
tive-bargaining contracts. for the purpose of preliminarily
dealing with the merits of factual and legal issues that are
subjects for the arbitrator and of issuing injunctions that




The Ninth Circuit has consistently followed and applied the anti-
injunction exception developed by the Supreme Court in Buffalo
Forge. 1105 In Matson Plastering Co. V. Operative Plasterers & Cement
Masons International Association,ll°6 the Ninth Circuit questioned
whether the district court had jurisdiction to issue a preliminary injunc-
tion against a union strike.' 10 7 The strike was over the employer's re-
fusal to pay an assessment levied by the union for late payments to the
union trust fund. A dispute between the union and employer arose
over whether the strike was prohibited by the no-strike clause of the
collective bargaining agreement. The union had refused to arbitrate
this issue and argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue
the preliminary injunction against the strike under the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act. The employer claimed the district court did have jurisdiction
1102. Id at 407-08.
1103. .1d at 406-07.
1104. Id at 410-11.
1105. See, e.g., J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Plumbers and Pipefitters Local 598, 568 F.2d 1292
(9th Cir. 1978) (restraining order against sympathy strike wrongfully granted where there
was no collective bargaining agreement and thus no obligation to arbitrate); Martin Hage-
land, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 460 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1972) (no injunction may issue
where collective bargaining agreement contains no mandatory arbitration clause and specifi-
cally reserves union's right to strike); Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. Longshoremen's and Ware-
housemen's Union, 454 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1971) (strike injunction proper where prior
arbitration decision held that strike violated contract).
1106. 633 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981).
1107. Id at 1308.
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because the case fell within the Boys Market exception.108
The Ninth Circuit stated that Buffalo Forge was controlling and
held that the district court had no jurisdiction to issue the preliminary
injunction against the strike by the union.10 9 The court reasoned that
Buffalo Forge clearly indicated that the district court lacked jurisdic-
tion to interpret the contract's no-strike clause. The court did have ju-
risdiction, however, to resolve the question of whether the strike's
legitimacy was arbitrable under the contract. ' Io Further, the court rec-
ognized, based upon Buffalo Forge, that where it is unclear that the
strike is over an arbitrable issue and is in violation of a no-strike clause,
an injunction may not issue pending the arbitrator's decision.'11 I The
court vacated the injunction and remanded to the district court to de-
termine whether the parties were required to arbitrate the issue of the
no-strike clause's applicability.
1 l 2
4. Employer's remedies for illegal strikes
Section 301(a) of the LMRA authorizes damage suits in federal
district courts for collective bargaining agreement violations." 13 An
action by an employer against a union for breach of the collective bar-
gaining agreement's no-strike clause is within the scope of section
301.1114 The union may be held liable if it authorizes, ratifies, or other-
wise participates in a strike which violates the agreement."' 5 Section
301(b), however, does not permit an employer to recover damages from
the individual union officers and members when the union entity vio-
lates a no-strike clause.
1" 16
1108. Id




1113. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chap-
ter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
1114. Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 247-49 (1962) (Court based decision
on Congressional intent underlying section 301(b) that union be solely liable in damages for
injury caused by it and that individual members be exempt from enforcement of money
judgment; § 301(b) was response by Congress to Danbury Hatters case, Loewe v. Lawlor,
208 U.S. 274 (1908); Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522 (1915), where individual union members
held liable in damages for union directed boycott of plaintiffs hats).
1115. See Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 444 U.S. 212, 216-17 (1979).
1116. 370 U.S. at 247-49.
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In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis,I1' 7 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed whether an employer may sue individual union members
under section 301(a) for violating a no-strike clause by engaging in a
wildcat strike in their personal and non-union capacity."'" Although
the employees' wildcat strike clearly violated the collective-bargaining
agreement's no-strike clause, the Court held that section 30 1(a) did not
sanction the damage action against the individual employees regardless
of whether their union participated in or authorized the strike.1'19 The
Court's decision rested on the legislative history of section 301.'120 This
history "clearly reveal[ed] Congress' intent to shield individual employ-
ees from liability for damages arising from their breach of the no-strike
clause. . . even though [this result] might leave the employer unable to
recover for his losses."
' 1 2'
In a footnote, the Court stated that other remedies were available:
for example, an employer may sue the union entity for damages, dis-
charge the striking employees, request the union to discipline the em-
ployees, or obtain an injunction."1 22  In his concurring opinion,
however, Justice Powell suggested that these other remedies are
illusory."
23
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice
Rehnquist, concluded that by holding that an employee, acting in an
individual non-union capacity, may breach the contract with impunity,
the majority ignored the long established common law principle of in-
dividual accountability for voluntary actions. 1 24 At common law, an
individual who voluntarily enters into an agreement, either personally
1117. 451 U.S. 401 (1981).
1118. Id at 402.
1119. Id at 415-17; see also Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l
Union, 452 F.2d 49, 54 (7th Cir. 1971) (section 301 does not subject wildcat strikers to liabil-
ity for damages caused by violating no-strike clause).
1120. 451 U.S. at 407.
1121. Id at 407-08.
1122. Id at 416-17 n.18.
1123. Id at 420 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell reasoned that a suit against the
union for damages is rarely feasible because proof that the union ratified the strike would be
lacking. Id at 422-23. Discharge of the employees would be unrealistic because (1) it would
cripple production; (2) certain selective discharges may be illegal, and may aggravate the
strike; and (3) the discharge may not be sustained by the arbitrator. Id at 421-22. As a
practical matter the union will not discipline its members for striking, and even if it did, it is
unlikely to be effective. Finally, injunctive relief is generally unavailable. Id at 420. But
even if obtained, the employees would be disinclined to obey it, and any enforcement of
penalties for contempt, if ordered, would be difficult. Id
1124. Id at 425 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
19831
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or through an agent, is liable in damages for breach."1 2"
The dissent also pointed out that the majority's holding would
tend to destabilize harmonious industrial relations between employer
and employees.' 126 Employers would be less likely to enter into a mu-
tually satisfactory collective bargaining agreement if they were liable to
employees for breach, while employees were not liable to them for the
same breach.' 127 It would not be the employer's fault for jeopardizing
industrial harmony, as the majority suggested, if it could sue employees
because it would be the employees' breach which broke the peace in the
first place. 1 2  The dissent concluded that if employees knew they
could be held personally liable for a breach of the contract without
union approval, it would result in fewer unauthorized strikes, enhanced
union authority, and greater industrial harmony."1
29
The dissent appears to be the better reasoned opinion. If the col-
lective bargaining process is to work, all parties must be bound by the
collective bargaining agreement, including all employees acting
through their union-agent. Otherwise, the contract takes on an illusory
gloss.
5. The effect of termination and modification provisions on the
right to strike.
Under Section 8(d)(4) of the NLRA, a party wishing to terminate
or modify a collective bargaining agreement must give sixty days notice
to the other party or wait until the expiration date of the contract,
whichever is longer, before resorting to a strike or lock-out." 30 In
NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 1131 the Supreme Court interpreted the term "ex-
piration date" in section 8(d)(4) to refer not only to the termination
date of a bargaining contract but also to a date when the contract by its
own terms was subject to modification." 32 The Court held that the
notice and waiting requirements of section 8(d)(4) are satisfied when a
1125. Id at 427.
1126. Id
1127. Id at 427-28.
1128. Id at 428.
1129. Id at 429.
1130. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976) provides, in pertinent part:
No party to such contract shall terminate or modify.. . [a collective bargain-
ing agreement] unless the party desiring such termination or modification...
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all
the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after
such notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs
later.
1131. 352 U.S. 282 (1957).
1132. Id at 290.
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bargaining contract provides a date after which modifications may be
negotiated and adopted by the parties, and where a strike by the union
in support of its modification demands occurs after both the date the
proposed modifications may become effective and the sixty day notice
period, but before the date the contract could be terminated."
1 33
In KCWFurniture, Inc. v. NLRB, 1134 the Ninth Circuit addressed
whether a valid collective bargaining agreement existed when an em-
ployer unilaterally changed the wages, hours and working conditions of
its employees." 35 The contract's "duration and renewal" clause pro-
vided that the contract was to continue in full force until April 1, 1977,
and thereafter, on a year to year basis by automatic renewal. The
agreement could be modified by either party by giving a "Notice of
Opening" at least sixty days before the yearly April 1 expiration date.
The "Notice of Opening" would not forestall the automatic re-
newal. 1' 36 The right to strike in support of modification demands was
reserved except for the period between the notice and the expiration
date. The contract was terminable by either party by giving a "Notice
of Termination" between sixty and ninety days before the expiration
date."1
37
On January 12, 1977, the union sent KCW the requisite "Notice of
Opening." No agreement had been reached by September 30, 1977,
and in October of 1977, KCW made unilateral changes in the terms
and conditions of employment. The Board found that the contract was
in effect when the changes were made and therefore held that KCW
had committed an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(5) of the
NLRA. 1
138
KCW argued that the duration and renewal clause could not be
construed to permit the contract to be both renewed and negotiable and
that the Board's interpretation as such rendered the clause in violation
of section 8(d)(4) of the NLRA. 1139 The Ninth Circuit held that the
duration and renewal clause, as interpreted by the Board, was valid
under Lion Oil. " The court stated that Lion Oil sanctioned a con-
tractual provision granting the right to negotiate during the term of an
automatically renewed collective bargaining agreement and the right to
1133. Id at 292-93.
1134. 634 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1980).
1135. Id at 438-39.
1136. Id at 437.
1137. Id at 438.
1138. Id
1139. Id at 439.
1140. Id at 441.
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strike in support of the proposed modifications upon giving sixty days
notice to modify the contract." 4  The court found it insignificant that
the contract was not terminable by notice for one year as opposed to
sixty days in Lion Oil. 1142 In either case, the contract was in effect dur-
ing modification negotiations and "a strike was authorized-by impli-
cation in Lion Oil by express provision here."
'"143
B. Pickets
Section 7 of the NLRA guarantees employees the right to picket in
support of a primary strike.1 44 When exercise of this right conflicts
with the private property rights of another, however, a proper accom-
modation must be resolved "with as little destruction of one [right] as is
consistent with the maintenance of the other."'" 45  In Hudgens v.
NLRB, 1 46 the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he locus of that accom-
modation. . . may fall at differing points along the spectrum depend-
ing on the nature and strength of the respective [section] 7 rights and
private property rights asserted in any given context." ' 1 47 The Court
stated that it was the Board's primary responsibility to accommodate
the rights of the parties involved. It then remanded the case to the
Board to make that determination."
148
On remand, the Board held that the private property rights of the
owner of a large shopping mall had to yield to the section 7 rights of
employees who picketed during an economic strike in front of an em-
ployer's retail store within the mall. The Board reasoned that the only
way the employees could effectively reach the store's potential custom-
1141. Id
1142. Id at 440.
1143. Id The Lion Oil Court held that a union's strike during modification negotiations
did not breach the contract. 352 U.S. at 293. The fact that the agreement provided a means
for both modification and termination was insufficient to support an inference that the par-
ties did not contemplate "that economic weapons might be used to support demands for
modification before the notice to terminate was given." Id at 293-94. In KCWFurniture,
there was no express or implied waiver of the right to strike during such period. 634 F.2d at
440.
1144. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492, 499 (1964): "Congress in-
tended to preserve the right to picket during a strike a [sic] gate reserved for employees of
neutral delivery men furnishing day-to-day service essential to the plant's regular opera-
tions." (footnote omitted).
1145. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (employer's refusal to
permit distribution of union literature on company-owned parking lot did not impede em-
ployees' right to self-organize because employees could be reached effectively by other less
burdensome means).
1146. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
1147. Id at 522.
1148. Id at 522; see NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
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ers was to picket in front of that store. 149
The Ninth Circuit was presented with a similar issue in Seattle-
First National Bank v. NLRB. 150 In that case, a bank owned a fifty
story building containing a restaurant involved in an economic strike.
The Board concluded that the Bank, an employer for purposes of the
Act,"1 " had committed an unfair labor practice by threatening to have
two employees arrested for trespassing while picketing in the foyer lo-
cated on the forty-sixth floor.' 152 The Bank argued that the picketers
should have been barred from the forty-sixth floor and confined to the
entrance of the building. The Ninth Circuit upheld the Board's deter-
mination, concluding that the least amount of injury to the bank's
property rights and the employees' section 7 rights could have been
achieved by allowing the employees to picket in the forty-sixth floor
foyer in a "manner that does not impede the use of [the] facilities on
that floor not associated with the restaurant.""1
53
The reasoning employed in Seattle-First was similar to that uti-
lized by the Board in Hudgens. The court found that the effectiveness
of a picket line depends on its location.' 54 Employees could not fully
implement their section 7 rights without confronting customers and
non-striking employees at the restaurant entrance.' 55 If the picketers
were restricted to the building entrance, customers and non-striking
employees could not be reached as effectively, and the employees' sec-
tion 7 rights would be "substantially diluted."' 1 56 Further, the court
recognized that the proper accommodation between the rights of both
parties may vary depending on the nature and strength of the section 7
rights involved." 57 Because the right to picket in support of an eco-
nomic strike is "at the core of section 7," the court determined that the
union should be allowed to picket in an effective manner whenever
possible during an economic strike."
58
Finally, the court held that the Board's order requiring the Bank to
cease interference with the union's economic strike activity was too
broad." 59 The order did not restrict the number and behavior of the
1149. Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. 414, 417-18 (1977).
1150. 651 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1980).
1151. Id at 1273 n.2.
1152. Id at 1273.
1153. Id at 1275.
1154. Id at 1276. See United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492, 499-500 (1964).
1155. 651 F.2d at 1276.
1156. Id
1157. Id
1158. Id See supra note 1145 and accompanying text.
1159. 651 F.2d at 1277.
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picketers, and thus, there was a possibility that it would permit a large
boisterous group of picketers to disturb other businesses or otherwise to
cause congestion leading to violence or damage to the Bank's prop-
erty.'1 60 Consequently, the court remanded the case to the Board for
appropriate revision of the order.l1
6'
VI. THE EMPLOYEE AND THE UNION
A. The Right to Fair Representation
A union has a statutory duty under the NLRA and the LMRA to
represent an employee-member fairly in its collective bargaining with
the employer, as well as in its enforcement of the resulting collective
bargaining agreement." 62 A breach of this duty occurs when a union's
conduct in processing an employee's grievance is arbitrary, discrimina-
tory, or in bad faith." 63
An employee may bring suit in district court against his or her
union for breach of the duty of fair representation and against the em-
ployer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement under section
301(a) of the LMRA.Y1s As a general rule, an employee who seeks a
remedy for breach of the collective bargaining agreement must exhaust
any exclusive grievance and arbitration procedures provided in the
agreement before bringing a section 301 suit against his or her union or
employer.1' 65 Exhaustion is not required if the employee shows that
the union, which controls the grievance and arbitration procedures,
wrongfully refused to seek arbitration."
66
The circuits are divided over whether an employee should be re-
quired to exhaust internal union appeals procedures prior to bringing a
secton 301 suit against an employer or union. In suits against the
union, the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits require exhaus-
tion unless the available remedies are inadequate or if the use of inter-
nal procedures would be futile." 67 Exhaustion is excused by the Tenth
1160. Id
1161. Id
1162. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967); Buzzard v. .AM Workers Local 1040, 480
F.2d 35, 40 (9th Cir. 1973).
1163. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
1164. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976); see Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees v. Lockridge,
403 U.S. 274, 298-99 (1971); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1964).
1165. Republic Steel v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965); see Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 563 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184 (1967).
1166. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185 (1967); see also Beriault v. Local 40, 501 F.2d 258,
262 (9th Cir. 1974).
1167. Buzzard v. IAM Workers Local 1040,480 F.2d 35, 41 (9th Cir. 1973); accord Tinsley
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and District of Columbia Circuits when union hostility would preclude
a fair hearing.
168
In suits against the employer, the Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits have ruled that an employee's failure to exhaust
internal procedures may not be asserted as a defense.' 16 9 The Seventh,
Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits, however, hold that exhaus-
tion may be required where the internal union procedures could result
in reactivation of the employee's grievance.
1 170
In suits against both the union and employer, the issue of exhaus-
tion of internal union appeals procedures regarding the union has been
analyzed separately from that regarding the employer. The result has
been a procedural discrepancy such that exhaustion may be required
with respect to the union, but not with respect to the employer.
1171
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict
among the circuits over the exhaustion requirement in Clayton v. Inter-
national Union, UAW.1 72 In Clayton, the union made a timely request
to arbitrate an employee's grievance but later withdrew the request.
Although the union constitution required exhaustion of internal union
appeals procedures before bringing suit, the employee filed a section
301 (a) suit against the union for breach of its duty of fair representation
and against his employer for breach of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. 1173 He sought damages from both the employer and the union
and reinstatement to his job. 1 74 The Court addressed whether his fail-
ure to exhaust internal union appeal procedures established by his
union's constitution barred his section 301 suit against both the union
v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 635 F.2d 1288, 1290 (7th Cir. 1980); Geddes v. Chrysler Corp.,
608 F.2d 261, 264 (6th Cir. 1979); Baldini v. Local 1040, 581 F.2d 145, 149 (7th Cir. 1978).
1168. Fizer v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 586 F.2d 182, 183-84 (10th Cir. 1978); Winter v. Local
639, 569 F.2d 146, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
1169. Retana v. Apartment Elevator Operators Union, 453 F.2d 1018, 1027 n.16 (9th Cir.
1972) (dictum); accord Johnson v. General Motors, 641 F.2d 1075, 1083 (2d Cir. 1981); Ged-
des v. Chrysler Corp., 608 F.2d 261, 264 (6th Cir. 1979); Peterson v. Rath Packing Co., 461
F.2d 312, 315 (8th Cir. 1972); Brady v. TWA, 401 F.2d 87, 102 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1048 (1969).
1170. Varra v. Dillon Co., 615 F.2d 1315, 1317-18 (10th Cir. 1980); Baldini v. Local 1041,
581 F.2d 145, 150 (7th Cir. 1978); Winter v. Local 639, 569 F.2d 146, 150-51 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
1171. See, e.g., Fizer v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 586 F.2d 182, 183-84 (10th Cir. 1978) (ex-
haustion of internal union appeals procedures required with respect to union but not em-
ployer); Winter v. Local 639, 569 F.2d 146, 149-51 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
1172. 451 U.S. 679 (1981).
1173. Id at 682-83. •
1174. Id at 690.
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and the employer. 175
The Court recognized the trial courts' discretion to require exhaus-
tion of internal union appeals procedures" 176 and stated that three fac-
tors should be considered when this discretion is exercised:
[F]irst, whether union officials are so hostile to the employee
that he could not hope to obtain a fair hearing on his claim;
second, whether the internal union appeals procedures would
be inadequate either to reactivate the employee's grievance or
to award him the full relief he seeks under § 301; and third,
whether exhaustion of internal procedures would unreasona-
bly delay the employee's opportunity to obtain a judicial
hearing on the merits of his claim."
17 7
A court may properly excuse an employee's failure to exhaust internal
remedies if any of these factors are found to exist.
1178
The Clayton Court focused on the adequacy of relief available
under the union's internal appellate procedure and found that the
union could neither reactivate the employee's grievance nor reinstate
him in his job." 179 The Court concluded that the relief available under
the union appeals procedures was inadequate, 110 and, therefore, the
national labor policy of encouraging "'rapid disposition of labor dis-
putes"' would not be served by requiring exhaustion. 1"8' Exhaustion
would only delay the employee's section 301 action, not eliminate it.
Moreover, the employee would be required to prove de novo that the
union breached its duty of fair representation and that the employer
breached the collective bargaining agreement regardless of the outcome
of the internal appeal."81
2
The union argued that even if exhaustion was not required with
respect to the employer, it should have been required with respect to
the union because the relief sought against the union in the section 301
suit was available through internal union procedures. 183 The Court
1175. Id at 682.
1176. Id at 689.
1177. Id
1178. Id
1179. Id at 690-91.
1180. Id at 691-92.
1181. Id at 693 (citing United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 63 (1981) (Stew-
art, J., concurring) (quoting UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 707 (1966))).
1182. 451 U.S. at 693.
1183. Id at 694-95. The Court noted that the record was unclear as to whether the relief
sought by the employee against the union was available through the internal appeals proce-
dures. Id at 690-91 n.17.
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rejected this argument and reversed the Ninth Circuit on this point.1 84
The Court explained that a trial court which required exhaustion
before the employer could be sued, but not before the union could be
sued, would confront "two undesirable alternatives."'1 85 If the action
against the employer were stayed pending resolution of the internal ap-
peals procedures, the court would effectively be requiring exhaustion
with respect to the employer, thus violating national labor policy.
1186
On the other hand, if the court permitted the suit against the employer
to proceed and tolled the statute of limitations in the suit against the
union pending exhaustion, the result could be two separate section 301
suits based on the same facts, proceeding at different paces in the same
court.'1 87 To avoid this dilemma, the Court held that exhaustion of
internal union remedies is not a prerequisite to a section 301 suit
against both employer and union if internal union appeals procedures
will neither reactivate the employee's grievance nor grant the employee
complete relief sought through a section 301 suit.
1 8
B. Discioline of Union Members
Generally, Congress has not placed any limitation on a union's
handling of its internal affairs.1 189 Union regulations that affect a
member's employment status are regulated, however, under section
8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA.190 A union may enforce a rule which reflects
a legitimate union interest, does not impair national labor policy, and is
reasonably enforced against members who are free to leave the union
and escape the rule.'191 The contractual nature of union membership
renders discipline of members non-coercive within the meaning of sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A). 1 92 When a union rule contravenes national labor pol-
icy, however, disciplinary action for a violation of such rule is coercive
and constitutes an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(1)(A)." 93
In NLRB v. Construction and Building Material Teamsters, Local





1189. Eg., NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg., 388 U.S. 175, 195 (1967) (union may fine em-
ployee for crossing picket line to work during strike).
1190. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1976).
1191. Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 430 (1969) (national labor policy not impaired by
union-imposed production ceiling).
1192. NLRB v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 1179, 526 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1975).
1193. Id (national labor policy impaired when union continued to discipline members for
failing to honor picket line of sister union after picket declared unlawful).
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291, 1194 the union caused an employee to be discharged from employ-
ment for inadvertently failing to pay union dues, without first giving
the employee notice of his membership suspension and an opportunity
to restore himself to good standing.' 195 A security provision in the col-
lective bargaining agreement provided that only members in good
standing could retain employment. 1196 The court held that the union's
fiduciary duty of fair representation and fair dealing came into play
because the sanction for nonpayment of dues interfered with the mem-
ber's employment and relations with his employer.' 197 The court held
that sections 8(b)(2) and (1)(A) of the Act, read with that duty in mind,
required the union to make certain that the member's delinquency was
not due to the member's ignorance or inadvertence before causing his
or her discharge as a sanction.1198
In NLRB v. Glaziers and Glassworkers Local 1621, 1199 the union
disciplined two members for working with a neutral employer behind a
union-recognized picket line although the employees had entered the
construction site through a neutral gate off-limits to picketing.12° The
neutral employer was a subcontractor of the general contractor who
was involved in the dispute.'120 The court held that the union's use of
coercive discipline against the members impaired national labor policy
against secondary boycotts and thus violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
NLRA. 120 2 The court explained that "'[a] contrary decision would un-
dermine the right of the [secondary employer] to remain neutral in a
labor dispute in which [it is] not involved.' 12o3
C. Union Votes
The courts will not disturb a union's reasonable interpretation of
its constitution, rules, or procedures without proof of bad faith or com-
1194. 633 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1980).
1195. Id at 1296.
1196. Id
1197. Id at 1299; NLRB v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, Local 568, 320 F.2d
254, 258 (3d Cir. 1963); see also General Teamsters Local 162, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 568
F.2d 665,668-69 (9th Cir. 1978); H.C. Macaulay Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 553 F.2d 1198, 1201
(9th Cir. 1977).
1198. 633 F.2d at 1299.
1199. 632 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1980).
1200. Id at 90.
1201. Id
1202. Id at 92-93.
1203. Id at 93 (citing Bricklayers and Stonemasons Union, Local 2 v. NLRB, 562 F.2d
775, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (contract clause permitting employees to treat neutral gate as imag-




pelling circumstances. 204 In Busch v. Givens, 1205 the union's president
was charged by a member with breach of fiduciary duty under Title V
of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 for
refusing to fund the attendance of certain delegates to a national union
convention. The delegates had been elected under the 1974 union con-
stitution. The president refused funding because a 1978 amendment to
the constitution restricted delegate status to particular union of-
ficers.' 2° The union constitution provided two steps for lawful amend-
ment: majority ratification of a written proposed amendment at a
regular meeting and a submission of the proposed amendment to a ref-
erendum of the entire asserting membership.1 20 7 The 1978 amendment
had been presented to the membership by referendum prior to ratifica-
tion by majority vote at a regular meeting. The complaining member
challenged the amendment's validity, asserting that the constitution
could not be interpreted to permit the referendum step to be performed
first.1 208 The court declined to revise the union's interpretation of its
constitution because the constitution itself did not prescribe a particular
sequence for the amendment steps,1209 and the outcome of the amend-
ment process would be unaffected by the order of votes. Either se-
quence would guarantee an open debate of the proposed amendment
and an opportunity for the membership to reject the proposed amend-
ment at an open meeting.
1 210
VII. PROCEEDINGS UNDER OTHER ACTS
A. Labor Management Relations Act
Section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA or
Act) prohibits employers from contributing money or anything else of
value to employee representatives.1 211 This restriction is intended to
1204. Stelling v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union No. 1547, 587 F.2d 1379, 1389
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979); Vestal v. Hoffa, 451 F.2d 706, 709 (6th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934 (1972); see also Gordon v. Laborers' Int'l Union, 490 F.2d
133, 137 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
1205. 627 F.2d 978 (9th Cir. 1980).
1206. Id at 979.
1207. Id at 980 n.5.
1208. Id at 981.
1209. Id at 980-81.
1210. Id at 981.
1211. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1976) provides in part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any employer... to pay, lend, or deliver, or agree to
pay ... any money or other thing of value-
(1) to any representative of any of his employees who are employed in an indus-
try affecting commerce; or
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(1) prevent employers from influencing union officials with contribu-
tions, and (2) prevent union officials from extracting contributions from
employers.1212 Under section 302(c)(5), however, employers may make
payments to employee pension plans, provided these plans are estab-
lished for "the sole and exclusive benefit of the employee of such em-
ployer."' 2 3 Authority to "restrain violations" of the Act is vested in
the federal court system under section 302(e).'
2 14
1. Judicial review of pension plan eligibility requirements
Courts recognize that trustees administering employee pension
funds possess the requisite experience and ability to design appropriate
eligibility standards for participation in the plan. Trustees are, there-
fore, given wide discretion in creating eligibility requirements. 1215 Ac-
cordingly, many courts construe section 302(e) to allow judicial review
only of "structurally deficient" plans, while precluding review of ac-
tions involving daily plan administration.
1216
Despite their broad discretion, however, trustees owe employees a
fiduciary duty not to impose unreasonable or arbitrary eligibility stan-
dards for participation in pension plans. 217 When such standards are
alleged to exist, the Ninth Circuit generally asserts jurisdiction under
section 302(e). 218
a. validity of break-in-service rule
Employee pension plans normally contain conditions and prohibi-
tions which employees must observe before they are eligible to receive
(2) to any labor organization. . . which represents. . . any of the employees of
such employer who are employed in an industry affecting commerce.
1212. United States v. Ryan, 350 U.S. 299, 304-06 (1956); Alvares v. Erickson, 514 F.2d
156, 164 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975); Bowers v. Ulpiano Casal, Inc., 393 F.2d
421, 425 (1st Cir. 1968).
1213. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (Supp. V 1981) provides that "[t]he provisions of this section
shall not be applicable. . . with respect to money or other thing of value paid to a trust fund
established. . . for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of such employer."
1214. 29 U.S.C. § 186(e) (1976) provides that "[t]he district courts of the United States...
shall have jurisdiction. . . to restrain violations of this section."
1215. Sailer v. Retirement Fund Trust, 599 F.2d 913, 914 (9th Cir. 1979); Tomlin v. Board
of Trustees of Constr. Laborers, 586 F.2d 148, 151 (9th Cir. 1978); Giler v. Board of Trustees
of Sheet Metal Workers, 509 F.2d 848, 849 (9th Cir. 1975); Lee v. Nesbitt, 453 F.2d 1309,
1311 (9th Cir. 1972).
1216. See Turner v. Local 302, In'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 604 F.2d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir.
1979).
1217. Alvares v. Erickson, 514 F.2d 156, 166-67 (9th Cir. 1975); Lee v. Nesbitt, 453 F.2d
1309, 1311 (9th Cir. 1972).
1218. See, e.g., Wilson v. Board of Trustees, 564 F.2d 1299, 1299-1300 (9th Cir. 1977).
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pensions. Many plans, for example, require employees to work a mini-
mum number of years in employment covered under the plan. Not
uncommon in such plans is a "break-in-service rule," which essentially
cancels all years of credit an employee earned prior to a "break" or
temporary termination of employment as defined by the rule. Many
employees who have had a break in employment may, thus, be denied
pensions because age, infirmity, or injury prevented them from accru-
ing the minimum number of years required after the break occurred.
The Ninth Circuit has held that break-in-service rules are not per
se invalid. 2 19 Instead, the court examines the application of the rule in
the plaintiffs circumstances to determine if it is arbitrary and
unreasonable. 1
220
In a prior decision, Lee v. Nesbitt,'221 the Ninth Circuit indicated
that even when the employee's break in service was involuntary, the
rule may be reasonable. 222 The Lee court found, however, that the
rule was unreasonably applied given the circumstances of the plaintiffs
case. The break occurred after the employee had accrued the
minimum fifteen years required to receive benefits, and was directly
due to the unavailability of work.12
23
In another prior decision, Burroughs v. Board of Trustees of Pen-
sion Trust,'1224 the Ninth Circuit held that a break-in-service rule was
unreasonable where the employee was not given notice of the rule. Ac-
cording to the court, this denied him the opportunity to protect himself
by complying with it.
1225
Recently in Ponce v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust,1226 the
1219. Wilson v. Bd. of Trustees, 564 F.2d 1299, 1300 (9th Cir. 1977).
1220. Id
1221. 453 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1972).
1222. I d at 1311.
1223. I d at 1312. Later decisions indicate a trend on the part of the Ninth Circuit to
construe Lee more broadly. Recognizing that application of the break-in-service rule in
each instance would be unreasonable, the court has required that the voluntariness of the
break be determined. See, e.g., Sailer v. Retirement Fund Trust, 599 F.2d 913, 915 (9th Cir.
1979) (court indicated that under standard break-in-service rule question of employee's vol-
untariness must be considered; the plan in issue, however, contained mitigating clause al-
lowing employee to avoid divesture of his credit by filing notice requesting that his credit be
vested, and, therefore, court declined to establish exacting burden of justification for rules
that mitigate potentially harsh effects of break rules); Wilson v. Board of Trustees, 564 F.2d
1299, 1301 (9th Cir. 1977) (employee who mistakenly thought the amount of his covered
employment was sufficient to prevent break in employment did not suffer involuntary break
in employment).
1224. 542 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1096 (1977).
1225. Id at 1131.
1226. 628 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1980).
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Ninth Circuit addressed two challenges to a pension plan's break-in-
service rule. The rule operated to cancel accrued employment when an
employee with less than fifteen years of service failed to complete at
least 300 hours of work in each of two consecutive years.
1227
In one appeal, construction workers with ten years of service under
the plan were denied pensions because of the break-in-service rule.1
221
They claimed the rule was arbitrary on its face and unrelated to any
legitimate trust purpose because the rule applied to only a few other-
wise eligible employees. 22 9 In affirming the lower court's judgment,
the Ninth Circuit advanced three reasons for rejecting the plaintiffs'
challenge.
The court first suggested that because of the limited review granted
under section 302(e), courts are less concerned about pension rules ex-
cluding a low percentage of plan members than those excluding a high
percentage of participants.' In the court's view, section 302(c)(5) was
not intended to remedy the burden imposed on a few individuals ex-
cluded from the plan, but instead, was intended to insure that plan
trustees would award benefits to "as many intended employees as is
economically possible."' 1231
The court next observed that break-in-service rules serve to pro-
mote employers' legitimate interest in encouraging employees' continu-
ous employment. It concluded that the low exclusion rate' indicated the
rule achieved its intended purpose.'1 2 Finally, the court countered the
plaintiff's claim that the low exclusion rate did not contribute to the
actuarial soundness of the plan. The court found authority indicating
that exclusion of even one employee influences the plan's actuarial
soundness by making funds available to other plan beneficiaries.
233
As the Ponce case indicates, the Ninth Circuit will uphold break-in-
service rules which exclude low percentages of participants. Con-
versely, rules which exclude high percentages of employees warrant
closer scrutiny.
The second appeal in Ponce involved a plaintiff who claimed that
the same break-in-service rule was arbitrarily and capriciously applied
to the circumstances of his case. Essentially, the rule, which was en-
1227. d at 539-40.
1228. Id at 540.
1229. Id at 542.
1230. Id
1231. Id. (quoting Gaydosh v. Lewis, 410 F.2d 262, 266 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
1232. 628 F.2d at 542.




acted with the plan in 1962, was applied to cancel approximately three
years of credit which the employee had earned prior to 1950.1234
The employee became disabled and was denied a pension because
the rule was applied to a period in 1950 and 1951 when the employee
had failed to earn any pension benefits. This application cancelled the
credit he accrued prior to 1950. Although the employee earned ap-
proximately fourteen years of credit after 1952, he did not satisfy the
requirement of fifteen years of service necessary to receive benefits
under the plan. 1235
The employee claimed that the use of the rule to cancel his credit
earned prior to 1950 was arbitrary and capricious because he had no
notice of its requirements at that time. He further argued that the hold-
ing in Burroughs dictated that plan participants have notice of all eligi-
bility requirements. 1236
The Ninth Circuit found the employee's reliance on Burroughs
misplaced. According to the court, the notice requirement of Bur-
roughs is triggered when plan trustees fail to notify employees of a
break-in-service rule but nevertheless apply the rule to breaks occur-
ring after the rule's enactment. It protects employees who could have
avoided their break had they been notified of the existence of the
rule. 23 7 The "fundamentally unfair" conduct of the Burroughs trustees
was not involved in Ponce, however, because the plaintiff's break oc-
curred before the rule's enactment. The court accordingly affirmed the
district court's judgment in favor of the defendant, and in so doing de-
clined to forbid application of a break-in-service rule to breaks occur-
ring before the rule's inception.'
b. minimum year service requirement
Courts have suggested that a pension plan is structurally defective
when it unreasonably denies pensions to a large number of partici-
pants. 1239 The Ninth Circuit implemented this proposition in Ponce by
imposing a strict standard on trustees to justify pension rules which
exclude a high percentage of participants. 1240
The plaintiffs in Ponce had also challenged the plan's fifteen year
1234. 628 F.2d at 540.
1235. Id
1236. 628 F.2d at 545.
1237. Id
1238. Id
1239. See, e.g., Burroughs v. Bd. of Trustees of Pension Trust, 542 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9th
Cir. 1977).
1240. 628 F.2d at 541-42.
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minimum service requirement, which mandated that employees com-
plete at least fifteen years of work to qualify for pensions.2 4' The
plaintiffs claimed the rule excluded an excessively high percentage of
plan participants. They introduced evidence that less than four percent
of the participants actually qualified for and received pension benefits,
in significant contrast to the national average of eight percent for plans
requiring eleven or more years of work. 24 2 Specific objection was di-
rected at the trustees' 1970 decision to more than double pension bene-
fit levels rather than lower the fifteen-year requirement in order to
increase the number of plan beneficiaries.'243
The Ninth Circuit, acknowledging the discretion granted pension
trustees, declined to impose precise exclusion rate guidelines. The
court, however, focused on the purpose of section 302(c)(5), which was
to guarantee pensions to as many participants as was economically pos-
sible. With this in mind, the court established the rule that "when a
[pension plan] vesting requirement is shown to exclude an unusually
high percentage of plan participants, the burden shifts to the trustees to
show the reasonableness of the requirement."12'
Applying the new standard to the facts before it, the court found
the trustees' explanation for their 1970 decision to more than double
benefits while retaining the fifteen-year requirement insufficient to sus-
tain their burden. The trustees believed that the benefit increase would
act as an incentive to the participants, who were construction workers,
and would thereby eliminate their high drop-out rate. 1245 The court,
however, noting the cyclical nature of the construction industry and its
high rate of work-related injuries, found the trustees' justification spec-
ulative absent documentation that the increased benefits would reduce
the drop-out rate.' 246 In conclusion, the court stated that "absent a
substantial and verifiable justification, it is arbitrary and capricious for
trustees both to maintain a vesting requirement with a high exclusion
rate and at the same time to pay an unusually high level of bene-
fits.""' 47 The court then vacated the district court's summary judgment
in favor of the defendant and remanded the case.
248
Justice Anderson, in a concurring opinion, expressed concern that
1241. Id at 539-40.
1242. Id at 543.
1243. Id at 540.
1244. Id at 543.
1245. Id
1246. Id at 543-44.




the court's holding would be construed too restrictively and would im-
pinge on the broad discretion granted pension trustees. More specifi-
cally, he feared that on remand the court's language would foreclose
consideration of all of the factors which render the construction labor
force unique in such situations.1249
2. Refund to employer of pension plan payments made after
expiration of collective bargaining agreement
Under section 302(c)(5)(B) of the Act, 250 employer payments to
pension funds established under section 302(c) 1251 must be made pursu-
ant to the terms of a written agreement. Pension payments made to
employees in a manner not authorized by the agreement have been
prohibited, 12 5 2 as have those where the employer has failed to sign the
pension agreement.
1253
Courts, however, have held that section 302(c)(5)(B) does not re-
lieve employers of their duty during collective bargaining to continue
payments to pension plans upon expiration of collective bargaining
agreements. The terms of such pension plans are held to survive the
expiration date of the agreement because section 8(a)(5) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act 254 requires employers to maintain the sta-
tus quo respecting wages and working conditions during the bargaining
process. 1255
In Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Western Conference of Team-
sters Pension Trust Fund,12 56 the Ninth Circuit denied the employer's
claim for a refund of payments made to a pension fund after the expi-
ration of the written agreement. The employer in Producers Dairy had
continued to contribute to the pension fund during negotiations for a
new collective bargaining agreement. Those contributions were dis-
1249. Id at 545 (Anderson, J., concurring).
1250. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (1976).
1251. Id § 186(c).
1252. See, e.g., Thurber v. Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Plan, 542 F.2d 1106,
1109 (9th Cir. 1976) (illegal for fund to pay benefits based on retroactive contributions not
authorized by provisions of fund agreement).
1253. See Moglia v. Geoghegan, 403 F.2d 110, 117-18 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
919 (1969).
1254. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
1255. See Peerless Roofing Co. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir. 1981) (employer
obligation to make trust fund payments survives expiration date of collective bargaining
agreement under employer's duty to maintain status quo); Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc. v.
NLRB, 632 F.2d 721, 729 (9th Cir. 1980) (employer has continuing duty not to make unilat-
eral changes in health care plan upon expiration of agreement), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 984
(1981).
1256. 654 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1981).
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continued after the unresolved negotiations resulted in a union
strike.1 257 The employer then sued the pension fund to recover all con-
tributions made after the expiration date of the collective bargaining
agreement on the theory that section 302(c)(5)(B) prohibited the trust
from retaining contributions made without a written agreement. The
district court awarded the employer a refund on contributions made
after the date the negotiations had reached an impasse.
125
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the LMRA did not create
a right of action for employers to recover payments made after an im-
passe had been reached.1259 The court reasoned that establishing an
employer's right to a refund would be detrimental to the beneficiaries
of the fund, whom the Act was intended to protect. 260 The court sug-
gested that employers could stop pension contributions when they be-
lieved an impasse had been reached and could raise impasse as a
defense if the union brought unfair labor practice charges.'
261
B. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
1. Trusteeship over union local
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA
or Act) 1262 provides for the imposition of a "trusteeship"'1263 by a labor
organization over a subordinate body in order to assure that the
financial, political, and contractual activities of the subordinate body
comply with the objectives of the labor organization.'264 The LMRDA
also provides for the institution of judicial proceedings by individual
members and subordinate units against labor organizations that have
improperly subjected such a member or unit to trusteeships. 265 Fed-
eral district courts are authorized to grant "such relief (including in-
junctions) as may be appropriate."'
1266
1257. Id at 627.
1258. Id
1259. Id at 628.
1260. Id
1261. Id
1262. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976 & Supp. 1981).
1263. 29 U.S.C. § 402(h) (1976) defines trusteeship as "any receivership, trusteeship, or
other method of supervision or control whereby a labor organization suspends the autonomy
otherwise available to a subordinate body under its constitution or bylaws."
1264. Trusteeships are permitted "for the purpose[s] of correcting corruption or financial
malpractice, assuring the performance of collective bargaining agreements or other duties of
a bargaining representative, restoring democratic procedures, or otherwise carrying out le-
gitimate objectives of such labor organization[s]." Id § 462.




In Higgins v. Harden 1267 the Ninth Circuit construed and applied
the trusteeship sections of the LMRDA to a labor organization's super-
vision of a subordinate body. In Higgins, the functions of a union local
were assumed by an international union, and local leaders were either
fired or forced to resign. One of the local leaders brought suit in fed-
eral court for a determination of the propriety of and the remedies for
the international's activity. The trial court concluded that a trusteeship
had been improperly imposed, that dismissal from employment pursu-
ant thereto was improper, that back pay and attorney's fees should be
awarded to those dismissed, and that compensation for emotional
anguish was inappropriate.
1 268
The LMRDA sections governing the trusteeship power 126 9 were
enacted to address abuses by labor organizations. 270 As a result, a
trusteeship has been broadly defined.1271 Acting in accordance with
this general concept, the Higgins court determined that a trusteeship
was imposed when the international union terminated a local officer's
authority to participate in collective bargaining and to review and ap-
prove expense accounts. 127 2 This ruling was simply a literal application
of section 402(h) of the Act. There appears to be no established rule for
defining methods of supervision or control that impose trusteeships.
Trial courts, however, have construed section 402(h) broadly.'273 The
scope of a trusteeship appears to be limited only by the resourcefulness
of labor organizations in manipulating their subordinate locals.
1274
For a trusteeship to be presumed valid, it must conform to the
1267. 644 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1981).
1268. Id. at 1350.
1269. 29 U.S.C. §§ 461-466 (1976).
1270. Benda v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 584 F.2d 308, 312
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 937 (1979) (citing R. SLOVENKO, SYMPOSIUM ON
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE AcT OF 1959 443-47 (1961)).
1271. Benda v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 584 F.2d 308, 312
n.1 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 937 (1979).
1272. 644 F.2d at 1350-51. The constitution of the international union provided for the
exercise of "direct supervision, direction and control" of the local unions. Id at 1350 n.1.
1273. See, e.g., Benda v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 584 F.2d
308, 312 n.1 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 937 (1979).
1274. See, e.g., Brennan v. UMW, 475 F.2d 1293, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (in-
ternational's contention that subordinate districts are merely arms of international did not
defeat finding of trusteeship); Cross v. UMW, 353 F. Supp. 504, 507-08 (S.D. Ill. 1973)
(when international appointed local officers to negotiate collective bargaining terms, al-
though label "semi-autonomous" applied, trusteeship existed); Executive Bd. Local Union
No. 28, IBEW v. IBEW, 184 F. Supp. 649, 651-52 (D. Md. 1960) (supervision by interna-
tional's agent, dismissal of local president, and imposition of new unpopular local bylaws
found to be trusteeship); see also Comment, Landrum-Groin and the Trusteeshp Imbroglio,
71 YALE L.J. 1460, 1478-95 (1962) (revocation-reissuance of local charters, assistance in lo-
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constitution and by-laws of the subordinating body,127 5 and it must be
authorized or ratified at a hearing before the labor organization's exec-
utive board or a similar constitutionally authorized body. 2 76 This does
not mean that all trusteeships are presumed invalid when no hearing is
held prior to their imposition. The Ninth Circuit has validated pre-
hearing trusteeships in "emergency" situations, 1277 and the Second Cir-
cuit has validated pre-hearing trusteeships when imposed in "good
faith."' 12 78  Greater discretion is left to the district courts in the Fifth
Circuit in determining validity.
1 279
Although the court mentioned the flexible application of the hear-
ing requirement of section 464(c) of the Act, Higgins was decided on
the basis of a section 462 violation of the constitution of the imposing
entity. The court's discussion of "emergency conditions" 1280 was ren-
dered moot by a provision in the defendant labor organization's consti-
tution requiring a hearing "not less than 4 days and not more than one




To assure that the purpose of a law is accomplished, an award of
attorney's fees is often essential. Nevertheless, under the American or
general rule "absent statute or enforceable contract, litigants pay their
own attorney's fees."'' 28 2 However, when a court exercises its equitable
powers and "overriding considerations indicate the need for such a re-
cal affairs by international's agent having power to impose trusteeship, and consolidation of
locals probably constitute imposition of trusteeships).
1275. 29 U.S.C. § 462 (1976).
1276. Id § 464(c).
1277. See, eg., Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union v. Rollison, 615 F.2d 788, 792-
93 (9th Cir. 1980) (partial trusteeship imposed without hearing held valid because it pro-
tected both parties' interests in view of long-lived animosity between local officers and inter-
national union); Retail Clerks Local 770 v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 479 F.2d 54, 55 (9th
Cir. 1973) (imposition of trusteeship denied pending hearings; international union failed to
show emergency when implementation of local's noncomforming contracts delayed by inter-
national's order).
1278. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Sombrotto, 449 F.2d 915, 921 (2d Cir. 1971)
(local bears burden of proof to show that pre-hearing trusteeship not imposed in good faith).
1279. Bailey v. Dixon, 429 F.2d 1321, 1322 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (district court's
injunction of pre-hearing trusteeship upheld as within court's discretion despite interna-
tional's argument that trusteeship could be ratified at later hearing).
1280. 644 F.2d at 1351.
1281. Id at n.2.
1282. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975).
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covery," an award of attorney's fees is appropriate. 2 83
In the context of the LMRDA's bill of rights for labor organization
members, 1284 the Supreme Court in Hall v. Cole 1285 expressly allowed
recovery of attorney's fees when a defendant acts in bad faith or when
a plaintiffs action confers a substantial benefit to other union mem-
bers. 1286 The Fifth Circuit extended the Hall holding to improper trus-
teeship cases, noting that an award of attorney's fees was consistent
with Congress' intent to protect members' rights. 1287 When the re-
sources of a labor organization are compared with those of an individ-
ual, this extension is justified. In Higgins, the Ninth Circuit joined the
Fifth Circuit in allowing attorney's fees as appropriate relief under sec-
tion 464(a) of the Act. 288
The relevant factors for determining the amount of an attorney's
fee award were originally set forth in a Fifth Circuit decision address-
ing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1289 These factors are
expressly recognized in most circuits, 1290 including the Ninth. 1291 The
broad acceptance of these factors demonstrates their rationality. There
seems to be less agreement, however, about the extent to which a trial
court must articulate its reliance on the factors. This is especially true
in the Ninth Circuit. 12 92 The Higgins court, finding no information in
the district court's record to support an award of attorney's fees, re-
1283. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. I, 9 (1972) (quoting Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S.
375, 391-92 (1970)).
1284. 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-15 (1976).
1285. 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
1286. Id at 14.
1287. McDonald v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 1217, 1227 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976).
1288. 644 F.2d at 1352-53.
1289. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).
The Higgins court enumerated the relevant factors to be considered in determining the
amount of an award for attorney's fees: (I) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service prop-
erly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to the acceptance of the
case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations
imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results ob-
tained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; (10) the "undesirability" of
the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and
(12) awards in similar cases. 644 F.2d at 1352.
1290. See, e.g., Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216 (4th Cir.), cer. denied, 439 U.S.
934 (1978); King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916
(1978); Finney v. Hutto, 548 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1977); Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503
F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
1291. Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 951 (1976).
1292. Compare Kessler v. Associates Fin. Serv. Co. of Hawaii, 639 F.2d 498, 500 (9th Cir.
1981) (no formal findings necessary when transcript reflected consideration of factors) with
LOYOL4 OF LOS ANGELES L4WPEVIEW
manded for an explanation of the award. 1293  Contrary to the
LMRDA's purpose, requiring a statement of the basis for an attorney's
fees award seems to assist labor organizations and frustrate members.
It would be virtually meaningless, however, to require consideration of
these factors without requiring a record of that consideration.
b. damages for emotional distress
The LMRDA does not provide for the recovery of damages result-
ing from emotional distress. The Ninth Circuit has adopted the general
rule that unless an actual injury has been proven, recovery for emo-
tional distress is precluded. 1294 This rule was followed in Higgins. 2 91
In contrast, punitive damages may be awarded without establishing
that actual injury was suffered. 1296 This is consistent with a refusal to
award emotional distress damages without a showing of actual injury
because punitive damages are deterrent-oriented rather than compen-
sation-oriented, and they can be justified by simply showing that a
wrongful act was done.
c. back pay awards
When employees are wrongfully dismissed, appropriate relief may
include recovery of back pay from employers. 1297 If, however, dis-
missed employees have also received unemployment compensation
from state-administered insurance programs, they would have received
compensation greater than what they would have received in the ab-
sence of the wrongful discharge. In Higgins, the Ninth Circuit ad-
dressed for the first time the deductibility of unemployment
compensation from a back pay award under the LMRDA. 1298
The Higgins court noted that in the context of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Gulleft Gin Co. 1299 held
that it was within the discretion of the NLRB to ignore the receipt of
Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975) (failure of record to supply
information prevents meaningful review), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976).
1293. 644 F.2d at 1352-53.
1294. Bise v. IBEW, Local 1969, 618 F.2d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
980 (1980); Ross v. IBEW, 544 F.2d 1022, 1025 n.2 (9th Cir. 1976); International Bhd. of
Boilermakers v. Rafferty, 348 F.2d 307, 315 (9th Cir. 1965).
1295. 644 F.2d at 1353.
1296. International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193, 200 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968).
1297. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
1298. 644 F.2d at 1353.
1299. 340 U.S. 361 (1951).
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unemployment compensation when making back pay awards. 13° Simi-
larly, the Tenth and Fifth Circuits have applied the discretionary rule
of Gulleft to uphold back pay awards that ignore unemployment com-
pensation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
130 1
Other circuits have upheld back pay awards in which unemployment
compensation has been deducted as also being within the discretion of
the district courts.
1 30 2
In Higgins, the Ninth Circuit applied Gullett to a LMRDA back
pay award and affirmed the trial court's decision not to deduct unem-
ployment compensation from the back pay award. 30 3 By not deduct-
ing such payments, an employee is allowed double recovery. The
Higgins court determined, however, that although employers pay the
premiums on the unemployment insurance, the benefits may be consid-
ered a collateral source of recovery. 1304 Borrowing a common law tort
concept, the court held that double recovery from a collateral source is
permissible, so long as that source is not created by the entity responsi-
ble for the primary source of recovery. 130 5 The Higgins court noted
that the determination of whether the payments were collateral was a




This ruling is probably correct, so long as trial courts properly ap-
ply their discretion. The purpose of back pay awards is to compensate,
not punish.130 7 If the trial court does not discern the precise way in
which a particular unemployment insurance plan is administered, its
award may overcompensate the employee and punish the employer.
Despite the inherent problems in granting greater discretion to the dis-
trict courts, the Higgins solution seems satisfactory; all states have their
own peculiar unemployment compensation plans, which cannot be ac-
commodated by a general edict from a federal circuit court. A district
court is in the best position to determine whether, under all the facts, it
1300. 644 F.2d at 1353 (citing 340 U.S. at 364).
1301. EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600,624-26 (10th Cir. 1980); Marshall v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 1977).
1302. EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n of Steamfitters Local 638, 542 F.2d 579, 591-92 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977); Ostaphowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394,
401 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d
850, 855 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
1303. 644 F.2d at 1353.
1304. Id
1305. Id Accord, EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n of Steamfitters Local 638, 542 F.2d 579, 591
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977).
1306. 644 F.2d at 1353.
1307. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006
(1971).
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is equitable to deduct unemployment compensation from a back pay
award.
3. Rerun election procedures
Section 482(b) of the LMRDA 13°8 requires that the Secretary of
Labor initiate civil suits against labor organizations if, after investiga-
tion of complaints by members, he or she determines that there is prob-
able cause to believe that the Act has been violated. If such a suit
results in a determination that the election requirements of the Act
have been violated, 13 19 section 482(c) 3 10 requires the Secretary to su-
pervise a rerun election. Rerun elections are to be conducted, "so far as
lawful and practicable, in conformity with the constitution and bylaws
of the labor organization.""'
3 I
A challenge to the procedures imposed by the Secretary for con-
ducting a rerun election may be made before the election by an appro-
priate motion to the district court, accompanied by supporting
affidavits. 3 12 The district court must determine, after an evidentiary
hearing that may be conducted upon the affidavits, whether the Secre-
tary's proposed procedures violate the union's constitution and section
482(c) of the Act. In drafting the rerun election procedures, the Secre-
tary may not set aside unchallenged provisions of a union's constitution
unless the provisions are unlawful or impractical. 31 3 If a union chal-
lenges the Secretary's determination to set aside constitutional provi-
sions, the Secretary must show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the constitutional provisions are unlawful.
3 14
In Millwrights Local Union No. 1914 v. Carroll,315 the Secretary of
Labor obtained a judgment from the district court setting aside the re-
sults of a union election on the ground that the union's constitutional
1308. 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1976).
1309. Election requirements appear in § 401 of the Act (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 481)
(1976)).
1310. 29 U.S.C. § 482(c) (1976).
1311. Id
1312. See Brennan v. Local 551, UAW, 486 F.2d 6, 8 (7th Cir. 1973).
1313. 29 U.S.C. § 482(c) (1976); see Trbovich v. UMW, 404 U.S. 528, 537 n.8 (1972);
Usery v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 543 F.2d 369, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cer. denied,
429 U.S. 1123 (1977).
1314. 29 U.S.C. § 482(c) (1976); cf Brennan v. Local 551, UAW, 486 F.2d 6, 8 (7th Cir.
1973) (union that objects to any action taken by the Secretary in supervisory capacity incurs
heavy burden of persuasion and proof; judicial action warranted only when there is proce-
dural irregularity, evidence of bias, or proof that Secretary's action manifestly arbitrary).
1315. 654 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1981).
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rules governing eligibility to run for office were unlawful. 13 16 The Sec-
retary decided that a rerun election must be conducted, in part, by the
use of absentee ballots. 31 7 Contending that the use of absentee ballots
violated its constitution and bylaws and thus the requirements of sec-
tion 482(c), the union filed a motion in district court seeking clarifica-
tion of the court's judgment. 1318  After the district court denied the
motion, the union filed a petition for a writ of mandate before the
Ninth Circuit. 1319 The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's denial
of the motion because the union improperly challenged the Secretary's
election procedures. Instead of filing a motion for clarification of the
district court's judgment setting aside the election and directing a new
election, the union should have filed supporting affidavits and moved
for an evidentiary hearing on the alleged violation of its constitutional
provision prohibiting absentee ballots. 1320
4. Union officials' fiduciary duties
Congress adopted the LMRDA to protect the rights of employees
and the general public in their dealings with labor organizations.
32'
Section 501(a) of Title V of the LMRDA codifies the fiduciary duties
the holders of certain positions within a labor organization owe to that
organization and its members. 1322 These fiduciary duties are subject to
two different types of interpretation. The generally accepted view is
that union officials have a fiduciary obligation when performing any
activity. 1323 This is the position adopted by the Ninth Circuit.1324 The




1320. Id at 550.
1321. Congress explained the need for the LMRDA in 29 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1976):
The Congress further finds, from recent investigations in the labor and manage-
ment fields, that there have been a number of instances of breach of trust, corrup-
tion, disregard of the rights of individual employees, and other failures to observe
high standards of responsibility and ethical conduct which require further and sup-
plementary legislation that will afford necessary protection of the rights and inter-
ests of employees and the public generally as they relate to the activities of labor
organizations, employers, labor relations consultants, and their officers and
representatives.
1322. 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1976) states that "It]he officers, agents, shop stewards, and other
representatives of a labor organization occupy positions of trust in relation to such organiza-
tion and its members as a group."
1323. See, e.g., Sablosky v. Budzanoski, 457 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 853
(1972); McCabe v. Electrical Workers Local 1377, 415 F.2d 92 (6th Cir. 1969); Johnson v.
Nelson, 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963). For a discussion ofjurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 501,
see Comment, The Fiduciary Duty Under Section 501 of the LMDA, 75 COLUM. L. REv.
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Second Circuit, however, holds that the "money or property" of the
union must be affected for there to be a breach of duty under section
501.1325
The relationship between the labor organization and the employee
is most clearly defined in the union's constitution and bylaws. The
union officials specified in section 501(a) have fiduciary obligations
both to their organization and to the individual members to insure that
the union-member relationship, as defined by the union's constitution
and bylaws, is preserved.
If a holder of a fiduciary position breaches his or her duty, the
labor organization or its governing board may bring suit in federal
court against that individual to recover damages or receive other ap-
propriate relief.1326 Upon failure of the organization or its governing
board to bring suit, any member of the organization may sue the of-
fending officer. 327 In some circuits, suits are limited to an officer's mis-
behavior as it affects money or property. The Ninth Circuit, however,
allows a suit for breach of fiduciary duty for any activity.
1328
In Busch V. Givens, 1329 the Ninth Circuit exercised section 501 ju-
risdiction over a suit by union members against a local union president.
The relief sought was an injunction against the president's attempt to
block payment of expenses for union members' attendance at a na-
tional convention. The union members contended that an amendment
to the union local's constitution, reducing the number of delegates
compensated for attending the national convention, was improperly en-
1189, 1190-97 (1975); Clark, The Fiduciary Duties of Union Officials Under Section 501 of the
LMRD,4, 52 MiN. L. Rav. 437, 440-44 (1967).
1324. Stelling v. IBEW Local 1547, 587 F.2d 1379, 1386 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 944 (1979).
1325. Head v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 512 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1975); Gurton v. Arons,
339 F.2d 371, 375 (2d Cir. 1964).
1326. 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1976) provides in part:
When any officer, agent, shop steward, or representative of any labor organization
is alleged to have violated the duties declared in subsection (a) of this section and
the labor organization or its governing board of officers refuse or fail to sue to
recover damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate relief within a rea-
sonable time after being requested to do so by any member of the labor organiza-
tion, such member may sue such officer, agent, shop steward, or representative in
any district court of the United States or in any State court of competent jurisdic-
tion to recover damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate relief for the
benefit of the labor organization.
1327. Id
1328. Stelling v. IBEW Local 1547, 587 F.2d 1379, 1386 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 944 (1979).
1329. 627 F.2d 978 (9th Cir. 1980).
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acted. 1330 The procedure for enacting an amendment required that the
proposal first be passed by a majority of the members present and vot-
ing at a meeting of the local and then be presented to the entire mem-
bership by means of a referendum.1 33 1 The challenged amendment in
Busch was submitted as a referendum before being approved at a
meeting.13
3 2
Citing no authority, the district court stated that it was "clear" that
an amendment could be made by referendum only after a meeting
vote.1 333 In reversing the lower court's decision, the Ninth Circuit ex-
plained that the constitutional provision had no order requirement.
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the union official's interpreta-
tion of the constitution's amendment requirements was not unreasona-
ble, made in bad faith, or made as a result of other extenuating
circumstances, it would not disturb the official's interpretation.
3 3 4
In interpreting constitutions of labor organizations, courts univer-
sally accept this approach. 33  This well-established rule thrusts the
burden in a judicial contest over the interpretation of a constitution or
set of bylaws onto the party challenging the interpretation of labor or-
ganization's officers. Although this may give entrenched union officials
an advantage in their constitutional dealings with the members, the in-
terests of judicial economy are served by such deference. If every inter-
pretation could easily be challenged in the courts, the result would be a
multiplicity of suits under LMRDA section 501(b). This is not to say
that a court may never overrule an official's interpretation; on the con-
trary, when "bad faith or other compelling circumstances" are found,
this seems mandated. 336 In Busch, it appears that the district court did
not overstep its authority, but rather failed to give adequate reasons for
its holding.
1330. Id at 979 & nn.1 & 3.
1331. Id at 980 n.5.
1332. Id at 979-80.
1333. Id at 980.
1334. Id at 980-91 (citing Stelling v. IBEW Local 1547, 587 F.2d 1379, 1389 (9th Cir.
1978)).
1335. The traditionally-cited formulation of the rule was articulated in Vestal v. Hoffa, 451
F.2d 706, 709 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934 (1972): "Courts are reluctant to
substitute their judgment for that of union officials in the interpretation of the union's consti-
tution, and will interfere only where the official's interpretation is not fair or reasonable."
Id at 709. See also Busch v. Givens, 627 F.2d at 981; Local 334, United Ass'n of Journey-
men v. United Ass'n of Journeymen, 628 F.2d 812, 815 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 462 U.S. 615 (1981).
1336. Stelling v. IBEW Local 1547, 587 F.2d 1379, 1389 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 944 (1979).
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Consistent with the concept that union officials' interpretations of
union constitutions can be overruled if they were made in bad faith or
were improper for other reasons is the rule that officials cannot inter-
pret those constitutions so as to circumvent the amendment process.13 7
It was determined, however, that the defendant-officer in Busch did not
act improperly to circumvent the amendment process.1
33 8
C. The Fair Labor Slandards Act
1. Child farmworker waivers
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) 3 3 9 was enacted in
part to stop the spread and perpetuation of conditions detrimental to
"the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for
health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers." 134 0 After
amendment in 1974, the FLSA prohibited nearly all agricultural em-
ployment of child laborers under age twelve.1341 Under the 1977
amendment, however, the Secretary of Labor could waive the prohibi-
tion with respect to ten- and eleven-year-old children harvesting short-
season crops.1342 Before granting such a waiver, the Secretary must
find, based upon objective data submitted by the applicant, that "the
level and type of pesticides and other chemicals used [on the crop]
would not have an adverse effect on the health or well-being of' those
permitted to work under the waiver provision. 1343
The Secretary of Labor has promulgated administrative regula-
tions for determining whether the health and well-being of children
employed pursuant to a waiver are being adversely affected.' 344 These
regulations were amended to create a presumption that the use of two
particular chemicals (Captan and Benomyl) under certain circum-
stances was not harmful to ten- and eleven-year-old children. 1345 Ulti-
mately, however, the regulations recognized that under no
circumstances was the use of those chemicals safe enough to permit
1337. District Council 37, Am. Fed'n v. Wurf, 496 F. Supp. 1021, 1026 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Colorado Labor Council v. AFL-CIO, 349 F. Supp. 37 (D. Colo. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 481 F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1973).
1338. 627 F.2d at 981.
1339. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976).
1340. Id § 202 (1976).
1341. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 25, 88 Stat. 72
(1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 212-213 (1976)).
1342. 29 U.S.C. § 213(c)(4) (Supp. V 1981).
1343. Id § 213(c)(4)(A)(iii) (Supp. V 1981).
1344. 29 C.F.R. § 575.5(d) (1978).
1345. 43 Fed. Reg. 36,623 (1978) (codified in 29 C.F.R. § 575.5(d)(4)-(d)(5)(i) (1979)).
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issuance of waivers. 1346
Regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor to effectuate
the purposes of 29 U.S.C. section 213(c) may be judicially reviewed on
the grounds of substantive indiscretion 1347 and procedural impropri-
ety.1348 The scope of review of the substance of an administrative rule
is narrow. A court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ad-
ministrative agency if there is a reasonable basis for the agency's con-
clusion. 1349 In reviewing findings of fact upon which administrative
rules are promulgated, a court may only review the evidence before the
administrative agency; it may not conduct its own full-fledged and in-
dependent evidentiary hearing.
1 350
The procedural requirements for administrative rulemaking dic-
tate that all rules be made upon notice, either through publication in
the Federal Register or by actual notice to affected parties.1 35' An ex-
ception exists, however, where an agency states in its rule that notice is
"impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest."'1
352
Additionally, in such circumstances public hearings are not necessary
prior to the effective date of a rule.
353
The rules promulgated by the Secretary of Labor under section
213(c)(4) were challenged on both substantive and procedural grounds
by a farmers' association in Washington State Farm Bureau v. Mar-
shall. 354 The plaintiff sought a permanent injunction and a declara-
tion to prevent the Secretary's denial of applications for waivers based
on the presumption that an adverse effect on the health and well-being
of children working under the waiver would result if they were em-
ployed in fields treated with Captan or Benomyl 355 The district court
granted the requested order and permitted denial of waiver applica-
1346. 44 Fed. Reg. 22,059-22,061 (1979) (codified in 29 C.F.R. § 575.5(d)(4) & (5) (1979)).
1347. A court must set aside administrative rulings found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1977).
1348. A court must set aside administrative rulings found to be "without observance of
procedure required by law." Id § 706(2)(D).
1349. Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974);
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
1350. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973); Asarco, Inc. v. United States E.P.A., 616
F.2d 1153, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 1980).
1351. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976).
1352. Id § 553(b)(B).
1353. Angel v. Butz, 487 F.2d 260, 262 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 967 (1974);
California Citizens Bank Ass'n v. United States, 375 F.2d 43, 50 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 844 (1967); Chip Steak Co. v. Hardin, 332 F. Supp. 1084, 1087 (N.D. Cal. 1971), af'd
per curiam, 467 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1972).
1354. 625 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1980).
1355. Id. at 301.
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tions only if these chemicals had been used in violation of modified
Environmental Protection Agency guidelines for the general public.
135 6
The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that, as a matter of law, adop-
tion of the regulations used to grant waivers was not arbitrary or capri-
cious, regardless of whether the Secretary was requiring a "reasonable
assurance" or an "absolute assurance" of no adverse effect on health
and well-being. 1357 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit found that in re-
viewing the Secretary of Labor's activity, the district court had failed to
confine itself properly to the administrative record created by the
agency, and instead had conducted a trial de novo. 1358 The Ninth Cir-
cuit also found that the district court had erred in holding that there
was not good cause for avoiding notice and hearing requirements when
the Secretary adopted the final regulations, which presumed that
Captan and Benomyl were harmful to ten- and eleven-year-olds. Be-
cause the purpose of the regulations was to protect child laborers from
carcinogenic pesticides, the waiver of notice requirements was justified.
The plaintiff could later show that low levels of exposure to the two
chemicals rendered their use safe and thus obtain waivers, without put-
ting children's health at risk. 135 9
2. Overtime pay requirement
a. appropriate remedy
Section 207(a) of the FLSA requires that employees working in
excess of forty hours in one week in industries affecting commerce be
paid at least one and a half times their regular rate of pay for the excess
hours. 1360 The purpose of the overtime compensation statute is to en-
courage the employment of more workers by placing a premium on an
individual's work in excess of a specified amount per week.' 361 The
Secretary of Labor may bring suit in federal district court to restrain
activity in violation of both the overtime compensation provision and
the provision against the withholding of unpaid wages and overtime
compensation. 1
362
1356. 1d The EPA guidelines are set forth in 43 Fed. Reg. 36,623 (1978) (codified in 29
C.F.R. § 575.5 (1979)).
1357. 625 F.2d at 304-05. See National Assoc. of Farmworkers' Org. v. Marshall, 628 F.2d
604, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (absolute certainty of child harvesters' safety required).
1358. 625 F.2d at 305.
1359. Id at 308.
1360. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1976).
1361. Day Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446, 470 (1948); Overnight Motor
Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 578 (1942).
1362. 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1976) states:
[Vol. 16
LABOR LAW SURVEY
A court may grant equitable relief in a FLSA suit brought by the
Secretary of Labor.1363 The trial court therefore has considerable dis-
cretion in fashioning a remedy for violations of the Act. A court's dis-
cretion in fashioning remedies to effectuate the statutory purpose,
however, must be guided by sound legal principles, not by its own incli-
nation. For example, in Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc. ,134
the Supreme Court held that in cases of improper employee dismissal
after institution of a FLSA action, there is "little room for the exercise
of discretion not to order reimbursement."'1
365
In determining proper overtime compensation, the Supreme Court
has held that when an employee is paid a fixed weekly wage, his or her
regular rate of compensation is the quotient of the amount paid over
the hours actually worked. 1366 The Ninth Circuit has ruled that this
quotient equals the regular hourly rate "[a]bsent explicit proof of an-
other mutually agreed upon rate of pay."' 1367 Known as the "fluctuat-
ing work-week" method, this formula has been adopted by the
Department of Labor.13 68 The utilization of this quotient as the regular
rate is unaffected by any provisions of an employment agreement recit-
ing alternate methods of computation. 1369 Employers and employees
may fix an hourly rate in order to achieve a guaranteed weekly income,
so long as minimum pay requirements are actually met.
13 70
In Marshall v. Chala Enterprises, Inc. ,3"" the Ninth Circuit re-
The district courts. . . shall have jurisdiction, for cause shown, to restrain viola-
tions of section 215 of this title, including in the case of violations of section
215(a)(2) of this title the restraint of any withholding of payment of minimum
wages or overtime compensation found by the court to be due to employees under
this chapter (except sums which employees are barred from recovering, at the time
of the commencement of the action to restrain the violations, by virtue of the provi-
sions of section 255 of this title).
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(2) (1976) makes the violation of § 206 and § 207 unlawful.
29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1976) provides that "the Secretary of Labor shall bring all actions
under Section 217 of this title to restrain violations of this chapter." The power of the Secre-
tary of Labor under § 211 was delegated to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion by Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 5 U.S.C. App. § 1 (Supp. 1981).
1363. Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291-92 (1960).
1364. 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
1365. Id at 296.
1366. E.g., 149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, 331 U.S. 199, 204 (1947); Overnight Motor
Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 579-80 (1942).
1367. Brennan v. Valley Towing Co., 515 F.2d 100, 106 (9th Cir. 1975) (quoting 149
Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, 331 U.S. 199, 204 (1947)).
1368. 29 C.F.R. § 778.114 (1982).
1369. 149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, 331 U.S. 199, 204 (1947); Walling v.
Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419, 424-25 (1945).
1370. Walling v. A.H. Belo Corp., 316 U.S. 624, 630 (1942).
1371. 645 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1981).
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viewed an employment agreement under which gasoline service station
attendants were paid fixed lump sums for sixty-hour work weeks. Each
hour an employee did not work resulted in a straight one-sixtieth re-
duction in weekly salary, while increases in pay were based on lump
sum increases rather than on hourly rate increases. 1372 These factors
convinced the court that the employees were receiving a straight weekly
wage for sixty hours of work. 1373 The district court, in the suit brought
by the Secretary of Labor, refused to grant restitutionary or prospective
injunctions on the ground that the compensation paid was "reason-
able."'1374 The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, directing that the
regular rate of pay be calculated by using the fluctuating work-week
method and that a restitutionary injunction issue, compelling payment
at one and one-half times the rate for past overtime hours.137  The
court held that, under Mitchell, there was little room for discretion not
to order backpay for overtime violations. 376 It also directed that the
refusal to grant a prospective injunction be reconsidered. 1377
b. employer's knowledge
For purposes of the FLSA, the term "'employ' includes to suffer
or permit to work."' 378 The accepted view is that for one to be em-
ployed, he or she must be suffered or permitted to work "with the
knowledge of the employer."'
' 379
In Forrester v. Roths I G.A. Foodliner, Inc.,138o the plaintiff made a
claim under section 207(a) of the FLSA for uncompensated overtime
work. In reporting the hours worked, he reported regular time hours
(forty per week) and some overtime hours, for which he was properly
1372. Id at 800-01.
1373. Id at 801.
1374. Id
1375. Id at 804.
1376. Id at 802.
1377. Id at 804; cf. Dunlop v. Saghatelian, 520 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975) (restitutionary and
prospective injunctive relief denied). The Chala court held that the denial of injunctive
relief in Dunlop was justified only because of the extreme circumstances of the case. 645
F.2d at 803.
1378. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (1976).
1379. Fox v. Summit King Mines, Ltd., 143 F.2d 926, 932 (9th Cir. 1944). Accord, Gulf
King Shrimp Co. v. Wirtz, 407 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1969); Burry v. National Trailer Convoy,
Inc., 338 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1964); Barras v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 249 F.2d
952 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 890 (1957); Mabee Oil & Gas Co. v. Thomas, 195 Okla.
437, 158 P.2d 713 (1945); Jackson v. Derby Oil Co., 157 Kan. 53, 139 P.2d 146 (1943).
1380. 646 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1981).
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paid.1 38' However, he deliberately did not report other overtime
hours.1382 The district court held that his FLSA claim was estopped by
his failure to disclose the extra overtime hours.138 3 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the ruling on the ground that because the employee had pre-
vented the employer from acquiring knowledge of alleged unpaid over-
time hours, there was no evidence that the employer suffered or
permitted the employee to work in violation of section 207(a).
1384
c. common carrier exemption
Section 213(b)(1) of the FLSA exempts from section 207's over-
time requirements "any employee with respect to whom the Secretary
of Transportation has power to establish qualifications and maximum
hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 304 of title
49. " 1385 Section 304(a) of Title 49 requires the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) to "regulate common carriers by motor vehicle...
and to that end the Commission may establish reasonable requirements
with respect to . ..qualifications and maximum hours of service of
employees."' 1386 A "common carrier by motor vehicle" is "any person
which holds itself out to the general public to engage in the transporta-
tion by motor vehicle in interstate or foreign commerce of passengers
or property."1 387 Section 1655(e) of Title 49 transfers to the Secretary
of Transportation all powers and duties of the ICC relating to qualifi-
cations, maximum hours of employment, and safety of equipment
under section 3041388
The Ninth Circuit addressed the common carrier exemption in
Marshall v. Aksland1389 In Marshall the defendant, owner of a truck-
ing line, at one time engaged in interstate commerce and complied with
all Department of Transportation regulations. Although he lost his in-
terstate contracts when certain of his shippers withdrew their business
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement with a union, he none-
theless continued his compliance with the regulations and endeavored,
1381. Id at 414. The reporting of hours was done on weekly time sheets filled out by the
employee and turned in to the store manager.
1382. Id No reason was given as to why the employer did not report the other overtime
hours.
1383. Id
1384. Id at 414-15.
1385. 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1) (1976).
1386. 49 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1976).
1387. Id § 303(a)(14).
1388. Id § 1655(e).
1389. 631 F.2d 600 (9th Cir. 1980).
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through advertising and other solicitation, to regain interstate ac-
counts. 390 The Secretary of Labor sued to enforce the FLSA overtime
compensation provisions as applied to the defendant.' 39' The district
court held that the carrier was exempt under 29 U.S.C. section
213(b)(1), and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
1392
The Marshall decision rests heavily upon a literal interpretation of
the statutory language. 393 The applicability of the common carrier by
motor vehicle exemption depends upon whether an employer is "hold-
ing itself out" to the general public as an interstate carrier by motor
vehicle. For the exemption to apply, the employer must be seeking in-
terstate business in good faith. 3 94 It is not necessary, however, that the
employer have realistic prospects for obtaining interstate contracts.
395
As noted above, 13 96 the FLSA maximum hours requirements do
not apply to employees subject to jurisdiction under the Motor Carrier
Act of 1935.1397 In United States v. American Trucking Associations,
Inc. ,1398 the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction under the Motor
Carrier Act of 1935 was limited to "those employees whose activities
affect the safety of operation" of the motor carrier industry. 3 99 In 1941,
the Interstate Commerce Commission stated that "'safety of operation'
...means the safety of operation of motor vehicles in the transporta-
tion of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce, and
that alone.""'1  The ICC also "limited [its jurisdiction] to those em-
ployees who devote a substantial part of their time to activities which
directly affect the safety of operation of motor vehicles" in interstate
commerce.14" 1 Applying this jurisdictional standard to various clasies
of employees, the ICC concluded that it had jurisdiction over drivers,
mechanics, loaders, and helpers but lacked jurisdiction over any other
class of employees.' 2 Dispatchers were specifically considered and re-
1390. Id at 601-02.
1391. Id at 601.
1392. Id
1393. Id at 602 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 303(a)(14) (1976) for the application of the 29 U.S.C.
§ 213(b)(1) exemption to those who merely hold themselves out to the general public as
interstate carriers by motor vehicle).
1394. 631 F.2d at 603.
1395. Id
1396. See supra text accompanying notes 1384-89.
1397. 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1976). The Motor Carrier Act of 1935 is also known as part II
of the Interstate Commerce Act.
1398. 310 U.S. 534 (1940).
1399. Id at 553 (emphasis added).





jected as members of a class subject to the ICC's jurisdiction.' 3
In 1943, the Supreme Court ruled that the FLSA does not apply to
areas where the ICC (or the Secretary of Transportation) has the power
to regulate employee wages and hours, even if such power has not been
exercised." ° In 1947, the Court determined that the ICC had correctly
defined the class of employees subject to its jurisdiction under the Mo-
tor Carrier Act of 1935. 41 °  In Pyramid Motor Freight Corp. v. Is-
pass,"°  however, the Court explained that although the ICC's
classifications of employees were correct, determination of whether an
individual employee was within a particular class was a factual ques-
tion subject to determination on a case-by-case basis.
140 7
When the ICC defined the classifications of employees subject to
its jurisdiction, it did not include dispatchers because their activities,
although related to safety, did not proximately cause safety viola-
tions. 14 s The ICC did not, however, clearly define the term "dispatch-
er." The First and Eighth Circuits have taken the position that to
determine whether an employee falls within a classification exempted
from FLSA coverage, one must look at whether that person's activities
have a substantial effect on motor vehicle safety, not whether a sub-
stantial portion of the person's time is spent in activities affecting
safety.14 9 This position deviates from the ICC specification that a sub-
stantial amount of employee time be spent in safety-related
activities.
410
In Marshall v. Union Pacfc Motor Freight Co. ,1411 the Ninth Cir-
cuit considered whether certain employees labeled as "dispatchers"
were subject to regulation by the Secretary of Transportation and
therefore exempt from FLSA overtime benefits. The employees sched-
uled the arrival, departure, loading, and unloading of truck trailers and
were responsible for the safe movement of vehicles within truck termi-
1403. Id at 134-35, 139.
1404. Southland Gasoline Co. v. Bayley, 319 U.S. 44, 47-48 (1943).
1405. Levinson v. Spector Motor Service Co., 330 U.S. 649, 669, 671-72 (1947); Pyramid
Motor Freight Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U.S. 695, 707 (1947).
1406. 330 U.S. 695 (1947).
1407. Id at 707.
1408. 28 I.C.C. at 135. "[It is clear that... [dispatchers'] errors in judgment are not the
proximate causes of... accidents, and that the dispatchers engage in no activities which
directly affect the safety of operation of motor vehicles in interstate or foreign commerce."
Id
1409. Crooker v. Sexton Motors, Inc., 469 F.2d 206, 209 (Ist Cir. 1972) (citing Yellow
Transit Freight Lines, Inc. v. Balven, 320 F.2d 495, 498 (8th Cir. 1963)).
1410. See supra text accompanying note 1401.
1411. 650 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1981).
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nals. They also inspected trailers for damage and made sure that haz-
ardous materials were properly labeled and documented. On some
limited occasions the employees performed actual loading opera-
tions.1412 The Ninth Circuit held that the employees were not subject
to the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Transportation.
4 1 3
In reaching its conclusion, the court deferred to the judgment of
the Secretary of Transportation. 41 4 The court appeared to be heavily
influenced by the label of "dispatcher" as applied to the employees in
question. Although it noted a proximate cause test, the court did not
elaborate upon the manner or degree to which safety was affected by
the employees' activities. 415 The court merely concluded that the em-
ployees did not spend a substantial amount of time in safety-related
work. 41 6 It thus appears that as long as employees are classified as
"dispatchers," the Ninth Circuit will require the employer to give them
FLSA benefits. This seems true regardless of what duties outside of the
traditional "dispatcher" role are assigned to such employees.
417
D. Occupational Safety and Health Act
1. Rulemaking procedures
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA) 1418 pro-
vides for inspection of workplaces by the Secretary of Labor 4 19 to as-
sure healthful working conditions and the preservation of human
resources. 1420 It also provides for the establishment of rules and regula-
tions by the Secretaries of Health and Labor for carrying out such in-
spections.1421  The Secretary of Labor has promulgated rules for
1412. Id at 1088.
1413. Id at 1090.
1414. Id "Normally, whether duties directly affect safety of operation of interstate motor
carriers and constitute a substantial part of the employees' activities is a matter for the Secre-
tary of Transportation to determine. . . . Decisions regarding in which duties affect safety,
and in what manner, require the Secretary's special knowledge and experience." Id (em-
phasis in original).
1415. Id
1416. Id at 1091.
1417. Id "Unless and until the Secretary considers the issue of what effect, if any, the new
duties of dispatchers have upon the existing classification, . . . dispatchers. . . are entitled
to the protection and benefits of section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act." Id (footnote
omitted).
1418. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980 & Supp. V 1981).
1419. Id § 657(a) (1976).
1420. Id § 651(b).
1421. Id § 657(g)(2) provides:
The Secretary [of Labor] and the Secretary of Health [and Human Services] shall
each prescribe such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out
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selected employer inspection sites 1422 and procedures to be taken in the
event an employer does not voluntarily permit inspection.
1423
Such rulemaking is subject to the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). 1424 Under the APA, there are two types of administrative rules:
legislative rules, subject to notice and comment requirements, and in-
terpretative rules, not subject to such requirements. 1425 Legislative
rules, which have the force of law, may be promulgated only when, as
in the case of OSHA, a statute specifically authorizes them. Interpreta-
tive rules are made either without specific statutory authorization, or
pursuant to such authorization, but without fulfillment of notice and
comment requirements. Courts accord varying degrees of deference to
interpretative rules, depending on judicial technical expertise, a case's
specific circumstances, and the particular regulation's history.
1426
Several courts have held that rules which have a "substantial im-
pact" on the affected parties must comply with the notice and comment
procedure even though the agency intended the rule to be interpreta-
tive.'427 The Ninth Circuit has not yet determined whether to adopt
the "substantial impact" doctrine despite conflict in district court deci-
sions. 1428 Furthermore, no clear statement has been announced by the
Supreme Court to direct the lower courts on this issue.
1429
their responsibilities under this chapter, including rules and regulations dealing
with the inspection of an employer's establishment.
1422. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LA-
BOR, FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL IV-l-3 (1979) [hereinafter cited as FIELD OPERATIONS
MANUAL].
1423. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (1982); FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 1422, at V-4-6.
1424. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-576 (1976 & Supp. V 1982).
1425. Id § 553(b) (1976).
1426. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944); see generally 2 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 7:1-7:29 (2d ed. 1979) (discussion of history of, distinc-
tions between, and judicial treatment of legislative and interpretative rules).
1427. Brown Express, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 695, 701-02 (5th Cir. 1979); Lewis-
Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 482 (2d Cir. 1972) (rule affecting rights and obli-
gations of aliens must be promulgated pursuant to APA notice and comment); Texaco, Inc.
v. Federal Power Comm'n, 412 F.2d 740,743-44 (3d Cir. 1969) (where numerous natural gas
companies affected and large sums of money involved, rule is not "minor" and must comply
with APA notice and comment); Pharmaceutical Mfg. Ass'n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858, 863
(D. Del. 1970); National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90, 96-97
(D.D.C. 1967), aft'dper curiam, 393 U.S. 18 (1968). Accord, Association of Nat'l Advertis-
ers, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 617 F.2d 611, 621-22 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
1428. Compare Hall v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 456 F. Supp. 695, 701-
02 (N.D. Cal. 1978) with Aiken v. Obledo, 442 F. Supp. 628, 649-50 (E.D. Cal. 1977).
1429. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), the Court refused to impose notice and comment requirements
beyond those recognized by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in its licensing proce-
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In Stoddard Lumber Co. v. Marshall,43 ° the Ninth Circuit held
that APA notice and comment requirements do not apply to OSHA
inspection selection procedures. 1431 In Stoddard, the employer was se-
lected for a general schedule inspection pursuant to OSHA inspection
selection procedures but the employer refused to permit the OSHA in-
spector to enter the premises to execute the inspection warrant. 1432 The
employer claimed the warrant was invalid because it was issued under
an OSHA regulation which had not been promulgated in compliance
with the APA notice and comment requirements and, therefore, the
selection procedures were per se unreasonable.1
433
The Ninth Circuit held that the challenged procedures were not
subject to the notice and comment procedure, 1434 reasoning that the
procedures were neither promulgated by the Secretary of Labor as leg-
islative rules nor had sufficient "substantial impact" to justify a notice
and comment procedure. 1435 By rejecting any requirement of notice
and comment for the inspection selection process, the court gave the
Secretary of Labor complete discretion in its selection of what to in-
spect under OSHA, subject only to fourth amendment restrictions.
1436
This comports with the purpose of OSHA to provide for the health and
safety of "every working man and woman in the Nation."'
1437
2. OSHA inspection warrants
a. probable cause
In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., the Supreme Court extended
fourth amendment protection to commercial inspections. 1439 Prior to
Barlow's, the Secretary of Labor urged Congress to authorize warrant-
less OSHA inspections.'" In Barlow's, the Supreme Court rejected
this view and held that warrantless searches are presumptively unrea-
sonable. 1441 In extending fourth amendment protection to commercial
dures. In these licensing procedures the AEC had required that detailed public hearings be
conducted prior to permitting the operation of a nuclear power plant. Id at 548.
1430. 627 F.2d 984 (9th Cir. 1980).
1431. Id. at 987-88.
1432. Id at 986.
1433. Id
1434. Id at 987-88.
1435. Id at 988.
1436. Id
1437. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976).
1438. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
1439. Id at 311.
1440. Id
1441. Id at 312.
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inspections, the Court stated that the probable cause required for a
criminal warrant is not required "[flor purposes of an administrative
search."'1412 Rather, the Court stated that probable cause justifying an
administrative search may be based "on a showing that 'reasonable leg-
islative or administrative standards for conducting an . . .inspection
are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment].' "I"
The Seventh Circuit, in Marshall v. Chromalloy American
Corp. ,"I held that the Barlow's probable cause standard did not re-
quire the Secretary of Labor to present accident statistics concerning
the individual employer in order to obtain an inspection warrant.
1445
In Chromalloy, probable cause was satisfied by showing in the warrant
application that there was a high incidence of injury in the foundry
industry.
446
In Stoddard Lumber Co. v. Marshall'447 , the Ninth Circuit adopted
the Seventh Circuit's position holding that individual statistics of the
employer's accident and illness rates were not required to satisfy the
Barlow's probable cause standard. The warrant challenged in Stoddard
Lumber provided details of the OSHA inspection selection plan, an
affidavit stating that the employer was selected pursuant to the selec-
tion plan, and statistics relating to the national injury rate in the lum-
ber industry. The court held this evidence sufficient to support a
finding of probable cause for the issuance of the inspection warrant." 8
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Seventh Circuit's reasoning that a
requirement for individual statistics in every search warrant would re-
sult in a "full-blown" hearing and unwarranted consumption of the
Department of Labor's enforcement energies.'
b. exparte warrants
Section 1903.4 of Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations
4
11
authorizes OSHA Area Directors to issue "compulsory process," which
1442. Id at 320.
1443. Id (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967)).
1444. 589 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 884 (1979).
1445. Id. at 1342.
1446. Id at 1343.
1447. 627 F.2d 984 (9th Cir. 1980).
1448. Id at 988-89.
1449. Id at 988.
1450. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4(a) (1980) provides that if a Department of Labor Compliance
Safety and Health Officer is refused admission to a place of employment, he or she shall
report the refusal to his or her Area Director. The Area Director, after consultation with the
Regional Solicitor, "shall take appropriate action, including compulsory process." Section
1903.4 states that "Iflor purposes of this section, the term compulsory process shall mean the
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includes ex parte applications for inspection warrants, when OSHA in-
spectors have been refused entry to an employer's premises. In Bar-
low's the Supreme Court stated in dictum that the process
contemplated by section 1903.4 should provide notice to the em-
ployer. 145 In Cerro Metal Products v. Marshall,145 2 the Third Circuit
relied in part on the Barlow's dicta to hold that section 1903.4 does not
empower OSHA directors to seek ex parte inspection warrants. 145 3 The
Cerro court's holding was also based on the nature of an amendment to
section 1903.4, and on the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of section
1903.4 in field operations manuals.
45 4
In Stoddard the employer challenged a search warrant which was
obtained by the Secretary of Labor through ex parte proceedings. The
employer argued that the court should adopt the Third Circuit rule that
section 1903.4 does not give the Secretary power to seek inspection
warrants through ex parte proceedings.
455
The Ninth Circuit, however, adopted the view taken by the dissent
in Cerro .1456 The Stoddard court held that the Secretary of Labor is
permitted to seek warrants under section 1903.4, regardless of the mod-
ifications in regulations or the dicta in Barlow's.1457 This decision is
consistent with the congressional declaration of policy when OSHA
was enacted. 458  If there were no provisions for ex parte inspection
warrants, the notice necessary for a hearing on a warrant would enable
employers to conceal before inspection dangerous conditions which
OSHA was designed to alleviate.
institution of any appropriate action, including exparte application for an inspection war-
rant or its equivalent."
1451. 436 U.S. at 318.
1452. 620 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
1453. Id at 979.
1454. Id at 975-82. The Third Circuit interpreted Barlow's to mean that power to seek
compulsory process is not power to seek ex parte inspection warrants. Id at 978-79 (citing
436 U.S. at 318 n.14 & 320 n.15). It then stated that courts could exercise their discretion in
following an amendment to section 1903.4, which defined "compulsory process" as includ-
ing ex parte warrants, because the amendment was an interpretative regulation. 620 F.2d at
981-82. It further noted that the OSHA Compliance Operations Manual had not remained
consistent in its interpretation of what should be done if an employer refused to permit an
OSHA inspection. Id at 979.
1455. 627 F.2d at 989.
1456. Id at 990 (citing 620 F.2d at 984 (Seitz, J., dissenting)).
1457. 627 F.2d at 990.
1458. One of the methods for safeguarding the health and welfare of employees is "by
providing an effective enforcement program which shall include a prohibition against giving
advance notice of any inspection and sanctions for any individual violating this prohibi-
tion." 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(10) (1976).
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E. The Railway Labor Act
The Railway Labor Act (RLA),145 9 enacted in 1926, originally ap-
plied only to employer-employee relationships in the railroad industry.
In 1936, the RLA was amended to extend its coverage to relationships
between air carriers and their employees. 1460  The provisions of the
original Act were incorporated into and expanded by the additions per-
taining to air carriers.' 46' Congress authorized the creation of the Na-
tional Air Transport Adjustment Board, 41 2 which, like the National
Railroad Adjustment Board,' 3 resolves disputes between employers
and employees arising from the interpretation and application of em-
ployment agreements. Decisions of both Boards are enforceable in fed-
eral district courts 14 6 4 to the same degree as are other civil suits.
The right to immediate appeal of a contempt order of either Board
or a district court depends upon the civil or criminal nature of the con-
tempt order. Criminal contempt rulings are final orders and are imme-
diately appealable.1465 Generally, civil contempt rulings are
interlocutory and are reviewable only after a final decree has been en-
tered."* 6 The civil or criminal character of the contempt order there-
fore becomes significant.
Notwithstanding this general rule, the law of the Ninth Circuit is
that a nonparty is entitled to an immediate appeal of a civil contempt
order.1467 The Second Circuit has held that where a preliminary in-
junction can only be challenged by the appeal of a contempt ruling, the
injunction will be examined in reviewing the contempt order.1468 If a
circuit were to adopt both of these rules, a third party could achieve
1459. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976) (originally codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 115-163 (1926)).
1460. Id. §§ 181-188 (1976).
1461. The provisions 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-152 & 154-63 were incorporated into id. § 181; the
provisions of id § 153 were incorporated into id. §§ 184-185.
1462. Id § 185 (1976).
1463. See id § 153.
1464. Id §§ 153 (p) (authorizing enforcement of National Railroad Adjustment Board de-
cisions) and 185 (authorizing enforcement of National Air Transport Adjustment Board de-
cisions by reference to § 153).
1465. McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61, 62 (1939); Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S. 105,
107 (1936); Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 517 F.2d 1348, 1349 (4th Cir. 1975); Duell v. Duell,
178 F.2d 683, 687-88 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
1466. Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S. 105, 107 (1936); Drummond Co. v. District 20, UMW,
598 F.2d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 1979); David v. Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1977).
1467. Liew v. Breen, 640 F.2d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 1981); David v. Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d
412, 415-17 (9th Cir. 1977). Cf Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 338 (1904)
(authorizing review by writ of error but not appeal).
1468. Vincent v. Local 294, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 424 F.2d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 1970).
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interlocutory review of a preliminary injunction, which would other-
wise be properly reviewed only at the case's conclusion.
Neither the label applied by a court when issuing a contempt order
nor the nature of the contemptuous activity is dispositive of a contempt
order's character. 14 9 Rather, the court's intent in issuing the contempt
order governs. An intent to punish the party violating an outstanding
court order or to vindicate the court's challenged authority is indicative
of criminal contempt. An intent to compel compliance with an out-
standing court order or to compensate a party for another's non-com-
pliance is an indication of civil contempt. 1470 Moreover, a contempt
order may be simultaneously criminal and civil.
14 7 1
The Ninth Circuit recently applied these concepts in Union of Pro-
fessionalAirmen v. Alaska Aeronautical Industries, Inc. ,1472 to an action
arising under the RLA. InAlaska Aeronautical, an air carrier was or-
dered, through a preliminary injunction, to reinstate certain dismissed
pilots and cease interference with union organizational activities.
When it refused to comply, a contempt order was issued requiring the
air carrier and its president, a nonparty to the action, to pay $17,500 to
the union for damages and attorneys' fees. After the air carrier com-
plied with the contempt order, the carrier and its president appealed
the order prior to final adjudication of the case. 1473 The Ninth Circuit
ruled that the contempt order was civil and was therefore appealable
only in conjunction with a final order.'474 In addition, it held that the
carrier's payment of the contempt penalty cancelled any right of its
president to appeal as a nonparty. 1
475
The Ninth Circuit's decision that the contempt order was of a civil
nature is well founded. It did not rely upon the district court's label,
but instead examined the substance of the contempt order. The court
found that at the time the order was issued, the employer was not com-
plying with an outstanding court order and that the district court had
imposed the penalty both to compensate the union and to compel com-
pliance. The court correctly observed that these are touchstones of civil
1469. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1966); United States v. Powers, 629
F.2d 619, 626 (9th Cir. 1980).
1470. United States v. Asay, 614 F.2d 655, 659 (9th Cir. 1980).
1471. United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 299 (1947) ("[Tlhe same acts may justify a
court in resorting to coercive and to punitive measures.").
1472. 625 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1980).
1473. Id at 882-83.
1474. Id at 883.
1475. Id at 884.
[Vol. 16
LABOR LAW SURVEY
contempt. 476 The court found no evidence of an intent to punish or to
vindicate the district court's authority. Evidence of one of these factors
is necessary for a finding of coexisting criminal contempt.
The court's ruling that the union president's appeal was moot and
its subsequent dismissal of that appeal, 4 77 appear to be correct. The
court implied that if a nonparty and a party are held in contempt for
violating a preliminary injunction, and the nonparty pays the penalty
imposed by the contempt order, that nonparty would have an immedi-
ate right to appeal. If the Ninth Circuit were to adopt the Second Cir-
cuit's position on the reviewability of preliminary injunctions, a review
of the underlying preliminary injunction would then be available along
with the review of the contempt order.
This would be an undesirable situation. By ignoring a preliminary
injunction, as did the air carrier in Alaska Aeronautical, and allowing a
nonparty to incur a contempt charge, a party could receive a premature
review of the injunction. This problem was not confronted in Alaska
Aeronautical because the nonparty had no financial interest in the ap-
peal. If such an interest had been arranged by his corporation, how-
ever, and if the Second Circuit's position on review of contempt orders
had been adopted, the disposition of this case would have been much
different. Such premature appeal of preliminary decisions would serve
to inhibit the ability of the National Railroad Adjustment Board, the
National Air Transport Adjustment Board, and the district courts to
resolve disputes.
F Sex Discrimination in Employment Under Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641478 (the Act) was enacted
to assure equal employment opportunities and to eliminate discrimina-
tory practices which have fostered unfavorable job environments for
certain groups of citizens.'479 Certain Title VII violations are shown by
means of a three-step process. First, the plaintiff must establish a
prima facie case of discrimination.1480 To do so, the plaintiff need only
show that the challenged policy, whether or not it is facially neutral,
1476. Id at 883.
1477. I.d at 884.
1478. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
1479. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
1480. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1372 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980); deLaurier v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 588 F.2d 674,
676 (9th Cir. 1978).
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has a substantially disproportionate impact on his or her group. 1481
Next, the employer may defend by showing that its policy is directly
related to a bona fide occupational qualification.148 2 Finally, the plain-
tiff may respond to the employer's justification by presenting evidence
of a prior history of discrimination to demonstrate that the challenged
policy is a pretext for additional invidious discrimination. 148 3 The
plaintiff may also show that non-discriminatory devices are available to
meet the employer's job-related needs.
148 4
In Wambheim v. JC Penney Co. ,1485 the Ninth Circuit examined
the requirements for a prima facie showing of sex discrimination under
Title VII. Two female employees of J.C. Penney Co. (Penney) insti-
tuted a class action suit against Penney alleging that two of the com-
pany's medical coverage plans-its head-of-household rule and its
maternity benefits policy-violated Title VII of the Act.1486 The dis-
trict court granted Penney's motion for summary judgment on the
ground that plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination.
148 7
Penney's facially discriminatory head-of-household rule was
changed to a facially neutral one in 197 1.1488 Prior to 1971, only men
were entitled to medical coverage for their spouses. The revised rule
allowed both sexes spousal coverage only if the employee earned more
than 50% of the combined income of the spouses. It also excluded
earnings from stocks, bonds, savings accounts, disability benefits, social
security, and pensions. 1489 Plaintiffs produced evidence to demonstrate
that as a result of the small percentage of women in management posi-
tions, only 37% of the women covered by the plan were entitled to
spousal coverage compared to 95% of the men.1490 They also intro-
1481. Since it was first articulated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31
(1971), the "disparate impact" theory has become a recognized means of demonstrating a
prima facie case under Title VII. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977);
Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1372 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928
(1980).
1482. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
1483. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973).
1484. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
1485. 642 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1981).
1486. Id at 363.
1487. Id
1488. Id at 364.
1489. Id
1490. Id Of a workforce composed of 70% women, 60% of the women occupied low-salary
positions compared to 33% of Penney's male employees. "Women occupied 6.7% of the
profit-sharing management positions and 35.5% of the lower level management." Id
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duced facts demonstrating Penney's different hiring and promotional
policies for men and women, its medical insurance plan's history, and
its refusal to include all earnings in its definition of income to support
their claim that the new head-of-household rule was a pretext for con-
tinued discrimination against women.1491
The Ninth Circuit, in line with the Supreme Court's decision in
Dothard v. Rawlinson ,1492 held that plaintiffs' showing that Penney's
head-of-household rule created a disparate impact on women was suffi-
cient to establish a prima facie case. 1493 The court, therefore, reversed
the district court's summary judgment.
Plaintiffs also challenged Penney's maternity benefits policy,
which provided such benefits only to married women, as "sex-plus"
discrimination. 1494 They claimed that this policy had a disparate im-
pact on women because of the disparity in spousal coverage under the
head-of-household rule.1495 The district court, however, held that no
disparate impact resulted, reasoning that the policy equally excluded
dependents of single men.
1496
Disapproving the lower court's examination of the language of the
maternity benefits rule in isolation, the Ninth Circuit held that consid-
eration of the impact of the rule in light of the operation of Penney's
entire medical plan and various employment practices was essen-
tial. 149 Although it noted that exclusion of maternity benefits, 1498 and
1491. Id at 364, 365-66 n.5.
1492. 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
1493. 642 F.2d at 365. The Dothard Court unequivocally held that a prima facie case of
discrimination is established by showing that a facially neutral policy operates in a substan-
tially disparate manner. 433 U.S. at 329. See also Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 575-76 (1978) (policy denying available jobs to qualified applicants based on job super-
intendent's lack of knowledge of applicant's abilities constituted prima facie Title VII case);
Nashville v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 141 (1977) (policy denying employees returning from preg-
nancy leave their accumulated seniority constituted prima facie Title VII case).
1494. 642 F.2d at 365. "Sex-plus" refers to discrimination based on sex plus a facially
neutral factor such as marriage.
1495. Id.
1496. Id at 366.
1497. Id
1498. Id (citing General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)). Gilbert involved a
Title VII challenge against an employer for failure to include pregnancy in its disability
insurance policy. The Court found no evidence that the insurance package favored men
over women. It, therefore, found no disparate impact on women. 429 U.S. at 139-40. The
Gilbert Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) does not require employers to pay greater
benefits to one sex than the other because of their different biological roles. Id at 139.
The Supreme Court, in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977), cautioned that
Gilbert does not allow an employer to impose a more substantial burden on women than
men. Id at 142. It recognized that under Gilbert, even a facially neutral benefit plan will
1983]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [o
provisions based on marital status1499 have been upheld, the court
nonetheless recognized that such policies in combination with the
head-of-household rule could have a disparate impact on women. 1," °
The court thus reversed and remanded, directing the district court to
examine the impact of the maternity benefits policy within the opera-
tion of the entire medical plan, as well as within Penney's hiring poli-
cies. 150 1 Evaluating the impact of a company policy within the context
of its entire benefit plan conforms with the Supreme Court's approach
in determining "disparate impact."'
' 50 2
G. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
1. Eligibility
In Southern Pacffc Co. v. Jensen,15 3 the Supreme Court excluded
from eligibility for state compensation the family of a longshoreman
killed on a gangplank between a ship and a pier.150 4 In response, Con-
gress enacted the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act'505 (LHWCA or Act) to provide compensation for longshoremen
and harbor workers who are injured on navigable waters and who are
otherwise ineligible for state relief.15°6 The ensuing forty-two year
struggle to define the scope of federal versus state compensation was
resolved in Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson.15° The Nacirema
Court explained that only Congress can determine the scope of federal
coverage.508 The Court determined that in enacting the LHWCA
Congress adopted the standard originally set forth in Southern Pacfc,
finding that Congress intended to draw the line of federal coverage at
require further analysis if the evidence shows that the pregnancy policy is a mere pretext for
invidious discrimination against one sex. Id at 145.
1499. 642 F.2d at 366. The court cited and distinguished Grayson v. Wickes Corp., 607
F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1979), and Stroud v. Delta Airlines Inc., 544 F.2d 892 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977), because no disparate impact was shown in either case. 642 F.2d
at 366 n.8.
1500. 642 F.2d at 366.
1501. Id
1502. See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136 (1976), where the Court viewed
the impact of the pregnancy exclusion within the context of the whole disability plan. See
also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. at 329-30, where the Court held that the height and
weight requirements of Alabama's prison guard program, when combined, resulted in a
discriminatory impact on women.
1503. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
1504. Id at 217-18.
1505. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (enacted in 1927).
1506. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 257-58 (1977).
1507. 396 U.S. 212 (1969).
1508. Id
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the water's edge and holding that injuries sustained by longshoremen
on piers permanently affixed to shore are not compensable under the
Act. 1509
Congress expanded the geographical area governed by the Act
when it increased federal benefit levels and coverage in 1972.1510 It
recognized that the landward shift of modern longshoring operations,
combined with the Nacirema rule, would limit many injured workers to
inadequate state compensation systems.1511 The 1972 amendments also
introduced a new employment status requirement, thereby creating a
dual "situs-status" test for compensation eligibility. 512 Under this test,
the injury must occur in one of the areas delineated in section
903(a),1513 and the employee must be "engaged in maritime employ-
ment" at the time of his or her injury
1 51 4
Precise definitions of "maritime employment" have not been es-
tablished because of Congress' failure to define this term in either the
statute or the Act's legislative history-1515  The Supreme Court, in
Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo,516 did note, however, that
"maritime employment" includes more than the work of "longshore-
men and persons engaged in longshoring operations."'' 51 7  Similarly,
1509. Id at 223-24. Justice Douglas, in dissent, noted the incongruity of a test determining
coverage based upon "where the body falls." Id at 225 (Douglas, J., dissenting). He advo-
cated a "status oriented" approach, whereby longshoremen would be entitled to coverage for
all injuries suffered in the course of their work. Id at 224.
1510. 33 U.S.C. §§ 903(a), 906, 910 (1976).
1511. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 262 (1977).
1512. P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 73 (1979). Prior to 1972, an employee injured
on navigable waters was covered as long as his or her employer had at least one employee
engaged in maritime employment, regardless of whether the injured person was so engaged.
Pennsylvania R.R. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334, 341-42 (1953). The 1972 amendments intro-
duced the requirement that the injured worker be "engaged in maritime employment." 33
U.S.C. § 902(3) (1976).
1513. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1976) provides:
Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death
of an employee but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring
upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier,
wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area
customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a
vessel).
1514. Id § 902(3) states:
The term "employee" means any person engaged in maritime employment, in-
cluding any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and
any harborworker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker, but
such term does not include a master or member of a crew of any vessel, or any
person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under
eighteen tons net.
1515. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 265 (1977).
1516. 432 U.S. 249 (1977).
1517. Id at 265 n.25. See also P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 77-78 n.7 (1979).
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the Ninth Circuit, in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Gilmore,"1 8 defined "mari-
time employment" as work having "a realistic relationship to the tradi-
tional work and duties of a ship's service employment."' 1519
The latter definition was recently re-examined by the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Duncanson-Harrelson Co. . Director, Office of Workers' Com-
pensation Programs.1520 Duncanson-Harrelson, a marine construction
company, appealed an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ's) and Bene-
fits Review Board's (Board's) compensation awards to two of its em-
ployees who were injured while working on dock construction projects.
The company claimed that neither employee was engaged in maritime
employment because the 1972 amendments to the LWHCA only cov-
ered employees loading, unloading, repairing, building, or breaking a
vessel. 1
521
Claimant Hatchett was injured while constructing a "dolphin," a
tie-up point off the dock for incoming ships. 1522 Because Hatchett's
work served an essential maritime purpose for ship mooring and ex-
posed him to the "perils of the sea," the ALJ concluded that he was a
maritime employee within the meaning of the Act.1523  Similarly,
claimant Hed, injured while constructing an off-shore oil tanker dock,
was held to be engaged in maritime employment. The Board con-
cluded that his work contributed to commerce on navigable waters be-
cause it provided a place for oil to be unloaded from oil tankers.
5 24
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decisions of the ALJ and the Board
holding that it had been correctly determined that the claimants were
engaged in "maritime employment" and were within the Act's situs
coverage at the time of their injuries. 15 25 Following recent Fourth 526
and Fifth 527 Circuit decisions which held that dock construction work-
1518. 528 F.2d 957 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976).
1519. Id at 961 (citing Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268
(1972); Onle v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 488 F.2d 758, 759 (4th Cir. 1973); Crosson
v. Vance, 484 F.2d 840, 847 (4th Cir. 1973)).
1520. 644 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1981).
1521. Id at 829.
1522. Id at 830.
1523. Id
1524. Id
1525. Id at 830-31.
1526. In Brown & Root, Inc. v. Joyner, 607 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
981 (1980), the two claimants were involved in the construction of a shipbuilding yard which
included a dry dock. Id at 1088. The court, citing pre-1972 cases which held that construct-
ing and repairing dry docks was maritime employment, concluded that the maritime charac-
ter of such work was not redefined by the 1972 amendments. Id at 1089-90.
1527. In Trotti & Thompson v. Crawford, 631 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1980), an employee
injured while doing carpentry work on a pier under construction was found to be engaged in
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ers were involved in maritime employment, the court found it unneces-
sary to decide if the employees were also "harbor workers" as the
Board had concluded. 1528 In a footnote, the court suggested that appli-
cation of Weyerhaeuser's "relationship to maritime activity" test was
sufficient because the concept of maritime employment includes more
than the work of "longshoremen" and "harbor workers." Specifically,
the court noted that the employee does not have to be both a harbor
worker or longshoreman and also engaged in maritime employment.
The statute merely indicates that longshoremen and harbor workers are
included within the concept of "maritime employment" for purposes of
the Act. 1
529
2. Compensation: scheduled benefits
To achieve its remedial purpose, the LHWCA requires employers
to compensate employees injured in the course of employment, irre-
spective of the employer's fault.1530 The Act serves to shift part of the
injured employee's burden onto the industry.' 53' Generally, LHWCA
provisions are to be construed liberally to achieve the Act's remedial
objectives and "to avoid incongruous or harsh results."'
' 532
Section 908 of the Act 1533 sets forth a compensatory scheme with
formulas for computing the amount of compensation awards. The
scheme encompasses four categories of disability: permanent total disa-
bility, temporary total disability, permanent partial disability, and tem-
porary partial disability. 1534  The "permanent partial disability"
category contains two compensation formulas. The first, in sections
908(c)(l)-(20), enumerates specific injuries for which the claimant is en-
titled to two-thirds of his or her average weekly wages for a specified
number of weeks, regardless of impairment to earning capacity.
5 35
maritime employment. Id at 1221-22. In Odom Constr. Co. v. United States Dep't of La-
bor, 622 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981), the claimant, injured
while moving concrete mooring blocks located on the banks of a navigable canal, was found
to be engaged in maritime activity because "[mioving the blocks directly furthered maritime
commerce." Id at 113.
1528. 644 F.2d at 831.
1529. Id at 831 n.l.
1530. Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408, 414 (1932).
1531. Id
1532. Id (citing Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 640 (1930)).
1533. 33 U.S.C. § 908 (1976).
1534. The four categories of disability are covered by 33 U.S.C. §§ 908(a) (permanent total
disability), 908(b) (temporary total disability), 908(c) (permanent partial disability), and
908(e) (temporary partial disability).
1535. 33 U.S.C. § 908(c) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
In case of disability partial in character but permanent in quality the compensa-
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The second, in section 908(c)(21), provides that "in all other cases" the
claimant is entitled to two-thirds of the difference between his or her
pre-injury average weekly wages and his or her post-injury wage-earn-
ing capacity for the duration of the disability.
153 6
In Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Com-
pensation Programs,537 the Supreme Court held that sections
908(c)(l)-(20) provide the exclusive remedy for workers whose injuries
fall within its schedule. The claimant employee sustained a five to
twenty percent loss of the use of one leg and suffered an impairment of
earning capacity exceeding forty percent. 1538 His injury, classified as a
"permanent partial disability," entitled him to benefits under section
908(c)(2).153 9 He filed for compensation under section 908(c)(21), how-
ever, which provided him with a substantially greater award.
1540
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, with
one judge dissenting, affirmed the ALJ and Board decisions allowing
the claimant compensation calculated under section 908(c)(2 1). 1541 Re-
lying on the remedial nature of the Act and a recent trend in state law
and Board decisions against awarding exclusive remedies under sched-
uled benefits, the circuit court held that section 908(c)(21) provided a
"remedial alternative" when the scheduled benefits fail adequately to
compensate the impairment of a worker's wage-earning abilities.
5 42
tion shall be 66 2/3 per centum of the average weekly wages, which shall be in
addition to compensation for temporary total disability or temporary partial disa-
bility paid in accordance with subdivision (b) or subdivision (e) of this section ...
and shall be paid to the employee, as follows:
(1) Arm lost, three hundred and twelve weeks' compensation.
(2) Leg lost, two hundred and eighty-eight weeks' compensation.
(20) Disfigurement: Proper and equitable compensation not to exceed $3,500
shall be awarded for serious disfigurement of the face, head, or neck or of other
normally exposed areas likely to handicap the employee in securing or maintaining
employment.
1536. Id § 908(c)(21).
1537. 449 U.S. 268 (1980).
1538. Id at 271.
1539. Id at 271-72 n.4.
1540. Id at 272 & n.5. Under § 908(c)(2), the claimant would have received approxi-
mately $3,200 to $12,800 depending on the final determination of the degree of his disability,
whereas under § 908(c)(21), he was awarded $86.76 per week for the duration of his working
life, which could total over $100,000. Id at 283 n.25.
1541. Id. at 273-74.
1542. Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,
606 F.2d 1327, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 268 (1980) (citing 2 A. LARSON, THE
LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 58.20, at 10-212 through 10-214 (1976) (discussing
recent trend in state workers' compensation law)); Brandt v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 8
BEN. REv. BD. SERV. 698 (1978); Dugger v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 8 BEN. REv. BD. SERV.
552 (1978) (illustrating recent Board trend away from remedially exclusive doctrine)).
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The Supreme Court reversed, finding nothing in the text of the
statute authorizing application of section 908(c)(21) as an alternative to
the scheduled benefits. 1543 Rather, the Court maintained that a literal
reading of the statute foreclosed an election of remedies. The Court
focused on the phrase preceding the scheduled benefits, which states
that those benefits "shall be paid to the employee, as folows.' 544 The
Court also read the "all other cases" phrase of section 908(c)(21) to
preclude any suggestion that it meant "'all of the foregoing' as
well." 15 45 Further, the Court found no support in the Act's legislative
history for interpreting section 908(c)(21) as an alternative to scheduled
remedies. 1546
The Supreme Court rejected the circuit court's reliance on the
state court and Board trends. It pointed out that federal courts are not
authorized to write state law into federal statutes. 15 47 The Court also
noted that because the Board is not a policymaking agency, its con-
struction of the Act carries no special weight. 1548 The Court, instead,
relied on the application of the statute during its first fifty years of ad-
ministration and the 1964 district court case, Williams v. Donovan,
15 49
to support its finding that relevant judicial authority supports a literal
reading of the statute.
1 550
The Supreme Court explained that the LHWCA, like other com-
pensation statutes, does not purport to offer complete compensation for
all of an injured worker's economic loss as evidenced by its maximum
remedy of two-thirds of actual earning loss.' 551 It found the use of
fixed schedule benefits consistent with the Act's attempt to compromise
between the interests of employers and those of disabled employees.
552
The Court recognized the possibility of incongruous results from
strict adherence to the scheduled benefits,1 553 but stated that it could
not avoid incongruities by ignoring or rewriting the statute. 1554 It
1543. 449 U.S. at 274.
1544. Id (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 908(c) (1976)).
1545. 449 U.S. at 274.
1546. Id at 275-76.
1547. Id at 279-80.
1548. Id at 278-79 n.18.
1549. 234 F. Supp. 135, 139 (E.D. La. 1964), aft'd, 367 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1966) (per
curiam) (holding scheduled benefits constituted exclusive remedy), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 977
(1967).
1550. 449 U.S. at 276.
1551. Id at 281 n.23.
1552. I d at 282.
1553. Id
1554. .d at 283.
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noted, however, that although frequent incongruities would justify leg-
islative review of the statute, sympathy for the claimant was an insuffi-
cient basis for approving a recovery not authorized by Congress.'
555
In dissent, Justice Blackmun protested that the majority had de-
parted from the guiding principles "by reaching, rather than avoiding,
a harsh and incongruous result."'' 556 He would have ruled that the
scheduled benefits should be construed in view of the statute's defini-
tion of "disability" as an economic concept. Under this construction,
Justice Blackmun read "all other cases" to include "any case in which
the worker does not wish to accept the compensation offered in subsec-
tions (1) to (20), but elects to bear the burden of proving the difference
between his wages before the injury and his wage-earning capacity af-
terwards."'' 557 According to Justice Blackmun, this construction is
more consistent with the Act's purpose. 558 He found nothing in the
legislative history to indicate that the prompt and certain relief of the
scheduled benefits was to be considered paramount to providing ade-
quate relief.
559
Justice Blackmun suggested a workable flexibility which is not ex-
pressly prohibited by the statute's language. The majority, instead,
chose a restrictive, expedient reading of the statute which will be ad-
vantageous to employers' interests and disadvantageous to some dis-
abled employees. It would appear to be more consistent with the
purpose of the Act to give the injured employee, for whom the Act was
created, the option of bearing the heavier burden and any delay en-
tailed in computing compensation based on loss of wage-earning ca-
pacity under section 908(c)(21).
H. Mine Safety and Health Act
The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (the Act) 5 61 was
enacted to improve safety and health conditions in mines. 1561 Partici-
pation of miners in the enforcement of the Act is encouraged for its
effective operation. 562 Section 813(f) provides for safety inspections of
mines and allows a miners' representative to accompany and aid the
1555. Id at 284.
1556. Id at 286 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1557. Id at 288.
1558. Id
1559. Id at 288-89.
1560. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (Supp. V 1981).
1561. 43 Fed. Reg. 17,546 (1978). See 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3401, 3411.
1562. S. REP. No. 181, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 35 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3401, 3412.
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safety inspector in an investigation and "to participate in pre- and post-
inspection conferences held at the mine." 5 6 3 If the miners' representa-
tive is an employee at the mine, section 813(f) protects him or her from
any wage loss during his or her inspection participation. 564 Moreover,
the inspector may be accompanied by additional representatives if he
or she decides that it will aid the inspection.1565  However, only one
miners' representative is entitled to protection from wage loss during
participation. 1566
Inspectors are authorized to issue written citations to mine opera-
tors who violate any provision of the Act.1567 The citation must iden-
tify which provision or rule was violated and specify a reasonable time
in which the condition must be corrected. 1568 Failure to correct the
violation within the designated time is grounds for a withdrawal order
under section 814(b).15 69 Under that section, the operator is ordered to
remove all persons from the area affected by the violation until an au-
thorized representative of the Secretary of Labor (Secretary) decides
that the violation has been abated.
1570
In Magma Copper Co. v. Secretary of Labor,15 7' the Ninth Circuit
addressed the application of the above limitation on wage protection
for employees' participation in mine inspection. Two Department of
Labor inspectors went to Magma Copper Company (Magma) to con-
duct an inspection of the entire milling complex, which occupied an
area of several miles. 1572 Intending to inspect different areas of the
mill, the inspectors requested the aid of two miners' representatives.
57 3
Magma agreed, yet claimed that section 813(f) entitled only one of the
participants to be paid during the inspection. 1574 Unwilling to subject a
miner to loss of wages during the inspections, the inspectors proceeded
with only one miners' representative. 57 5 The inspectors then issued a
citation and withdrawal order under section 814(b) against Magma for




1567. Id § 814(a).
1568. Id
1569. Id § 814(b).
1570. Id
1571. 645 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1981).
1572. Id at 695. Magma's milling complex included a receiving bin, a mine crusher, a
mill crusher, a concentrator building, a molybdenum plant, and a filter plant. The mill was
a "mine" subject to the Act. 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
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its refusal to pay a second miners' representative.15 76
Magma protested the citation and withdrawal order in an action
against the Secretary before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (Commission)
reversed the ALJ's vacation of the citation and order.
157 7
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Commission's holding, adopting
the qualified application of the payment limitation sentence released in
an Interpretative Bulletin issued by the Department of Labor. 5 78 The
Bulletin provided that only when one inspector requests additional
miner assistance does the Act limit pay protection to one employee. In
instances where several inspectors are necessary to carry out separate
aspects of the inspection, however, the payment protection extends to
one employee accompanying each inspector.
1579
The court noted mine disaster incidents which instigated the legis-
lative reform in mine inspections, specifically the Scotia disaster which
claimed the lives of twenty-three miners and three federal inspec-
tors.15 80 The dangerous condition causing the fatal gas explosion had
been deceptively concealed during one-person inspections of the mine.
The tragedy is proof of the inadequacy of one-person inspections in
1576. Id
1577. Id Congress established the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
to review orders, citations, and penalties issued under the Act. 30 U.S.C. § 823 (Supp. V
1981).
1578. 645 F.2d at 696. The Bulletin indicates that the general rule of section 813(f) "is that
the participation right gives rise to a corresponding protection against loss of pay." 43 Fed.
Reg. 17,546, 17,549 (1978). Viewing the payment limitation sentence within the context of
the Act, the Bulletin read it to modify merely the sentence directly preceding it:
To the extent that the Secretary or authorized representative of the Secretary deter-
mines that more than one representative from each party would further aid the
inspection he can permit each party to have an equal number of such additional
representatives. However, only one such representative of miners who is an em-
ployee of the operator shall be entitled to suffer no loss of pay during the period of
such participation under the provisions of this subsection.
Id (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 813(f) (Supp. V 1981) (emphasis in original)).
According to the Bulletin, only one employee is entitled to participation compensation
when one inspector is involved or when several inspectors conduct a concerted inspection.
Yet, it distinguishes situations when more than one inspector is needed, "such as when the
mine is so large that it is necessary to send several inspectors in order to most effectively or
efficiently conduct inspection activity," or when several inspectors inspect different areas of
the mine. In these situations, the Bulletin directed that each employee singly aiding one of
the inspectors is protected from pay loss. Otherwise, "an anomaly would result in that the
decision to send several inspectors, rather than a single inspector, to a mine would adversely
impact the protection against loss of pay, thereby eroding the participation right itself." Id
The Bulletin further stated that the manner in which inspectors were assigned would thus
determine the scope of the statutory right. Id
1579. Id
1580. 645 F.2d at 698.
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some situations.15 8 1 Unwilling to risk a reoccurrence of the deception
which led to the Scotia disaster, the Ninth Circuit rejected Magma's
narrow rendition of section 813(f) in favor of the Department of La-
bor's interpretation, which is consistent with the goals of the statute.1
58 2
The Ninth Circuit's approach promotes the goals envisioned by
Congress: miner participation to encourage safety-oriented behavior
and the refinement of danger detection skills among mine employees.
This approach may encourage litigation relating to the circumstances
or conditions warranting the payment of two or more employees ac-
companying investigation teams at a particular mine. However, the ex-
pansion of the wage protection will help achieve needed employee
participation and awareness to reduce the risk of accidents associated
with the hazards of the mining industry.
Z Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA or Act), 15 3 discrimination based on an employee's age is un-
lawful. The ADEA primarily stemmed from the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which barred employment discrimination based on race, religion,
and sex. 1 58 4 The goal of the ADEA is to promote the employment of
older persons through educational and remedial programs which are
designed to cure employment problems of the aged.
1 585
The Act contains three exceptions to the rule against employer age
discrimination: (1) when age is a valid occupational qualification nec-
essary for normal business operation, (2) when the employer is observ-
ing the terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan, and (3) when the
1581. The report on the Scotia disaster revealed that Scotia personnel regularly engaged in
deceptive concealment of violations during one-person inspections. For instance, air from a
section of the mine not under inspection would be pumped into the area currently being
inspected so that area would meet required ventilation levels. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON
EDUCATION AND LABOR SUBCOMM. ON LABOR STANDARDS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., SCOTIA
COAL MINE DISASTER 28, 28-29 (Comm. Print 1976).
1582. 645 F.2d at 698-99.
1583. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976). According to id § 623(a): "It shall be unlawful for an
employer--(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's age."
1584. See H.R. RE. No. 805, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 1, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2213, 2214.
1585. Id See also 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1976), which states that the purpose of the Act is to
"promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of
meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment."
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rules are violated for good cause.1586 In 1978, Congress revised the
second exemption by prohibiting forced retirement based on age. 1
587
1. Pre-amendment application of the ADEA
a. retroactivity of the 1978 amendments
In general, statutory changes apply retroactively except when the
statute or legislative history direct to the contrary, or when manifest
injustice would result.1588 Considerations of justice and legislative in-
tent have been advanced by circuit courts 15 8 9 to support the position
that the 1978 ADEA amendments are to be given prospective applica-
tion only.
In Los 4ngeles Department of Power and Water v. Manhart,15 9° the
Supreme Court enunciated a general prohibition against retroactive ap-
plication of laws related to pension funds absent specific mandate be-
cause severe economic consequences may result from such
1586. 29 U.S.C. § 623(1) (1976) provides that:
(f) It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor
organization-
(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited. . . where age is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular
business, or where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age;
(2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employee
benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subter-
fuge to evade the purposes of this chapter, except that no such employee benefit
plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual; or
(3) to discharge or otherwise discipline an individual for good cause.
1587. Id § 623(0(2) (Supp. 1979) provides:
(f) It shall not be unlawful for an employer...
(2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employee
benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subter-
fuge to evade the purposes of this chapter, except that no such employee benefit
plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual, and no such seniority system or
employee benefitplan shall require orpermit the involuntary retirement of any individ-
ual. . . because of the age of such individual.
(Emphasis added).
1588. Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974); United States v. The
Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 103, 110 (1801); Smart v. Porter Paint Co., 630 F.2d 490,
497 (7th Cir. 1980); Sikora v. American Can Co., 622 F.2d 1116, 1120 (3d Cir. 1980).
1589. See Jensen v. Gulf Oil Ref. & Mktg. Co., 623 F.2d 406, 411-13 (5th Cir. 1980) (de-
clined to apply ADEA revisions retroactively because such application would deprive em-
ployer of substantive contractual rights and would unfairly penalize employer for its good
faith reliance on statutory law). See also Sikora v. American Can Co., 622 F.2d 1116 (3d
Cir. 1980), where the court cited Senator Williams' comments during the Senate debate on
the amendment: "The bill is not retroactive. The question of mandatory retirements prior
to the effective date of this bill will be determined by the courts' interpretation of existing
law." Id at 1120 (citing 123 CONG. Rac. S17,304 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977) (remarks of Sen.
Williams). The Sikora court also found that retroactive application might affect the sol-
vency of the pension plan and result in injustice. 622 F.2d at 1123.
1590. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
LABOR LAW SURVEY
application. 1591 In Aldendifer v. Continental Air Lines, Inc. ,1592 the
Ninth Circuit, without supporting analysis, ruled the amendments to be
prospective. 593 In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Shell
Oil Co. ,"9 however, the Ninth Circuit concluded that retroactive ap-
plication of the amendments would be inconsistent with congressional
intent and would be manifestly unjust.
1595
b. mandatory retirement under pre-amendment construction
Prior to the 1978 amendments, section 623(f)(2) of the ADEA per-
mitted forced retirement based on age if the discharge was authorized
by a bona fide retirement plan which was not established in order to
evade ADEA goals. Such a plan, however, cannot be advanced as a
reason for not hiring any individual. 5 96 The exemptions contained in
section 623(f(2) were intended to further the employment of older per-
sons without burdening employers by requiring them to include such
employees in existing retirement plans.
1597
In United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann,598 the employer uniformly
enforced its policy of retiring employees at its retirement plan's desig-
nated age. The Supreme Court construed the plan as one requiring
mandatory retirement at the designated age, rather than one permitting
the employer the option to retire the employee at the designated
age. 1599 The employer was "observing the terms" of a plan within the
meaning of section 623(f)(2).
The Ninth Circuit recently applied the McMann analysis in Al-
dendfer-6 °° The FAA bans airlines from retaining first officers over
1591. Id at 721.
1592. 650 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1981).
1593. Id at 173.
1594. 637 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1981).
1595. Id at 684. The court based its holding on the policy considerations articulated in
Manhart. Id at 685. See supra text accompanying note 1593. Accord, Smart v. Porter Paint
Co., 630 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1980); Jensen v. Gulf Oil Ref. & Mktg. Co., 623 F.2d 406 (5th
Cir. 1980); Sikora v. American Can Co., 622 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir. 1980).
1596. 29 U.S.C. § 623()(2) (1976); see supra note 1584.
1597. United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 200, 202, 203 n.9 (1977). The
McMann court found that the legislative history of the ADEA suggested an intent to pre-
serve, rather than undermine, the numerous pension plans in existence at the time the
ADEA was passed. Id at 199.
1598. 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
1599. Id at 196-97. The Court accepted the Fourth Circuit's reasoning that under the
circumstances the plan required mandatory retirement at age 60. See McMann v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217,219 (4th Cir. 1976), rev'don other grounds, 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
1600. 650 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1981).
19831
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age sixty, although second officers are not similarly restricted. 60 1
Three of the employer's first officer pilots attempted to reduce their
rank to second officer prior to their sixtieth birthdays. Their bids were
rejected for safety reasons1 60 2 and each pilot was involuntarily retired
pursuant to a pension plan designating sixty as the normal retirement
age. 603 The pilots claimed that their rejected bids and subsequent
forced retirement violated the ADEA1
6°1
Although the plan did not expressly require retirement at age
sixty, it designated sixty as the normal retirement age. 60 5 Evidence
showed that the employer had rejected rank reduction bids of other
sixty-year-old first officers and that twenty-one of twenty-three pilots
retired at age sixty.1606 The Ninth Circuit, persuaded by McMann,
construed the employer's plan as requiring mandatory retirement at
age sixty based on the employer's "uniform retirement practices" and
on "the specific terms of the pension plan."' 160 7 The court, therefore,
affirmed the district court's judgment that the employer's actions fell




c. involuntary retirement at the employer's option underpre-
amendment construction
While the McMann Court held that section 623(f)(2) allowed
mandatory retirement, it declined to address the conflict raised by two
bulletins issued by the Department of Labor concerning the legality of
plans providing for involuntary retirement at the employer's option.
60 9
In a bulletin issued shortly after the ADEA's enactment, the Depart-
ment stated that this practice would not invalidate the plan under sec-
tion 623(f)(2). 16 10 The Department revised its position in a 1975 report
to Congress, stating that plans which contain provisions for mandatory
1601. Id at 172.
1602. Id The employer testified that second officers possessing more experience than a
first officer in the cockpit could diminish the younger first officer's authority during a crisis
and jeopardize cockpit discipline.
1603. Id
1604. Id
1605. Id at 173.
1606. Id The court noted that those who did not retire served in management positions
pursuant to post-retirement provisions of the plan.
1607. Id
1608. Id
1609. 434 U.S. at 197 n.4.
1610. 29 C.F.R. § 860.110(a) (1982) states: "The fact that an employer may decide to per-
mit certain employees to continue working beyond the age stipulated in the formal retire-
ment program does not, in and of itself, render an otherwise bona fide plan invalid insofar,
as the exception provided in section [623]()(2) is concerned."
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pre-sixty-five retirements are unlawful if applied at the option of the
employer. 1611 In Marshall v. Hawaiian Telephone Co.,1612 the Ninth
Circuit rejected the Department of Labor's 1975 guidelines. The court
refused to adopt the anomalous approach that forced retirement at a
certain age complies with the Act, while retirement at the employer's
option violates it.16
13
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Shell Oil Co. ,1614
the Ninth Circuit applied the pre-amendment construction of section
623(0(2) to a retirement plan provision which authorized involuntary
retirement only for "ill health or other cause."' 16 15 Relying on this pro-
vision, the employer retired thirteen employees because of their age.
616
The Secretary claimed that because age did not constitute "other
cause," the employer violated the terms of its plan. 161 7 The court re-
jected the Secretary's argument and concluded that the Hawaiian Tele-
phone decision recognized age as a valid "cause" for involuntary
retirement under the terms of an optional plan. 618 The Ninth Circuit,
therefore, held that the retirements were authorized by the plan.
16 19
In another decision concerning a retirement occurring before the
1611. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR ANNUAL REPORT ON AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
AcT OF 1967 at 17 (1975) provides that mandatory pre-sixty-five "retirements are unlawful
unless the mandatory retirement provision: (1) is contained in a bona fide pension or retire-
ment plan, (2) is required by the terms of the plan and is not optional, and, (3) is essential to
the plan's economic survival or to some other legitimate purpose."
1612. 575 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1978).
1613. Id at 767. The plan upheld in Hawaiian Telephone specifically granted the em-
ployer the option of retiring employees at age 60. Id at 764.
Accord, Carpenter v. Continental Trailways, 635 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1980) (optional in-
voluntary retirement provision upheld because involuntary retirement at reasonable age
puts employees on notice that they may be retired; therefore, they are in same situation as
employees facing mandatory retirement), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 986 (1982); Smart v. Porter
Paint Co., 630 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1980) (optional involuntary retirement provision
which granted employer latitude upheld in spite of employer's random exercise of option);
Jensen v. Gulf Oil Ref. & Mktg. Co., 623 F.2d 406,413 (5th Cir. 1980) (optional involuntary
retirement provisions upheld after court concluded it was at liberty to decline to follow
administrative guidelines, such as 1975 Report, which were inconsistent with previous
agency interpretations); Zinger v. Blanchetter, 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1977) (involuntary re-
tirement provision upheld even though union and railroad agreed that merger of railroad
with another would not result in any present employees being deprived of employment),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978).
1614. 637 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
1615. Id at 684.
1616. Id at 683. The district court had stayed the proceedings pending the Supreme
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1978 ADEA amendments, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that a plan
must expressly provide for involuntary retirement in order for employ-
ers validly to force retirement under section 623(f)(2) pre-amendment
exemptions. In Benzel v. Valley National Bank of Arizona,1620 an em-
ployee who was threatened with involuntary retirement voluntarily re-
tired in 1977.1621 The employer's retirement plan, however, did not
authorize involuntary retirement.
1 622
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment for the employer. It held that pre-amendment section
623(f)(2) did not authorize involuntary retirement when the provision
was not included in the retirement plan.1 623 The court refused to ex-
tend the exemption of former section 623(0(2) to plans not expressly
authorizing involuntary retirement. 624 The court stated that the 1978
amendments indicated that Congress did not intend to allow such an
exemption, even when the terms of a plan expressly authorize it. 1625
2. Rebuttal of a prima facie case under the ADEA
Because both the ADEA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
1626
were designed to eliminate employment discrimination, courts may ap-
propriately apply the Title VII burdens of persuasion to ADEA
cases.1627 The burdens of persuasion under Title VII were articulated
in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green .1621 The plaintiff must ini-
tially establish a prima facie case;1629 the employer may rebut the
plaintiff's case by advancing nondiscriminatory reasons for its ac-
tions. 1630 The employer's reasons, however, must be framed clearly
enough to allow the plaintiff a full opportunity to challenge them as
1620. 633 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1980).
1621. Id at 1326.
1622. I d
1623. Id at 1327. Accord, EEOC v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 632 F.2d 1107, 1110-11 (4th
Cir. 1980) (involuntary retirement before mandatory retirement age prohibited where plan
does not expressly grant employer option of retiring employees early, and past employer
practices of discretionary retirement did not make such action valid); Sexton v. Beatrice
Foods Co., 630 F.2d 478, 486 (7th Cir. 1980) ("[Ain employer does not observe the terms of
the plan unless the plan expressly sanctions the decision to force the employee to retire early
1624. 633 F.2d at 1327.
1625. Id
1626. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000h(6) (1976).
1627. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014-16 (1st Cir. 1979).
1628. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).




pretextual. 16 3' The plaintiff then may show that the employer's ration-
ale merely masked discrimination.
1632
The Ninth Circuit applied these burdens of persuasion to the
ADEA in Sutton v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 1633 In Sutton, the employee
testified that he was forced to retire, was replaced by a younger man,
and was told by a vice president that the company desired to replace
certain older executives. 634 The employer presented substantial evi-
dence that age was not the reason for compelling the employee's retire-
ment. 635 The evidence indicated that the forced retirement resulted
from the employee's repeated breach of corporate protocol. 636 More-
over, the employee had been informed of his unacceptable perform-
ance. The employer offered Sutton the choice of either improving his
conduct to the satisfaction of a skeptical management, or accepting re-
tirement under an expired retirement plan which provided greater ben-
efits than the plan in force. 1 637 The district court found unconvincing
the employee's demonstration of pretext, which was merely a challenge
of the credibility of the employer's proffered rebuttal.163 8 The Ninth
Circuit indicated that the employee may have established a prima facie
case of age discrimination, but held that the employer sufficiently re-
butted any such presumption. 6 39 In addition, Sutton failed to show
that the employer's reasons were not legitimate.' 640 Although the
Ninth Circuit's review of the credibility determinations made by the
trial judge was limited, the court held that the evidence fully supported
the trial court's findings."'
1631. Id at 1094.
1632. Id at 1093.
1633. 646 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1981).
1634. Id at 409. The district court discredited the employee's testimony and found he had
failed to establish a prima facie case. It also ruled that had the employee maintained his
initial burden, the employer's reasons for its actions were sufficient to rebut the employee's
prima facie case of discrimination. The employee failed to demonstrate that the employer's
reasons were pretextual. Id at 412.
1635. Id at 410.
1636. Id Personality and management conflicts had developed between the employee and
his new supervisor. The employee bypassed his immediate superiors and failed to disclose
to them the contents of an executive committee report he presented to the employer's chief
executive. The report, which the chief executive declined to implement, suggested the re-
moval of the employee's immediate superiors. Id
1637. Id at 410-11.
1638. Id at 411.
1639. Id at 412.
1640. Id.
1641. Id at 412-13.
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a. jury instructions
In actions brought under the ADEA, the plaintiff bears the ulti-
mate burden of proving that the employer discriminated against him
because of age." 2 Employment decisions, however, may be based on
a number of reasons. Courts, therefore, have developed standards for
determining if the employer's reliance on the employee's age was suffi-
cient to constitute an ADEA violation. The narrowest view requires a




Another test applied by many courts requires that age be a determina-
tive factor.16" A third position requires that age be a contributing fac-
tor in the employer's decision. 1645
The Ninth Circuit, in Kelly v. American Standard, Inc. ,1646 adopted
the determinative factor test for establishing an ADEA violation. A
fifty-seven year old employee was discharged from his sales position
with the employer. He was a victim of the employer's national person-
nel reduction program.1" 7 The employee introduced statistical evi-
dence demonstrating a pattern of age discrimination in the discharge
program as well as evidence of remarks made to him concerning his
replacement by a younger employee and the employer's intention to
reduce the average age of its sales representatives. 164 The employer
denied making the statements and claimed that the employee was dis-
charged "because he was the least effective member of the Seattle sales
1642. Smith v. Flax, 618 F.2d 1062, 1066 (4th Cir. 1980).
1643. See, e.g., Brennan v. Reynolds & Co., 367 F. Supp. 440, 444 (N.D. IU. 1973) (statute
serves to prevent termination based on age alone; otherwise, plaintiff must prove discharge
was not for "good cause").
1644. See, e.g., EEOC v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 632 F.2d 1107, 1110 (4th Cir. 1980)
("necessary that age be a determinative factor, but not the sole determining factor"), cer.
denied, 454 U.S. 825 (1981); Smithers v. Bailar, 629 F.2d 892, 896-98 (3d Cir. 1980); Smith v.
Flax, 618 F.2d 1062, 1066 (4th Cir. 1980); Goldman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 607 F.2d 1014,
1019 (Ist Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003,
1019 (1st Cir. 1979); Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 594 F.2d 638, 641 (8th Cir. 1979);
Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 317 (6th Cir. 1975) (recovery permitted if age was
factor which "made a difference in determining whether [the employee] was to be retained
or discharged"); Olsen v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 480 F. Supp. 773, 779 (N.D. Cal.
1979). See also 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(c) (1980).
1645. See, e.g., Kentroti v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 585 F.2d 967, 974 (10th Cir. 1978) (re-
covery available if "one factor in the decision was age"); Wilson v. Sealtest Foods, Div. of
Kraftco Corp., 501 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir. 1974); Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F.
Supp. 655, 660-61 (W.D. Va. 1977) (jury properly instructed to determine if employer's deci-
sion was based "'in whole or in part on age'; or... 'one of the reasons for. . . discharge
was.. . age' ").
1646. 640 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1981).
1647. Id at 977.
1648. Id
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force."' 16 9 The jury, however, returned a verdict for the employee. 1650
On appeal, the employer challenged the jury instruction that the
plaintiff should prevail if age "made a difference in determining
whether or not [he] was retained or discharged."'165' The employer
claimed that an ADEA violation exists only if age was the "sole factor"
in the discharge. It argued that the section 623(f)(1) exceptions to the
mandates of ADEA, "where age is a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion. . . , or where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors
other than age,"1 652 would be meaningless if age could not be
considered.
1653
The Ninth Circuit explained that age may be one factor, but an
ADEA violation occurs when age is a determinative factor in the dis-
charge.' 654 Whether age is a determining factor is a question of fact to
be resolved by a jury. 655 The court further held that if the jury had
found that the employee was discharged because he was the least effec-
tive sales representative, rather than because of age, the termination
would have been based on a reasonable factor other than age.' 6 56 The
N inth Circuit, adhering to the "determinative factor" test, therefore,
upheld the jury instruction. It rejected the "sole factor" test as placing
an unwarranted burden of proof on the employee since employers can
always advance business reasons for their actions.
1657
3. Calculation of damages under the ADEA
The ADEA proscriptions against age discrimination are enforced
through the "powers, remedies, and procedures" of designated sections
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).165 8 Successful claimants can
1649. Id
1650. Id
1651. Id at 984 (trial judge relied on Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 317 (6th
Cir. 1975), for this instruction).
1652. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976).




1657. Id at 984-85.
1658. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976) provides:
The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the pow-
ers, remedies, and procedures provided in sections 21 l(b), 216. . ., and 217 of this
title ... . Amounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of this chapter
shall be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation
for purposes of sections 216 and 217 . . . . Provided, That liquidated damages
shall be payable only in cases of willful violations of this chapter. In any action
brought to enforce this chapter the court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal
or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter,
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recover lost wages and benefits and an additional equal amount as "liq-
uidated damages" for "willful" violations of the Act.
1659
a. standards of wi/lfulness
Two standards of "willful" have emerged in federal courts to de-
termine an award of liquidated damages under the ADEA. One re-
quires only that the discriminatory discharge be voluntary, knowing or
intentional. The Third Circuit, in Wehr v. Burroughs Corp. 1660 enunci-
ated this standard of willfulness. In Wehr, the court held that a willful
ADEA violation did not require proof of an employer's knowledge of
the implications of its actions under the ADEA. The employer must
merely have knowingly and voluntarily, as opposed to inadvertently,
discharged the employee. 1661 The second, more stringent, standard re-
quires an employer's awareness of a possible ADEA violation. 662
In Kelly, the Ninth Circuit adopted the more relaxed standard for
"willful" violations of the ADEA. The employee in Kelly had success-
fully challenged his discharge under the ADEA. 1663 The district court
held that a "willful" violation had not occurred, and therefore, denied
the employee's request for liquidated damages. 1664 The Ninth Circuit,
however, rejected the lower court's definition of "willful" which re-
including without limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or
promotion, or enforcing the liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum
wages or unpaid overtime compensation under this section. Before instituting any
action under this section, the Secretary shall attempt to eliminate the discrimina-
tory practice. . ., and to effect voluntary compliance. . . through informal meth-
ods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion.
1659. Id Although willful violations are required for liquidated damages under the
ADEA, they are not required for such damages under the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(1976), which provides in part that "[amny employer who violates [this Act] shall be liable to
the employee[s]. . . in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid over-
time compensation. . . and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages."
1660. 619 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1980).
1661. Id at 283.
1662. See, e.g., Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 595 (10th Cir. 1980) (willful viola-
tion found where employer knew of possible impropriety under ADEA); Loeb v. Textron,
Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1020 n.27 (Ist Cir. 1979) (defining more stringent standard of willful).
See also Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307, 1310 (5th Cir. 1976), where the Fifth
Circuit quoted the district court's definition of "willful" as an intentional act done with
awareness of its "implication under a wage act." This definition was derived from a previ-
ous Fifth Circuit decision, Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, 458 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972). The Hays court did not expressly accept or reject the lower
court's definition of "willful" because the appeal addressed a different issue.
1663. 640 F.2d at 977. See supra notes 1646-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the facts of Kelly.
1664. 640 F.2d at 979.
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quired the employer's knowledge of ADEA implications. 1665 The court
noted that the definition applied by the district court had been derived
from a case interpreting "willful" under the FLSA statute of
limitations.
16 66
The Kelly court distinguished the willfulness required under the
FLSA statute of limitations from that required under the ADEA liqui-
dated damages provision. Under section 255(a) of the FLSA, 1667 ac-
tions must be brought within two years. If the employer's actions were
willful, however, the limitation period is three years. 668 The court ex-
plained that the three year provision was intended to prevent employ-
ers with knowledge of the FLSA from delaying employees' lawsuits by
misleading them as to their rights.
669
The court described liquidation damages under the ADEA as a
substitute for punitive damages and thus a deterrent to intentional vio-
lations of the ADEA167 ° It adopted the Wehr "knowing and volun-
tary" test of willfulness to determine awards of liquidated damages.1
67
1
The Ninth Circuit stated that the district court's standard of "willful"
would, in effect, encourage employers to know as little as possible
about the ADEA in order to avoid liability for liquidated damages.
672
It therefore concluded that the Wehr standard would best effectuate the
purposes of the ADEA and remanded the case for a determination of
liquidated damages under that standard.
1673
The Kelly court noted that the employee's evidence of discrimina-
tion might establish willfulness under the "knowing and voluntary"
test,1674 yet it did not foreclose the possibility that the lower court might
find that the discrimination was inadvertent.1675 The Ninth Circuit,
however, offered no guidance as to what would constitute an inadver-
tent discriminatory discharge. It adopted the Wehr standard of willful-
ness, which requires only that the discharge itself be voluntary rather
than accidental. 676 This test seems to render ADEA liquidated dam-
1665. Id at 979-80.
1666. Id at 979.
1667. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1976).
1668. Id.
1669. 640 F.2d at 979. Employers would only have reason to mislead or delay employees
when they realized that their actions may have violated an employment act. Id
1670. Id
1671. I.d at 980.
1672. I.d
1673. Id at 980-81.
1674. Id at 981.
1675. Id
1676. 619 F.2d at 283.
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ages automatic because it is difficult to imagine a situation where an
employer has accidentally "discharged" an employee. The employer,
therefore, bears a heavy burden in disproving willful ADEA claims.
b. availability of the FLSA "goodfaith" defense under the ADEA
The ADEA specifically incorporates sections 211, 216, and 217 of
the FLSA to enforce its anti-age discrimination provisions. 677 While
section 216(b) of the FLSA imposes on employers liability for liqui-
dated damages for all violations of the FLSA,1678 section 626(b) of the
ADEA limits awards of liquidated damages to "willful" violations of
the ADEA. 1679 Conversely, section 260 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of
1947 (PPA)168 grants courts discretion to deny or limit liquidated dam-
ages in FLSA actions where an employer shows that it acted in good
faith and reasonably believed it had not violated the FLSA. 16 81
The Fifth Circuit, in Hays v. Republic Steel Corp. ,1682 held that the
"good faith" provision of the PPA also applied to ADEA violations
because it amended the FLSA provisions incorporated into the
ADEA1 613 In a subsequent case, Lorillard v. Pons,1684 the Supreme
Court, in a footnote, explained that the good faith provision of the PPA
mitigated the automatic operation of the liquidated damages clause
with regard to all FLSA violations. 685 The Court further stated that
although sections 255 and 259 of the PPA 168 6 are expressly incorpo-
rated into section 626(e), 68 7 the ADEA makes no reference to section
260 of the PPA. 161 The Pons Court, therefore, suggested that the
FLSA good faith defense was not available in ADEA actions.
Although the Pons Court did not directly address the availability
1677. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976); see supra note 1658.
1678. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976); see supra note 1659.
1679. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
1680. Id § 260 provides in part:
In any action commenced. . . under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,.. if
the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving
rise to such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believ-
ing that his act or omission was not a violation of the [FLSA], . .. the court may,
in its sound discretion, award no liquidated damages or award any amount thereof
not to exceed the amount specified in section 216 of this title.
1681. Id
1682. 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976).
1683. Id at 1311-12.
1684. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
1685. Id at 581-82 n.8.
1686. 29 U.S.C. §§ 255, 259 (1976).
1687. Id § 626(e), amended as id § 626(e)(1) (Supp. III 1979), provides that "[s]ections
255 and 259 of this title shall apply to actions under this chapter."
1688. 434 U.S. at 581-82 n.8.
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of the FLSA good faith defense in ADEA actions, circuit courts have
relied on the Pons footnote to reject the Hays interpretation and to
hold that the FLSA good faith defense is not available under the
ADEA.'68 9 These circuit courts have concluded that the ADEA's will-
fulness test serves the same function as the good faith defense under the
FLSA1
690
In Kelly, the Ninth Circuit followed the recent trend pronouncing
the FLSA good faith defense inapplicable to ADEA violations. The
district court in Kelly denied liquidated damages because it found that
the employer's action fell within the good faith provisions of the Portal-
to-Portal Act.169 1 The Ninth Circuit, observing that the PPA was en-
acted before the ADEA, stated that Congress would have specifically
incorporated section 260 into section 626(b) if it intended it to ap-
ply.1692 The court found persuasive the recent reliance on Pons by
some circuits and held that the FLSA good faith defense was not appli-
cable to the liquidated damages provisions of the ADEA1
693
The Kelly court further doubted that an employer who willfully
violated the ADEA could nevertheless have acted in good faith.
1694
This observation, however, appears contradictory in view of the Ninth
Circuit's willful standard. Under its standard, a "willful" violation is a
voluntary, rather than an inadvertent, act of the employer and does not
require employer knowledge of ADEA implications. Conceivably, an
employer could voluntarily discharge an employee under a good faith
or reasonable belief that it was not violating the ADEA or FLSA,
whereas under the narrower standard of "willful," a "good faith" de-
fense would be difficult to prove because the employer would impliedly
have acted with the knowledge that its conduct may have violated the
ADEA.
1695
The ADEA's "willful" qualification, intended as a substitute for
1689. See, e.g., Goodman v. Heublein, Inc., 645 F.2d 127, 129-30 (2d Cir. 1981); Wehr v.
Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 279 n.5 (3d Cir. 1980); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003,
1020 (lst Cir. 1979).
1690. Goodman v. Heublein, Inc., 645 F.2d 127, 129 (2d Cir. 1981); Wehr v. Burroughs
Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 279 n.5 (3d Cir. 1980); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1020 (1st
Cir. 1979).
1691. 640 F.2d at 981.
1692. Id
1693. Id at 982.
1694. Id
1695. See, e.g., Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 595 (10th Cir. 1980) (finding of
willful violation with knowledge of ADEA consequences foreclosed employer's good faith
defense, even if court were to find that such defense is available under ADEA), rev'd in part
andremanded, 649 F.2d 1383 (1981).
1983]
LOYOL4A OF LOS ANGELES LAW. REVIEW [Vol. 16
the FLSA good faith defense, renders the Ninth Circuit's standard
questionable. A standard requiring a willful violation of the ADEA,
rather than a willful discharge, would better serve the function of the
"willful" provision for liquidated damages.
c. prejudgment interest under the ADEA
The ADEA provides that damages arising from violations of its
provisions are to be considered "unpaid minimum wages or unpaid
overtime compensation for purposes of sections 216 and 217 of [the
FLSA. '' 16 9 6 The Act further authorizes courts to "grant such legal or
equitable relief' appropriate to realize the purposes of the ADEA.1
697
Neither the ADEA nor the FLSA expressly authorizes awards of
prejudgment interest. In FLSA actions, however, courts have allowed
such awards. 1698 The recovery of interest has been justified on the the-
ory that a violating employer should not be unjustly enriched by the
use of the employee's money.1699 On the other hand, courts have not
allowed prejudgment interest where maximum amounts of liquidated
damages were awarded under section 216(b) of the FLSA. 1700 Because
liquidated damages may be viewed as compensation for delays in pay-
ment to employees, recovery of interest on unpaid wages and liqui-
dated damages would essentially grant employees double
compensation for the same damages.
170 1
Federal authority for awarding prejudgment interest in ADEA ac-
1696. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976); see supra note 1659.
1697. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
1698. See, e.g., Marshall v. Hope Garcia Lancarte, 632 F.2d 1196, 1199 (5th Cir. 1980)
(prejudgment interest recoverable in actions under § 217 of FLSA); Usery v. Associated
Drugs, Inc., 538 F.2d 1191, 1194 (5th Cir. 1976); McClanahan v. Mathews, 440 F.2d 320, 326
(6th Cir. 1971) (in FLSA § 216 actions where liquidated damages not awarded, interest must
be paid on back pay awards); Holtville Alfalfa Mills, Inc. v. Wyatt, 230 F.2d 398, 401 (9th
Cir. 1955); Marshall v. Gerwill, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 744, 755 (D. Md. 1980) (fairness dictates
court discretion to award prejudgment interest under FLSA); Marshall v. Duncan, 480 F.
Supp. 62, 64 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (award of prejudgment interest in actions under § 217 of
FLSA within sound discretion of court), modofed, 659 F.2d 1082 (6th Cir. 1981). But see
Barcellona v. Tiffany English Pub., Inc., 597 F.2d 464, 468-69 (5th Cir. 1979) (denied pre-
judgment interest as not recoverable under section 216 of FLSA); Landaas v. Canister Co.,
188 F.2d 768, 772 (3d Cir. 1951) (prejudgment interest not recoverable).
1699. McClanahan v. Mathews, 440 F.2d 320, 326 (6th Cir. 1971).
1700. See, e.g., Barcellona v. Tiffany English Pub, Inc., 597 F.2d 464, 468-69 (5th Cir.
1979); McClanahan v. Mathews, 440 F.2d 320, 326 (6th Cir. 1971) (denial of prejudgment
interest where court awarded liquidated damages held proper); Pedreyra v. Cornell Prescrip-
tion Pharmacies, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 936, 951 (D. Colo. 1979).
1701. See, e.g., Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 715-16 (1945) (denied
recovery of interest on mandatory liquidated damages awards under section 216(b) of FLSA
in a decision rendered before § 260 of Portal-to-Portal Act enacted giving courts discretion
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tions is strikingly scarce. In Hoffman v. Nissan Motor Corp. ,72 a dis-
trict court denied prejudgment interest to an employee who recovered
liquidated damages under section 626(b) of the ADEA 7°3 The Hoff-
man decision is consistent with FLSA cases awarding prejudgment in-
terest because none of these cases allowed liquidated damages.
7 °4
In Kelly, the Ninth Circuit held that awards of prejudgment inter-
est are available under the ADEA. 17 °0 The court upheld the district
court's award of prejudgment interest based on the ADEA provision
authorizing courts "to grant such legal or equitable relief. . . appropri-
ate to effectuate the purposes of [the Act]."17 06 The court also relied on
FLSA cases allowing prejudgment interest to support its holding. 7 7
The Kelly court, however, did not address the denial of prejudg-
ment interest in FLSA cases where liquidated damages were
awarded. 70 8 The absence of discussion leaves open the possibility that
the Ninth Circuit might authorize prejudgment interest in ADEA ac-
tions even when awards of liquidated damages are granted. Such a
result would unwisely allow double compensation because liquidated
damages and prejudgment interest serve essentially the same compen-
satory function.
d attorneys'fees on appeal
The ADEA authorizes an award of reasonable attorney fees to a
plaintiff successful at the trial level. 7' The appellate court, however,
retains discretion to award attorney fees for successfully litigated ap-
peals. 7 10 In ADEA cases, attorney fees are awarded on appeal to the
successful party where the complexity and time required to dispose of
the issues raised warrant reimbursement. 171  Because the appeal ad-
dressed complex issues of first impression, the Kelly court granted the
in awarding liquidated damages); McClanahan v. Mathews, 440 F.2d 320, 325-26 (6th Cir.
1971).
1702. 511 F. Supp. 352 (D.N.H. 1981).
1703. Id at 360.
1704. .d
1705. 640 F.2d at 982.
1706. Id (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976)). The district court awarded Kelly $27,000
for lost income and pension recovery. It also awarded eight percent prejudgment interest,
which the Ninth Circuit reduced to six percent on the agreement of the parties.
1707. 640 F.2d at 982.
1708. See supra text accompanying notes 1660-76.
1709. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976) incorporates id § 216(b), which in pertinent part provides:
"[Tihe court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff...
allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action."
1710. Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 594 F.2d 638, 643 (8th Cir. 1979).
1711. Montalvo v. Tower Life Bldg., 426 F.2d 1135, 1150 (5th Cir. 1970).
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employee's request for attorney fees and remanded the determination
of the award to the trial court. 1712 In calculating the attorney fees, the
Ninth Circuit directed the trial court to consider (1) the number of
hours of preparation, (2) the attorney's experience, (3) the number and
complexity of the issues, (4) the amount of wasted or duplicated effort,
and (5) the customary fees charges for equivalent litigation services in
the community.
17 13
e. deduction of unemployment compensation from back pay awards
Under section 626(b) of the ADEA, courts are entitled to grant the
relief they deem appropriate to further ADEA goals. 1714 Circuit courts
have acknowledged the district courts' discretion in determining
whether to offset unemployment compensation benefits from back pay
awards. 17
15
The Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co. ,1716 articulated
the "collateral source" rule in its holding that the National Labor Rela-
tions Board had not abused its discretion in declining to offset unem-
ployment compensation from back pay awards in an action filed under
the National Labor Relations Act. The Court reasoned that unemploy-
ment compensation is a benefit awarded by the state and it therefore
stems from a collateral source rather than directly from employer
funds. 17 17 Some courts have relied on Gulett's "collateral source" rule
in refusing to deduct unemployment compensation from back pay
awards. 17
18
1712. 640 F.2d at 986.
1713. Id. In support of its itens for consideration the court cited Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569
F.2d 1231, 1247-50 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Johnson v. Georgia
Highway, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 477 F. Supp.
1012 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aft'dasmodfied, 619 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1980).
1714. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
1715. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 625-26 (10th Cir. 1980) (not abuse of
discretion to decline offsetting unemployment benefits from back pay awards in ADEA ac-
tion); Merriweather v. Hercules, Inc., 631 F.2d 1161, 1168 (5th Cir. 1980) (affirmed lower
court's deduction of unemployment benefits from Title VII award); Marshall v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 1977) (trial court had not abused discretion
in denying request to offset unemployment compensation from ADEA award); EEOC v.
Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local No. 638, 542 F.2d 579, 592 (2d Cir. 1976) (alfirmed de-
duction of unemployment compensation from Title VII award), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911
(1977); Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394,401 (3d Cir. 1976) (affirmed district
court's offset of unemployment insurance from Title VII award), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041
(1977).
1716. 340 U.S. 361 (1951).
1717. Id. at 364.
1718. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 624-26 (10th Cir. 1980); Marshall v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 1977); Pedreyra v. Cornell Pre-
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In Naton v. Bank of California, 1719 the Ninth Circuit indicated its
approval of the "collateral source" rule in ADEA actions. 172" The
court held, however, that the district court had not erred in deducting
unemployment compensation payments from an award of back pay
damages.17 2 1 The bank employee in Naton was terminated at the age
of sixty-one pursuant to a bank-wide personnel reduction. 722 In the
action filed by the employee under the ADEA, the jury found that age
was a determining factor in the employee's discharge. 723 The district
court subtracted the employee's unemployment compensation benefits
from his back pay award because the employee and employer had con-
tributed to the state fund providing the benefits. The employee chal-
lenged the deduction as improper because the unemployment
compensation benefits were issued from a collateral source.
1724
The Ninth Circuit expressed uncertainty about the application of
the "collateral source" rule where the employer has contributed to the
unemployment compensation fund. 172  The court, however, did not
hold the rule applicable. It held that regardless of a finding that the
benefits were from a collateral source, the district court could elect to
deduct the unemployment benefits under its discretionary authority as
granted to the courts by section 626(b) of the ADEA. 172 6 The Ninth
Circuit's recognition of the district court's authority to deduct unem-
ployment compensation from damages under the ADEA indicates that
it would also uphold a lower court's election not to deduct such benefits
from ADEA awards, provided they derive from a collateral source.
f. deduction of sick pay and vacation allowances
Another issue arising under ADEA section 626(b) is whether
courts may appropriately refuse to subtract benefits derived from the
scription Pharmacies, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 936, 951 (D. Colo. 1979); Abron v. Black & Decker
Mfg. Co., 439 F. Supp. 1095, 1114-15 (D. Md. 1977), mod#Fed, 654 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1981);
Tidwell v. American Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424,437-38 (D. Utah 1971). But see Buchholz v.
Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 706,712-13 (ED. Wis. 1978); Coates v. National Cash Reg-
ister Co., 433 F. Supp. 655, 663 (W.D. Va. 1977); Chernoff v. Pandick Press, Inc., 440 F.
Supp. 822, 826-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841,
843-45 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Bishop v. Jelleff Assoc., 398 F. Supp. 579, 597 (D.D.C. 1974);
Schulz v. Hickok Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208, 1217 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
1719. 649 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1981).
1720. Id at 699.
1721. Id at 700.
1722. Id at 693.
1723. Id at 698.
1724. Id at 699.
1725. Id
1726. Id at 700.
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employer, rather than from a collateral source. Where the benefits are
earned by the employee and accrued to him or her as employment
compensation, it has been held that no offset from damages should be
made. 1727 If, however, the benefits are incidental to termination, l e.,
would not have been received if the employee had not been terminated,
offset from back pay awards is appropriate. 
1728
The Naton court adopted the earned or incidental to termination
dichotomy in deciding whether subtraction of sick pay and vacation
pay from back pay awards was appropriate under the ADEA. After his
termination an employee received sick leave and vacation pay benefits
from the employer. 1729 The employer's policy required that these bene-
fits be used prior to retirement or to facilitate early retirement. Sick
leave and vacation pay benefits were not due as additional monetary
compensation upon retirement. 730 In Naton, the employee appealed
the district court's deduction of the amount received for sick pay and
vacation pay from the employee's damage award.
173 1
The Ninth Circuit noted that if upon retirement the employee
would have been entitled to compensation for the accrued sick pay and
vacation pay in addition to his regular pay, such benefits would have
been part of his compensation and the district court would have erred
in deducting them from the award. 732 The court, however, found that
the employer's evidence supported the conclusion that the employee
would not have received the sick pay and vacation pay but for his ter-
mination. It therefore held that the deduction was proper. 173
The Ninth Circuit, in the Naton decision, suggested that a district
court's discretion under the ADEA is limited in that benefits received
entirely from the employer can be included in damages only if the em-
ployee would have been entitled to the awards as additional employ-
ment compensation. In turn, such cases depend on the particular
employer's policies with respect to the noncollateral benefits in ques-
1727. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 626 (10th Cir. 1980) (no offset of
vacation allowance earned and accrued by employee).
1728. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 626 (10th Cir. 1980) (offsetting of
severance pay made by employer correct because it would not have been made if termina-
tion had not occurred and thus went beyond the relief necessary to make plaintiff whole);
Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 317 (6th Cir. 1975); Coates v. National Cash
Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655, 663 (W.D. Va. 1977); Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421
F. Supp. 841, 844-45 (W.D. Okla. 1976).







tion. This approach is functional since it relieves from potential double
liability those employers who seek to allay an employee's discharge
through severance pay and other benefits.
g. recovery for emotional distress
Pursuant to section 626(b) of the ADEA, courts have discretion to
grant legal or equitable relief "including without limitation judgments
compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion, or enforcing the
liability for amounts deemed unpaid minimum wages." 1734 While this
section seemingly provides courts with broad remedial powers, circuit
courts addressing the issue have denied recovery of damages for pain
and suffering under the ADEA.
17 35
Such courts reason that the ADEA's remedial scheme is intended
to prevent psychological damage arising from age-related discrimina-
tion by compelling employer compliance with the Act. Under the
scheme, employer noncompliance entitles the employee to reinstate-
ment or promotion, lost wages, and, in some cases liquidated damages.
Courts indicate that these remedies are sufficient to alleviate psycholog-
ical damage. 17 36 Moreover, courts have found allowance of damages
for pain and suffering as not consistent with the ADEA's purpose of
resolving alleged violations through mandatory administrative concili-
ation efforts. 17 3 7 Thus, courts conclude that to award emotional dam-
1734. 29 U.S.C. § 262(b) (1976).
1735. See Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 284 (3d Cir. 1980); Walker v. Petit
Constr. Co., 605 F.2d 128, 129-30 (4th Cir.), mod#fed sub nom. Frith v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc., 611 F.2d 950 (1979); Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292, 1296 (4th Cir.
1979); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1241 (3d Cir. 1977); Dean v. American See. Ins.
Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1038-39 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Rogers v.
Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 839-42 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1022 (1978).
For district courts denying recovery for emotional distress, see Douglas v. American
Cyanamid Co., 472 F. Supp. 298, 304 (D. Conn. 1979); Riddle v. Getty Ref. & Mktg. Co.,
460 F. Supp. 678, 680 (N.D. Okla. 1978); Quinn v. Bowmar Publishing Co., 445 F. Supp.
780, 784 (D. Md. 1978); Ellis v. Philippine Airlines, 443 F. Supp. 251, 252 (N.D. Cal. 1977);
Postemski v. Pratt and Whitney Aircraft, 443 F. Supp. 101, 103 (D. Conn. 1977); Fellows v.
Medford Corp., 431 F. Supp. 199, 202 (D. Or. 1977); Sant v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 424 F. Supp.
621, 622 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
1736. See Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292, 1295 (4th Cir. 1979); Dean v.
American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1038 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066
(1978); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
1737. The ADEA directs that administrative remedies must be pursued prior to the filing
of a private suit. Specifically, individuals who intend to sue must give the Secretary of La-
bor 60 days notice of such intent. The Secretary then must attempt to remedy the unlawful
practice through informal conciliation methods. 29 U.S.C. § 262(d) (1976). If such efforts
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ages in private litigation would encourage employees to avoid agreeing
to administrative resolutions, in which such damages are not
provided. 1738
Some district courts, on the other hand, have allowed recovery for
emotional distress.1739 Those courts believe that a broader remedial
reading of the discretion granted under section 626(b) of the ADEA
better reflects the purposes of the Act and Congressional intent. 1740
InNaton, the Ninth Circuit held that damages for pain and suffer-
ing could not be recovered under the ADEA.' 741 The Naton court af-
firmed the district court's order striking the employee's prayer for
damages for pain and suffering. 1742 The court reasoned that such dam-
ages would obstruct the conciliation process, and it failed to find that
Congress had authorized them by implication. Further, the court
viewed the remedies expressly authorized by the ADEA as sufficient to
achieve the Act's purpose.
743
J Employee Retirement Income Security Act
1. Offset of workers' compensation from pension payments
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act174 4 (ERISA) was
passed in 1974 in response to an extensive study of private pension
plans throughout the country. 745 Congress engineered this complex
system of laws to protect beneficiaries who in the past had been de-
prived of benefits because pension plans had terminated due to lack of
fail, the Secretary may bring suit under the ADEA. The employee's right to bring a private
action terminates when the Secretary files suit. 29 U.S.C. § 262(c) (1976).
1738. See Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292, 1296 (4th Cir. 1979); Dean v.
American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1038-39 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066
(1978); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
1739. See, e.g., Wise v. Olan Mills, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 542, 545 (D. Colo. 1980); Hassan v.
Delta Orthopedic Medical Group, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (E.D. Cal. 1979); Flynn v.
Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 463 F. Supp. 676, 678 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Morton v. Sheboy-
gan Memorial Hosp., 458 F. Supp. 804, 807 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co.,
445 F. Supp. 706, 713-14 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 419 F.
Supp. 1123, 1132-33 (N.D. III. 1976), on rehearing, 432 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
1740. See, e.g., Wise v. Olan Mills Inc., 485 F. Supp. 542, 544 (D. Colo. 1980); Hassan v.
Delta Orthopedic Medical Group, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (E.D. Cal. 1979).
1741. 649 F.2d at 699.
1742. Id at 698.
1743. Id at 699.
1744. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976 and Supp. Ill 1982).
1745. Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980).
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funds. 7 46 ERISA attempts to insure the receipt of promised benefits to
employees upon their retirement once those benefits become vested,'74 7
although it also establishes minimum vesting requirements entitling
more employees to benefits. 748
Under section 203(a), ERISA entitles employees to a "nonforfeit-
able" right to their retirement benefits once they satisfy the statute'sminimum vesting requirements. 74 9 Section 203(a), however, specifi-
cally exempts certain pension plan provisions from the nonforfeiture
rule. 750 The Act defines "nonforfeitable" as the participant's uncondi-
tional claim to benefits under a pension plan "which is legally enforce-
able against the plan."''7 1  In Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp. ,1752 the Supreme Court emphasized that "nonforfeit-
able" means that the "claim to the benefit," not the benefit itself, is
"'unconditional' and 'legally enforceable against the plan.' "'1753 The
Court further stated that forfeiture contemplates a total loss of benefits;
therefore, "nonforfeitable" describes the "quality of the participant's
right to a pension rather than a limit on the amount he may col-
1746. Id at 362; see 29 U.S.C. 1001(a) (1976), which announces in pertinent part the Con-
gressional policy behind ERISA:
The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee
benefit plans in recent years has been rapid and substantial; ... that the continued
well-being and security of millions of employees and their dependents are directly
affected by these plans; ... that owing to the lack of employee information and
adequate safeguards concerning their operation, it is desirable in the interests of
employees... and the free flow of commerce, that disclosure be made and safe-
guards be provided with respect to the establishment, operation, and administra-
tion of such plans; . . .that despite the enormous growth in such plans many
employees with long years of employment are losing anticipated retirement bene-
fits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in such plans; ... that owing to the
termination of plans before requisite funds have been accumulated, employees and
their beneficiaries have been deprived of anticipated benefits; and that it is there-
fore desirable ... that minimum standards be provided assuring the equitable
character of such plans and their financial soundness.
1747. 446 U.S. 359, 375 (1980).
1748. See 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1976).
1749. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1976) provides: "Each pension plan shall provide that an em-
ployee's right to his normal retirement benefit is nonforfeitable upon the attainment of nor-
mal retirement age and in addition shall satisfy the requirements of paragraph (1) and (2) of
this subsection."
1750. See 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(3) (1976) which delineates plan provisions which are not to
be treated as forfeitures. For example, there are pension plan provisions denying payment
upon the participant's death under § 1053(a)(3)(A); suspending payment while the employee
is employed under § 1053(a)(3)(B); applying plan amendments retroactively under
§ 1053(a)(3)(C); and, allowing forfeiture of benefits in certain circumstances when employ-
ees who have vested rights in less than fifty percent of their benefits withdraw their
mandatory contribution benefits from the plan under § 1053(a)(D)(i)-(iv).
1751. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(19) (1976).
1752. 446 U.S. 359 (1980).
1753. Id at 371.
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lect."'1754 In sum, the term "nonforfeitable" does not itself guarantee a
particular level of benefits to participants under a pension plan.
Section 204 of ERISA enumerates the minimum benefit accrual
requirements for pension plans. 1755 Under this section, Congress has
preserved, with certain limitations, the commonly employed practice of
integrating an employee's benefits received under the Social Security
Act 1756 and the Railroad Retirement Act 1757 with pension funds to
compute benefit levels.
175
InAlessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. ,1759 the Supreme Court held
that pension provisions which offset workers' compensation benefits
from retirement benefits were authorized under ERISA. Alessi in-
volved consolidated cases in which the plaintiffs challenged pension
terms that subtracted workers' compensation payments from their pen-
sions. In both cases, the district courts found the offsets in violation of
section 203(a) of ERISA as unauthorized forfeitures. 760 Furthermore,
both district court judges held that an IRS-issued Federal Treasury
Regulation authorizing such offsets was invalid because it contravened
the purpose of ERISA.17 6 1 The employers successfully obtained a re-
versal of the district court rulings from the Third Circuit in their con-
solidated appeal.
1762
1754. Id at 372-73.
1755. 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (1976).
1756. 42 U.S.C. § 401 (1976).
1757. 45 U.S.C. § 231 (1976).
1758. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1054(b)(1)(B)(iv), 1054(b)(1)(C), 1054(b)(1)(G) (1976). But see 29
U.S.C. § 1056(b) (1976), which limits such integration, in that "a plan may not decrease
benefits of such participant by reason of any increase in the benefit levels payable under
Title II of the Social Security Act. . . or the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937 .. if such
increase takes place after September 2, 1974."
1759. 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
1760. Id at 508.
1761. Id at 508-09; see 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.41 l(a)-4(a) (1980), which provides that "nonforfeit-
able rights are not considered to be forfeitable by reason of the fact that they may be re-
duced to take into account benefits which are provided under the Social Security Act or
under any other [flederal or [s]tate law and which are taken into account in determining
plan benefits."
Although the Treasury Regulation was issued under an antiforfeiture provision appear-
ing in the Internal Revenue Code pension plan requirements (26 U.S.C. § 411 (a) (1976)),
ERISA expressly authorized application of Treasury Department Regulations issued under
the tax code pension provision to analogous provisions of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1202(c)
(1976), which provides that "[r]egulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury under
sections 410(a), 411, and 412 [of Title 26]. . . shall also apply to the minimum participation,
vesting, and funding standards set forth in . . . [this chapter which includes 29 U.S.C.
§ 1053(a)]."
1762. Id at 509. Buczynski v. General Motors, 616 F.2d 1238 (3d Cir. 1980), aJ'd, 451
U.S. 504 (1981).
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The plaintiffs argued that because workers' compensation offsets
were not among those specifically exempted from the nonforfeitable
rule, they were illegal forfeitures. The Supreme Court, however, dis-
agreed and affirmed the Third Circuit's decision.
1763
The Court initially pointed out that the plaintiffs' argument by-
passed the threshold issue of defining what benefits, once vested, be-
come nonforfeitable under section 203(a). 1764 It then held that the
statutory definition of "nonforfeitable" guarantees only a legally en-
forceable "claim" to benefits, not a particular amount or method of
calculation. The Court observed that ERISA leaves the determination
of benefit levels and calculations to the parties creating the plan, pro-
vided they are within the parameters set forth under section 204 of the
Act.
1765
The Court then turned to the benefit computation practices per-
missible under section 204. The Court noted ERISA's authorization of
pension fund integration1766 with benefits derived under the Social Se-
curity Act and the Railroad Retirement Act.1767 The Court concluded
that Congress, in authorizing such integration, did not find it necessary
to exempt the practice under section 203's nonforfeiture provision.
Specifically, the Court found the employers' offsetting provision similar
to the integration system in that the employees were entitled to an es-
tablished pension level, whereas pension payments were reduced by the
amount received through workers' compensation. 1768 The Court con-
cluded, therefore, that Section 203 was equally inapplicable to the chal-
lenged offsetting practice. Furthermore, the Court found the practice
to be consistent with the Act's goal of promoting private pension plans,
while allowing certain avenues of cost reduction for employers.
1769
The Court then upheld the validity of the challenged IRS regula-
tion 770 which authorized workers' compensation reductions in pension
1763. 451 U.S. at 509.
1764. Id,xat 511.
1765. Id at 511-12.
1766. Id at 514. The Alessi Court defined integration as "a calculation practice under
which benefit levels are determined by combining pension funds with other income streams
available to the retired employees." Id Such a system allows the employees as a group to
benefit from a higher pension level and the employer to maintain the high level by drawing
from other sources which depend on employer contributions. Under an integration system,
however, an individual employee might attain the established pension level through a com-
bination of the pension payments and payments from other sources. Id
1767. Id
1768. Id at 516.
1769. Id at 516-17.
1770. 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.41 l(a)-4(a) (1980). See supra note 1761 for the text of the regulation.
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benefits covered under ERISA. The Court concluded that because the
integration was not per se prohibited by Section 203(a), it was not lim-
ited to Social Security and Railroad Retirement benefits. 1771 The
Court also rejected the claim that workers' compensation disability
awards were too different from Social Security and Railroad Retire-
ment awards to justify similar integration. The Court noted that both
the Social Security and Railroad Retirement Acts provide disability
benefits, while ERISA made no distinction among the types of benefits
which could be integrated. 77 z
In addition, the Court stated that Congress was aware of IRS rul-
ings which allowed workers' compensation offsets within the realm of
permissible integration and chose to leave them in effect when ERISA
was passed. 1773 In conclusion, the Court held that workers' compensa-
tion offsets from pension payments are permitted under ERISA be-
cause "Congress ...permitted integration along the lines already
approved by the IRS, which had specifically allowed pension benefit
offsets based on workers' compensation."' 1774
2. Normal retirement age under section 203
Under section 203(a) of ERISA, 1775 pension plans must provide
that employees have a "nonforfeitable" right to retirement benefits
upon their reaching "normal retirement age." The term "normal re-
tirement age" is defined in 29 U.S.C. section 1002(24)1776 as the earlier
of: (A) the normal retirement age defined in the plan or (B) the later of
(i) age sixty-five or (ii) ten years after the participant joined the plan.
Section 203(a) has been construed to require that pension benefits
be nonforfeitable only upon reaching the normal retirement age.
Therefore, section 203(a) does not require payment of benefits to em-
ployees before they reach normal retirement age.
177 7
In Hum v. Retirement Fund Trust of Plumbing, Etc. ,1778 the Ninth
Circuit adopted the stance that section 203(a) provides no protection
from benefit suspension before the employee reaches normal retirement
1771. 451 U.S. at 518.
1772. Id. at 519.
1773. Id at 519-20.
1774. Id at 521.
1775. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1976).
1776. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(24) (1976).
1777. See, e.g., Riley v. MEBA Pension Trust, 452 F. Supp. 117, 120 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 586
F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1978); Capocci v. General Motors Corp., 444 F. Supp. 1306, 1308 (D.
Hawaii 1978).
1778. 648 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1981).
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age. 1779 The plaintiff employee was receiving early retirement benefits
which were suspended while he held office as a union official. During
the period of suspension, the employee was fifty-eight and fifty-nine.
The employee's suit was dismissed by the district court for failure to
state a claim under section 1053(a) of ERISA1
780
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's judgment. The pen-
sion plan to which the plaintiff belonged designated sixty-five as the
normal retirement age. The court held, therefore, that sixty-five was
the normal retirement age for section 1053(a) purposes. Because the
employee was not sixty-five during the benefit suspension period, the
court concluded that no claim was stated under section 1053(a).""
3. Preemption of state law
a. state law indirectly related to pension plans
Section 514(a) of ERISA 1782 provides that ERISA's provisions
shall preempt any state law relating to employee benefit plans. This
provision illustrates Congress' intent to place certain pension plan reg-
ulations under exclusive federal control.
InAlessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. ,17s3 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether ERISA's preemption provision invalidated
a New Jersey Worker's Compensation Act which prohibited the offset
of worker's compensation awards from employee retirement bene-
fitS.'78 4 The Alessi Court interpreted ERISA to allow such offsets, 1785
which placed the New Jersey statute in conflict with ERISA.
The district courts both held that ERISA did not preempt the New
Jersey statute. The Third Circuit reversed and construed section 514(a)
as having broad preemptive parameters. 786 According to the Third
Circuit, the New Jersey statute was preempted by section 203(a) of ER-
ISA because its sole purpose was to establish a statutory requirement
1779. Id at 1253-54.
1780. Id at 1253.
1781. Id
1782. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this sub-
chapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all state laws
[that] relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title
and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title.
1783. 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
1784. Id at 511.
1785. Id at 516. TheAessi Court found that workers' compensation offsets from pension
benefits did not violate the anti-forfeiture provision of section 203(a) of ERISA. Id
1786. Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 616 F.2d 1238, 1250 (3d Cir. 1980), aft'd sub
nom Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
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for pension plans. 1787
The Supreme Court also determined that the New Jersey statute
was preempted by ERISA, but found it unnecessary to define the outer
parameters of the preemptive provision. Rather, the Court reasoned
that the New Jersey statute related to pension plans within the meaning
of section 514(a) because it eliminated a method of calculating pension
benefits which is permitted under ERISA. 1788 ERISA's preemption
provision was held to apply equally to state laws which indirectly inter-
fere through workers' compensation laws, as it does to direct intrusions
under pension regulation statutes. Furthermore, because the Alessi
pension plans were products of collective bargaining, the Court found
preemption further justified by the federal interest in eliminating state
interference in labor-management negotiations.
1789
b. state domestic laws impliedly exemp/edfrom
ERJSA -s preemption pro vision
ERISA's preemption provision states generally that the Act super-
sedes state laws relating to employee benefit plans. 1790 Another ERISA
provision, section 206(d)(1), prohibits assignment or alienation of pen-
sion plan benefits. 179 1 Plan participants and plan administrators have
relied on ERISA's preemption and nonalienation provisions to chal-
lenge the enforcement of state court orders to pay part of participants'
pension benefits directly to their ex-spouses to satisfy state court ali-
mony and support orders or divorce decrees. Circuit courts have thus
far rejected such challenges.
The Ninth Circuit, in Stone v. Stone 1792 and Carpenters Pension
Trust for Southern Calfornia v. Kronschnabel,1793 held that ERISA
does not preempt state court orders requiring pension plan trustees di-
rectly to pay a participant's ex-spouse his or her community property
share of the participant's pension benefits. 1794 Neither opinion offered
any rationale why ERISA did not preempt such state court orders.
Rather, in both cases the court found controlling the Supreme Court's
summary dismissal of the appeal of the California state court case, In re
1787. Id See 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1976).
1788. 451 U.S. at 524.
1789. Id at 525-26.
1790. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976).
1791. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1976).
1792. 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981).
1793. Id at 745.
1794. Id at 742; id at 748.
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Marriage of Campa.1795 The court felt bound by Campa's holding that
ERISA does not preempt the enforcement of community property
laws. 
1796
Prior to Stone and Kronschnabel, the Second Circuit, in American
Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Merry,79 7 had rejected a literal reading
of ERISA's preemption provision and held that state court garnish-
ments of pension benefits to satisfy court-ordered family support pay-
ments are "impliedly excepted" from ERISA's preemption and
nonalienation provisions. 1798 The strong public policy and state inter-
est in enforcing family support obligations weighed heavily in the
court's conclusion that Congress did not intend ERISA to preempt this
area of state law. 1799
In Operating Engineers' Local 428 Pension Trust Fund v. Zambor-
sky, 18°0 the Ninth Circuit adopted the implicit exemption approach de-
scribed in the Second Circuit's Merry decision. 180 ' In Zamborsky, the
trustees of a union pension fund appealed a district court's refusal to
enjoin enforcement of a state court's garnishment order requiring the
trustees to pay a participant's ex-spouse part of the participant's bene-
fits to satisfy court-ordered spousal payments. 180 2 The original divorce
decree awarded the plan participant his employment benefits as his sole
separate property, and also ordered him to pay his ex-wife $200 per
month in spousal support. 18 0 3 When the participant stopped paying the
required spousal support, his ex-wife obtained a state garnishment or-
der requiring the pension plan trustees to pay her the accrued pay-
ments, as well as $200 per month thereafter from the participant's
benefits.1804  The trustees relied on ERISA's preemption and
nonalienation provisions in seeking an injunction against the garnish-
ment order. 180 5 Although a temporary restraining order was issued, the
1795. 89 Cal. App. 3d 113, 152 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 1028
(1980).
1796. 632 F.2d at 742; id at 747-48. The Kronschnabel court discussed the impact of
Supreme Court summary dismissals of state court appeals for want of a substantial federal
question and concluded that the dismissal of Campa operated as a decision on the merits.
Therefore, the decision prevented lower courts from reaching opposite conclusions than
those reached in the dismissed case. Id at 747.
1797. 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979).
1798. Id at 121.
1799. Id at 122-24.
1800. 650 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1981).
1801. Id at 198-99.
1802. Id. at 197.
1803. Id
1804. Id at 198.
1805. Id
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district court denied the trustees' subsequent request for a permanent
injunction.
18 0 6
The Ninth Circuit held that the garnishment order was impliedly
exempted from ERISA's preemption provision.180 7 The court stated
that the principles of domestic relations law, specifically, that the sub-
stance of domestic relations law is determined by the states and that
when state law in this area conflicts with federal statutes, review is lim-
ited to determining whether "Congress has 'positively required by di-
rect enactment that state laws be pre-empted.'"1808 Further, the
domestic relations law "must do 'major damage' to 'clear and substan-
tial' federal interests before. . .[it] will be overridden."'' 80 9 Neither a
direct enactment nor major damage to federal interests was found by
the court regarding the garnishment at issue. Rather, the court con-
cluded that, owing to ERISA's concern for family welfare, to preempt
this garnishment order would be contrary to ERISA's purpose.18 10
The trustees then argued that the garnishment conflicted with ER-
ISA's nonalienation provision and was thus impliedly preempted. The
court, however, found no such conflict.'18  It concluded that compli-
ance with both the federal and state laws was possible. A literal inter-
pretation of section 206(d)(1), the court held, merely required that
"[e]ach pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the
plan may not be assigned or alienated."'' 8 1 2 The trustees satisfied sec-
tion 206(d)(1) by requiring that benefits not be assigned. Furthermore,
the court did not find the garnishment to be an "obstacle" to the con-
gressional purpose of ensuring that benefits be available for retirement
purposes.18 1
3
In further support of its conclusion, the court reasoned that Con-
gress intended greater rights to attach to the spousal maintenance
award here than to the community property awards of Stone and
Kronschnabel because spousal support is related to need, while com-
munity property awards are not.18 1 4
The court's literal interpretation of section 206(d)(1) is problem-
atic. Essentially, the court held that the trustees' duty under section
1806. Id at 197-98.
1807. Id at 200.
1808. Id at 199 (quoting Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979)).
1809. 650 F.2d at 199.
1810. Id at 199-200.
1811. Id at 200-01.
1812. Id at 201 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1976)).
1813. 650 F.2d at 201.
1814. Id at 202.
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206(d)(1) is discharged once they insert a nonalienation provision in
the pension plan. A more reasonable reading would invest trustees
with responsibility to see that the provision is enforced. Otherwise,
they have no responsibility to protect participants' benefits from any
state garnishment order. Concededly, state garnishment orders unre-
lated to family obligations might be challenged under the preemption
provision. However, participants would have more security knowing
that the nonalienation provision is substantially more than a mere pro-
vision in the plan.
Congress could not have intended nor should courts hold that
most provisions in ERISA may be complied with merely by inclusion
in a pension plan without a concomitant obligation of enforcement. In
fact, ERISA gives participants a cause of action when the provisions or
terms of a pension plan have been violated by trustees or employers. 8 1 5
Furthermore, the trustees in Merry voiced concern that compliance
with a state garnishment order similar to that in Zambrosky would sub-
ject them to breach of fiduciary duty claims under section 404(a)(1) of
ERISA.8 16 There is no doubt, therefore, that ERISA itself recognizes
that the nonalienation provision is more than a mere formality.
Rather than resolving the trustees' conflicts challenge with a literal
compliance approach to the nonalienation provision, it would have
been wiser for the Ninth Circuit to follow the Second Circuit's holding
in Merry that state garnishment orders for spousal support are im-
pliedly exempted from ERISA's nonalienation provision. 17
K. Sherman Anti/rust Act
1. Labor exemption from the antitrust laws
a. statutory labor exemption
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act,""'8 enacted in 1890, pro-
hibits combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade. The Supreme
Court's early application of the antitrust laws to enjoin union activities
as unlawful restraints of trade 1819 caused strong union protest. In re-
sponse, Congress passed the Clayton Act of 1914.182° Section 20 of the
Clayton Act8 21 prohibits federal courts from issuing injunctions in la-
1815. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1976).
1816. 592 F.2d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 1979); 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1976).
1817. See 592 F.2d at 121-25.
1818. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
1819. See, e.g., Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (Danbury Hatters Case).
1820. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976); 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976).
1821. 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976).
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bor disputes between employees and employers. Under section 6 of the
Act,1822 labor organizations and their members are immunized from
antitrust liability when they are lawfully pursuing legitimate labor
objectives.
The relief accorded labor under the Clayton Act was severely un-
dermined by the Supreme Court in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deer-
ing,18 21 which restricted the Clayton labor exemptions to union
activities between employees and their own employer. This narrow in-
terpretation of section 20 of the Clayton Act rendered the Act substan-
tially ineffective in curtailing court issued injunctions against union
activities.
The subsequent enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act1824 in
1932 provided more effective protection for labor organizations. Under
section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,18 25 federal courts are prohibited
from issuing injunctions against certain union activities arising in the
context of labor disputes. Section 51826 of the Act further restricts the
injunctive power of the courts by prohibiting injunctions against the
activities enumerated in section 4 when they are issued on the ground
that those participating in the labor dispute "are engaged in an unlaw-
ful combination or conspiracy." The term "labor dispute" is broadly
defined under section 13(c) 18 27 to include "any controversy concerning
terms or conditions of employment." In response to Duplex Printing,
section 13(c) of Norris-LaGuardia expressly extends the scope of labor
disputes beyond the "proximate relation of employer and em-
ployee."'' 1 28 In the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress also announced
the public policy of the United States favoring employees' freedom to
engage in labor activities. 1829
In United States v. Hutcheson,8 3° the Supreme Court interpreted
the Norris-LaGuardia Act expansively to effectuate Congress' efforts to
stop the use of the antitrust laws as a vehicle for interference in labor
activities. The Hutcheson Court held that the interplay between the
two Acts demonstrated Congress' intent to include the labor activities
defined in the Norris-LaGuardia Act within section 20 of the Clayton
1822. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976).
1823. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
1824. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).
1825. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976).
1826. 29 U.S.C. § 105 (1976).
1827. 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1976).
1828. Id
1829. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
1830. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
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Act, thus exempting labor organizations from the antitrust act.1831 The
Court articulated the rule that the statutory labor exemption to the an-
titrust laws under section 20 would apply "so long as a union acts in its
self-interest and does not combine with non-labor groups." 832
Despite the general rule denying antitrust exemption to union
combinations with nonlabor groups, the Supreme Court has extended
the statutory exemption to union regulation of independent contractors
when the contractors' practices affect wages and working conditions of
union members. 1833 Under such circumstances the independent con-
tractors are held to be "labor groups" involved in "labor disputes"
within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
18 34
In American Federation of Musicians v. Carroll,18 35 the Supreme
Court articulated the rule that independent contractors are "labor
groups" involved in "labor disputes" if there is "job or wage competi-
tion or some other economic interrelationship affecting legitimate
union interests between the union members and the independent con-
tractors."'' 836 In Carroll, the Court upheld union regulations requiring
independent booking agents to adopt certain business practices
promulgated by the union. The agents were intermediaries through
which union musicians obtained orchestra engagements. The Carroll
Court held that these agents had an "economic interrelationship" with
the union musicians and that the union regulations were reasonably
related to the union's interest in maintaining union wage scales.
1837
The Supreme Court applied the Carroll test to union regulations
imposed on theatrical agents similar to those involved in Carroll. In
H.A. Artists & Associates, Inc. v. Actors' Equity Association,838 the
agent regulation system, which was challenged as a violation of anti-
trust laws, was initially adopted by the union in 1928 to curtail the
widespread agent abuses against union members. Essentially, the
union required agents who represented union members to obtain union
1831. Id. at 236.
1832. Id at 232.
1833. See, e.g., American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99 (1968); Local 24 of
the Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 362 U.S. 605 (1960) (Oliver I1); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959) (Oliver I); Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake
Valley Co., 311 U.S. 91 (1940).
1834. American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99, 106 (1968) (quoting Carrol v.
American Fed'n of Musicians, 241 F. Supp. 865, 887 (1965)).
1835. 391 U.S. 99 (1968).
1836. Id. at 106 (quoting Carroll v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 241 F. Supp. 865, 887
(1965)).
1837. Id at 115.
1838. 451 U.S. 704, 721-22 (1981).
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licenses. The licenses established restrictions on agents' commissions,
set scale wage levels for union members, provided for termination of
agency contracts if the agents failed to procure employment for union
members within a specified period of time, and required agents to pay
franchise fees.
1839
The Supreme Court held that agent regulations are included
within the labor exemption to the antitrust laws. 8 40 The Court clari-
fied the Carroll test by confirming the rule that where no direct wage or
job competition exists between the union and the group it regulates, the
independent group is a labor group if "there is 'some. . .economic
interrelationship affecting legitimate union interests.' "1841
The agents' role in the entertainment industry was the basis for the
Court's conclusion that the economic interrelation test was satisfied.
8 42
The Court observed that agents are an essential vehicle through which
union actors and actresses procure employment. They perform essen-
tially the same services that unions perform for their members in most
nonentertainment industries, such as negotiating wages, and terms and
conditions of employment for the actresses and actors they represent.
Furthermore, because agents' fees are a negotiated percentage of mem-
bers' wages, the Court concluded that without union regulation of
agency fees the union would be unable to maintain minimum wages for
its members. It therefore held that the regulations fell within the labor
exemption because they were necessary to ensure payment of minimum
wages to union members. 8 43 The Court also held that the regulations
promoted legitimate union interests. 844
Although the Supreme Court upheld the agency's regulatory
scheme in H.A. Artists, it held that the franchise fees levied upon the
licensed agents were an impermissible component of the regulatory sys-
tem.8 45 The Court's decision appeared to be grounded both on its fail-
ure to find any cases holding that a union may impose fees on agents
who represent union members8 46 and on Carroll, which did not ex-
pressly sanction union extraction of such fees. The union's claim that
the fees served basic purposes of the system by covering its administra-
tion costs was held to be an inadequate justification. The Court sug-
1839. Id at 709-10.
1840. Id at 714-15.
1841. Id at 721-22 (citing Carroll, 391 U.S. at 106).
1842. 451 U.S. at 721-22.
1843. Id at 720 (citing Carroll, 391 U.S. at 112).
1844. Id at 721.
1845. Id at 722.
1846. Id at 722 n.29.
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gested that the revenues lost from discontinuing the fees could be offset
by increasing members' dues. It also concluded that elimination of the
franchise fees would not necessarily affect any legitimate union
interest. 847
In a separate opinion, Justice Brennan 848 concurred in all the ma-
jority's holdings with the exception of its treatment of the franchise
fees. Brennan, instead, agreed with the Second Circuit's holding that
the fee, which was incident to a legitimate regulatory scheme and com-
mensurate in amount with the purpose for which it was sought, was
consistent with the labor policies which justify the labor antitrust ex-
emptions. Therefore, in Brennan's view, the fee system should also
have been entitled to exemption from antitrust challenge."8 49
In the final analysis, HA. Artists confirms the Supreme Court's
position, first set forth in Carroll, that union regulation of agents in the
entertainment industry falls within the labor exemption from the fed-
eral antitrust laws. The Supreme Court in HA. Artists, however, went
further than the Carroll Court when it expressly excluded a union's
extraction of fees covered by agents from the antitrust exemption af-
forded to regulatory schemes.
b. nonstatutory labor exemption
As previously stated, the statutory labor exemption to the antitrust
laws generally does not extend to union combinations with nonlabor
groups. 850 To effectuate the policy favoring collective bargaining
agreements, however, a limited nonstatutory exemption is accorded to
agreements between unions and employers which restrict competition
in wages and working conditions.8 "1 On the other hand, the antitrust
exemption does not extend to union-employer agreements that allow
employers to violate the antitrust laws.
1852
More recently, in Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfit-
1847. Id. at 722.
1848. Id. at 723 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan's
opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Marshall.
1849. Id. at 723-24.
1850. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975);
UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 662 (1965); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325
U.S. 797, 811 (1945); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941).
1851. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. at 622; Local
189 Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 691 (1965) (plurality opin-
ion of White, J.).
1852. See, e.g., UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (union conspiracy with large
coal producers to set industry-wide wages at levels forced smaller producers out of business);
Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945) (electrical contractors agreement to
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ters Local 100,1853 the Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, re-
fused to extend the nonstatutory antitrust exemption to union-
employer agreements that excluded nonunion subcontractors from
competing in the job market sought by the union. In Connell, the
union was a party in a multiemployer bargaining agreement with a
mechanical contractors association. At issue, however, was the union's
effort to obtain agreements from the general building contractors to
subcontract their mechanical work to mechanical subcontractors that
had collective bargaining agreements with the union. Those general
contractors who refused to sign the agreement were picketed into sub-
mission. Moreover, the union expressly disclaimed interest in organiz-
ing the current employees of the general contractors.
85 4
Although the union's organizational goals were legal, the Court
held that the methods used were not immune from antitrust chal-
lenge."'- The union's method had the effect of sheltering members of
the subcontractors association from outside competition in areas cov-
ered by the agreements between the union and the general contractors.
The Court further found that competition would also be eliminated in
those areas covered by the multiemployer agreement which were unre-
lated to wages; hours and working conditions. The union's success in
obtaining agreements from general contractors would have given the
union control over the market for mechanical subcontracting while
those same agreements made nonunion subcontractors ineligible to
compete for portions of the available work.' 5 6 The Court concluded
that the anticompetitive effects of the agreements constituted a direct
restraint on the market and contravened antitrust policies to an extent
not justified by national labor policies.
8 57
In California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated General Con-
tractors of California, Inc. ,1858 the Ninth Circuit addressed an unusual
case in which an employers' organization claimed antitrust immunity
for its conspiracy against union subcontractors. Two unions in Califor-
nia State Council filed an antitrust action against an employers' organi-
zation, the Associated General Contractors of California (AGCC),
purchase equipment solely from union manufacturers who sold only to union contractors
created industry-wide price and wage increase).
1853. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
1854. Id at 619.
1855. Id at 625.
1856. Id at 623-25.
1857. Id at 625.




alleging that the AGCC had conspired with other industry employers
to boycott union signatory subcontractors. The district court viewed
the unions' charge as one arising against an employer in a normal labor
dispute and, therefore, dismissed the claim as unactionable under fed-
eral antitrust law. 859
On appeal, the unions claimed that the AGCC's conduct was simi-
lar to that which subjected the union in Connell to antitrust liability.
The AGCC, however, maintained that employer conspiracies against
unions are not subject to the antitrust laws. Even if actionable, AGCC
claimed that its conduct fell within the labor antitrust exemption. 6 °
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the unions' characterization of the
AGCC's conduct as "virtually the obverse" of the Connell situation in
its attempt to coerce employers to hire only nonunion subcontrac-
tors.18 61 The court therefore held that the Connell rationale was
equally applicable to permit cognizance of the unions' antitrust claim.
It reasoned that AGCC's conduct constituted a potential restraint of
trade by excluding union subcontractors from competing in a portion
of the job market.
861
The court further held that AGCC's activity did not fall within the
labor antitrust exemption. 8 63 The exemption had never been extended
to nonabor groups' anticompetitive conduct. 8 ' The court concluded
that such an extension would contravene the pro labor purpose behind
the exemption.8 65 The court observed that because the statutory labor
exemption does not apply to union-nonlabor conspiracies, it should not
extend to anticompetitive behavior on the part of employer groups act-
ing alone.
8 66
The AGCC's conspiracy was also found to be unentitled to the
nonstatutory labor exemption to the antitrust laws.'867 The Ninth Cir-
cuit construed Connell as limiting the nonstatutory labor exemptions to
union-employer agreements concerning wages and working conditions.
AGCC's conduct involved neither an agreement with a union nor
wages or working conditions.
8 6
1859. Id at 529-30.
1860. Id at 530.
1861. Id at 532.
1862. Id
1863. Id. at 533-34.
1864. Id at 533.
1865. Id
1866. Id
1867. Id at 536.
1868. Id
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In dissent, Judge Sneed voiced concern that the threat of antitrust
liability might force all of the employers involved to sign collective bar-
gaining agreements with the union. 8 69 He also disagreed with the ma-
jority's conclusion that the unions' claim was actionable under the
antitrust laws. According to Judge Sneed, the only injury suffered by
the unions was impairment of their organizational efforts to represent a
greater portion of the work force.18 70 Such injuries, he concluded, are
actionable only under the labor laws.
187 1
The AGCC's subsequent petition for a rehearing and rehearing en
banc was denied. The denial of the petition was accompanied by an
explanation designed to alleviate AGCC's fears that the decision might
discourage multiemployer bargaining. 872 The court pointed out that a
vast difference exists between employer agreements designed to pro-
mote collective bargaining and those that seek destruction of collective
bargaining by denying union subcontractors access to the market.1
8 7 3
The former type of employer agreement can be certified through
NLRB and union approval. The court further pointed out that mul-
tiemployer agreements are not in themselves violations of antitrust
laws. Only those with anticompetitive designs or effects can trigger an-
titrust liability.
8 74
2. Union standing to bring private antitrust action
Section 4 of the Clayton Act 8 75 authorizes private antitrust actions
for treble damages by "any person. . . injured in his business or prop-
erty" resulting from a violation of the antitrust laws. This remedy was
enacted to provide compensation for private injuries and to further the
antitrust goal of free competition.
18 76
Read literally, the statute grants relief to any person injured by
reason of an antitrust violation. Unwilling to allow the vast litigation
1869. Id at 541 (Sneed, J., dissenting).
1870. Id at 542.
1871. Id
1872. Id at 543.
1873. Id
1874. Id at 543-44.
1875. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States. . . without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover three-
fold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
1876. In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 199 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 919 (1974); In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122,
128 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
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envisioned by section 4's broad language, circuit courts have devised
various standing doctrines restricting the availability of private anti-
trust actions. The Supreme Court, however, has offered no guidelines
for antitrust standing, nor has it directly taken issue with the circuits
over their restrictive readings of section 4.1877
The "direct injury" test employed by some circuits requires that
the plaintiff suffer "direct" rather than remote or indirect injury from
antitrust violations in order to have standing to sue. 18 78 This test tends
to focus on the relationship between the antitrust violator and the vic-
tim, and denies standing to injured claimants who are separated from
the violator by an intermediate victim. The Ninth Circuit has criticized
this approach because it forecloses valid claims merely because of the
presence of intermediate victims. 18 79 The tendency in some "direct in-
jury" circuits to automatically deny standing to those labeled "credi-
tor," "landlord," "lessor," "franchisor," and "supplier" has also been
criticized. 880
The Third and Sixth Circuits have recently adopted a more flex-
ible "zone of interests" test to determine antitrust standing.8 8 ' Under
this approach, standing is conferred on those who suffer injuries which
are "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected" by the anti-
trust laws.88 2 The Third Circuit has stated that the test is met if the
"plaintiff is one 'whose protection is the fundamental purpose of the
antitrust laws.' "1883 This approach seeks to lessen the plaintiffs' bur-
den in establishing standing, and to further the underlying policy con-
siderations of the antitrust laws.
1877. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263 n.14 (1972) (acknowledg-
ment in dictum that "lower courts have been virtually unanimous in concluding that Con-
gress did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that
might conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation."); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395
U.S. 642, 646-47 (1969) (while noting that Court of Appeals had denied recovery for similar
incidental injuries from antitrust violations, Court allowed plaintiff recovery as principal
victim of defendant's illegal pricing practices but no test for standing offered).
1878. See, e.g., Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971); Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383, 395
(6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963).
1879. See In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 127 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
1880. Id
1881. See Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 552 F.2d 90, 99 (3d Cir.), cer. denied,
434 U.S. 823 (1977); Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 505-08
(3d Cir. 1976); Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1148-49 (6th Cir. 1975).
1882. Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1152 (6th Cir. 1975).
1883. Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 1976)
(quoting In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 125 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973)).
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The Ninth Circuit applies the "target area" test, which falls some-
where in between the stricter "direct injury" approach and the more
lenient "zone of interests" test. Under the "target area" approach, a
plaintiff has standing to sue if he or she is "within the target area of the
antitrust violation" and "was not only hit, but was aimed at."1884 More
precisely, plaintiffs have standing if they are within the area of the
economy which the antitrust violators reasonably could have foreseen
would be adversely affected by their illegal activities.
1885
Several circuits have held that unions may have standing to sue
under the antitrust laws. 18 86 Unions have been brought within section
4's injury to "business" on the theory that they are in the business of
representing and organizing employees who may be injured by em-
ployer conspiracies directed against the union.
8 87
In California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated General Con-
tractors, Inc. ,1888 the Ninth Circuit applied the target area test to deter-
1884. Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 365 (9th Cir. 1955).
1885. Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 425 (9th Cir. 1975); In re Western Liquid
Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 199 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974).
1886. See Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172, 1176-77 (5th Cir. 1976);
Carpenters v. United Contractors Assoc., 484 F.2d 119, 121-22 (6th Cir. 1973); International
Ass'n of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers v. United Contractors Assoc., 483
F.2d 384, 390-91 (3d Cir. 1973), modfled, 494 F.2d 1353 (1974); Nichols v. Spencer Int'l
Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332, 334-35 (7th Cir. 1967).
1887. Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172, 1176 (5th Cir. 1976); Interna-
tional Ass'n of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers v. United Contractors As-
soc., 483 F.2d 384, 394 (3d Cir. 1973), modFled, 494 F.2d 1353 (1974).
1888. 648 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 51 U.S.L.W. 4139 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983). On certi-
orari, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's determination that the union had
standing to maintain a private damage action under section 4 of the Clayton Act. According
to the Court, a union in its representational and organizational capacities is rarely a class
protected by the antitrust laws, especially when the dispute is with employers with whom the
union bargains. Id. at 4145. Protections afforded union activities instead stem from labor's
antitrust exemption and federal labor law. Applying these principles, the Courtthen con-
cluded that because the plaintiff union had a longstanding collective bargaining relationship
with the defendant employers, "labor-market interests" predominated and the asserted in-
jury could not be characterized as the type that antitrust laws were designed to redress. Id
See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1977), wherein the
Court set forth the antitrust standing test applied by the Associated General Contractors
court.
The Court also acknowledged that the "directness of the injury" was an additional fac-
tor to be utilized in determining antitrust standing. The union's injury to its "business activ-
ities" was then characterized as merely an indirect consequence of any harm suffered by
those directly affected by the coercive behavior. 51 U.S.L.W. at 4145. Despite allegations of
the employers' intent to harm the union, the Court held that the union's allegations of conse-
quential harm were insufficient as a matter of law to support an antitrust action. Id at 4146.
Other factors pertinent to the Court's decision were: the existence of more direct victims of
the conspiracy; the potential of double recovery and complex damage apportionment; the
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mine the unions' standing to sue employers for treble antitrust
damages. In Caifornia State Council, two unions brought an antitrust
action against an employer organization's alleged conspiracy to boycott
subcontractors with collective bargaining agreements with the union.
The Ninth Circuit held that the unions had satisfied the target area
test of standing. The unions' complaint satisfied factual causation be-
cause it alleged that the employers' conspiracy injured the unions' busi-
ness of organizing employees, negotiating and policing collective
bargaining agreements, and obtaining employment for union mem-
bers. 889 Applying the target area test, the court held that the unions
had standing to sue on the grounds that the injury to the unions' busi-
ness was not only foreseen by the employers, but was, in fact, the in-
tended result of the boycott. 890
In a footnote, the court expressed its willingness to apply the more
flexible "zone of interests" standing test introduced in the Third and
Sixth Circuits.' 89' The court further suggested in footnotes that, in fu-
ture cases, plaintiffs denied standing under the traditional target area
test should still be given standing if to do so would further the policies
underlying the antitrust laws. 8 92
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Sneed asserted that the injury to the
unions' organizational and representative efforts was not actionable
under the antitrust laws. Although Judge Sneed cited no authority, he
claimed that such injury to unions was actionable only under the labor
laws. 18 93 Therefore, the dissenting judge apparently espouses the posi-
tion that unions do not have standing to sue under the antitrust laws.
According to Judge Sneed, only the union signatory employers
who were victimized by the boycott had standing to sue because they
were directly harmed by the boycott. He viewed the injury to the un-
ions as analogous to the merely incidental injury which employees of a
speculativeness of the union's alleged injury; and the nature of the union's injury. Id at
4145-46.
In a dissent, Justice Marshall, criticized the majority's holding, asserting that it resulted
in an unwarranted restriction of the broad remedial language of section 4 of the Clayton
Act. Id at 4147 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He particularly objected to the import of the
majority's decision in the instant case, Le., foreclosing the intended victim of the conspiracy,
the union, from proving its injury as a result of the antitrust violation. In Marshall's view,
antitrust violators should not escape liability merely because harm is indirectly rather than
directly inflicted on the intended victim. Id (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1889. 648 F.2d at 537.
1890. Id. at 538.
1891. Id. at 538 n.18.
1892. Id
1893. Id at 542 (Sneed, J., dissenting).
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boycotted employer might suffer. Therefore, he argued that allowing
standing to the unions here would, in effect, also allow standing to the
employees of the boycotted employers, 1894 a result which would be con-
trary to previous Ninth Circuit decisions which denied antitrust stand-
ing to injured employees.
895
Judge Sneed's attempt to analogize the unions' position in this case
to that of employees who are incidentally injured by the boycott fails.
His analysis ignores consideration of both the motive and the intended
victim of the antitrust activity. The majority's finding that the unions
were the target aimed at more accurately analyzes the situation.
The employers here were boycotted solely because of their union
affiliation. By refusing union signatory employers access to the job
market, the defendant employers were attempting to strike at the un-
ions. By way of illustration, if one of the union employers managed to
extricate itself from the collective bargaining agreement with the union,
it would no longer be a target of the boycott. Conversely, a nonunion
employer not previously boycotted would become a boycott target if it
signed a collective bargaining agreement with one of the unions.
Therefore, it does not follow that the unions' injury is merely an inci-
dental, rather than intended, result of the boycott. More precisely, the
unions were the primary target aimed at through the indirect route of
the boycott of union employers.
Judge Sneed appears to favor an approach closer to the "direct
injury" test of antitrust standing, at least for unions. On the other
hand, the majority of the court indicated its preference for a more leni-
ent standing test. As decided by the majority, furthermore, unions may
be appropriate plaintiffs in private antitrust actions under the target
area standing test in the Ninth Circuit.
3. Federal preemption over state antitrust laws
In Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Seamfltters Local
100,1896 the Supreme Court addressed federal preemption of state anti-
trust laws in antitrust actions involving labor organizations. The Court
set forth the rule that federal preemption is required when the union
1894. Id at 543.
1895. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. E. & J. Gallo Winery Co., 604 F.2d 645, 646 (9th Cir. 1979)
(farm-worker employees of grower-employer victimized by price discrimination denied
standing because their alleged injury of reduced availability of work was too remote from
activities of defendants); Contreras v. Grower Shipper Vegetable Ass'n, 484 F.2d 1346, 1347
(9th Cir. 1973) (standing denied to agricultural workers who claimed reduced work availa-
bility resulting from defendants' price fixing), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 932 (1974).
1896. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
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activity at issue "is closely related to [union] organizational goals."'' 97
This broad federal preemption in cases involving union organizational
efforts was advocated because the federal antitrust statutes, unlike
many state antitrust laws, have been specially tailored to create the
proper accommodation between federal labor and antitrust policies in
an effort to avoid conflict with the labor policy favoring employee or-
ganization.'8 98 The Connell Court, however, did not completely fore-
close the possibility that some union agreements with nonlabor groups
may be subject to state antitrust laws. The controlling factor according
to the Court "is the risk of conflict with the NLRA or with federal labor
policy."'
1899
In California State Council, the Ninth Circuit relied on Connell to
hold that the unions' state antitrust claims against the employers' con-
spiracy were preempted by federal antitrust laws.' Although the
court acknowledged that the Connell holding was limited to union or-
ganizational activities, it found the Connell reasoning equally applica-
ble on the issue of preemption of the unions' state antitrust claims. 190 '
No further explanation was given for the court's cursory conclusion.
The court apparently attached no significance to the fact that it
was presented with the reverse situation of that before the Connell
Court. Connell involved an employer's antitrust action against a union,
challenging its method of organization, 90 2 whereas California State
Council involved an antitrust suit brought by two unions against an
employers' organization that was waging a boycott against union signa-
tory employers. 90 3 The California State Council court, furthermore,
made no attempt to determine whether application of the state antitrust
laws to the employer conspiracy would constitute a risk of conflict with
federal labor policy. Connell suggested that such an analysis should be
applied where the challenged activity does not involve union organiza-
tional efforts. Without additional explanation, the California State
Council decision suggests that the Ninth Circuit has construed Connell
to give broad federal preemption of state antitrust laws whenever a la-
bor union is a party to the suit.
1897. Id at 637.
1898. Id at 636.
1899. Id at 637.
1900. 648 F.2d at 540.
1901. Id
1902. 421 U.S. at 618-19.
1903. 648 F.2d at 529.
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